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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 葉疏(Shu Ye) | |
dc.contributor.author | Yi Zhang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 張怡 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T16:10:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2025-07-22 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-07-22 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-06-01 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/62805 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本文選取2014-2017 間中國深滬兩市A股上市公司披露 R&D 投入強度與高管激勵數據的1228 家企業作為研究樣本,實證檢驗 R&D 投入強度與企業價值(TOBINQ)的關係,並進一步分析高管激勵是否對R&D投入強度與企業價值有調節效應。並在此研究基礎上,根據企業所有權性質不同及所屬行業分類不同,將樣本分為國營企業及私營企業、歸屬於高科技行業企業及歸屬於非高科技行業企業兩組樣本,分別對兩組樣本的高管激勵的調節效應進行研究分析。研究企業在不同的所有權性質及行業分類下,高管激勵對 R&D 投入強度與企業價值的調節效應是否有所差異。
本文研究結果表明: (1)R&D 投入強度與當期企業價值為正相關關係。 (2)R&D 投入強度對企業價值的影響存在正向的滯後效應,該滯後效應至少存在兩期,且在滯後一期達到最佳,隨後開始減弱。 (3)高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵對 R&D 投入強度與當期企業價值的關係均具有正向的調節作用,企業可以通過建立適當的高管激勵機制來強化 R&D 投入強度與當期企業價值的正相關關係。 (4)從高管激勵的調節效益來看,高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵皆為半調節變量;根據企業所有權性質不同,高管激勵的調節效應也存在差異。在私營企業中,高管薪酬激勵與股權激勵皆為半調節變量,即高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵既直接作用於企業價值,也能夠強化R&D 投入強度與企業價值的正相關關係。在國營企業中,高管薪酬激勵及股權激勵均對R&D 投入強度與企業價值的關係不具調節效應。 在歸屬於高科技行業的企業中,高管薪酬激勵及股權激勵-持股對R&D 投入強度與企業價值關係的調節效應並不顯著,高管股權激勵-激勵計劃為半調節變量。在歸屬於非高科技行業的企業中,高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵皆為半調節變量。 最後,根據本文的實證結果,從高管激勵的角度提出如何促使企業加大研發投入,提高企業價值的建議,並指出本文的不足及展望。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | With 1,228 companies that disclose R&D input intensity and executive incentive data from listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai between 2014 and 2017 as the research sample, this paper aims at empirically testing the relationship between R&D input intensity and enterprise value (TOBINQ), and it further analyzes whether executive incentives have the regulatory effect on R&D investment intensity and enterprise value. On the basis of the above research, according to the different nature of the ownership of the enterprise and the different classification of the industry, this paper divides the sample into two groups as state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, enterprises belonging to high-tech industries and enterprises belonging to non-high-tech industries, and studies and analyzes the regulation effect of the sample's executive incentives respectively. It aims at studying whether there are differences in the regulatory effect of R&D input intensity and enterprise value by executive incentive under the different ownership nature and industry classification.
The results of this paper show that: (1) R&D input intensity is positively correlated with current enterprise value. (2) There is a positive lag effect on the impact of R&D input intensity on enterprise value. The lag effect has at least two phases, and it reaches the best in the first phase of lag, and then begins to weaken. (3) Executive compensation incentives and equity incentives have a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between R&D investment intensity and current enterprise value. Enterprises can strengthen the positive correlation between R&D investment intensity and current enterprise value by establishing appropriate executive incentive mechanisms. (4) From the perspective of the adjustment benefits of executive incentives, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives are semi-regulated variables; according to the different nature of enterprise ownership, there are also differences in the regulatory effects of executive incentives. In the private enterprises, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives are semi-regulated variables, that is, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives directly affect the enterprise value, and it can also strengthen the positive correlation between R&D investment intensity and enterprise value. In the state-owned enterprises, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives have no regulatory effect on the relationship between R&D input intensity and enterprise value. In the enterprises belonging to the high-tech industry, the adjustment effect of executive compensation incentives and equity incentive-shareholding on the relationship between R&D investment intensity and enterprise value are not significant. The equity incentive-incentive plan is a semi-regulated variable. While in the enterprises belonging to non-high-tech industries, the executive compensation incentives and equity incentives are both semi-regulated variables. Finally, according to the empirical results of this paper, from the perspective of executive incentives, this paper puts forward suggestions on how to encourage enterprises to increase R&D investment and improve enterprise value, and the shortcomings and prospects of this paper are also presented. | en |
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dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
摘 要 i Abstract iii 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景及研究意義 1 1.1.1 研究背景 1 1.1.2 研究意義 3 1.2 研究內容與研究框架 5 1.2.1 研究內容 5 1.2.2 研究框架 6 1.3 研究方法 6 第二章 理論分析與文獻綜述 8 2.1 概念界定 8 2.1.1 R&D投入 8 2.1.2 企業價值 9 2.1.3 高管及高管激勵 10 2.2 相關理論 12 2.2.1 委託-代理理論 12 2.2.2 激勵理論 13 2.2.3 技術創新理論 15 2.3 文獻綜述 16 2.3.1 關於R&D投入與企業價值 16 2.3.2 關於高管激勵與R&D投入 18 2.3.3 關於高管激勵與企業價值 19 2.3.4 高管激勵、R&D投入與企業價值之間的關係 21 2.3.5 相關文獻評述 23 第三章 假設提出與研究設計 24 3.1 研究假設提出 24 3.1.1 R&D投入與企業價值間相關性的假設 24 3.1.2 高管激勵對R&D投入與企業價值間相關性的調節作用的假設 25 3.2 樣本選擇和數據收集 31 3.3 變量定義 32 3.3.1 被解釋變量 32 3.3.2 解釋變量 32 3.3.3 調節變量 33 3.3.4 控制變量 34 3.4 回歸模型 37 第四章 實證研究 40 4.1 描述性統計分析 40 4.1.1 企業價值描述性統計分析 40 4.1.2 R&D投入強度描述性統計分析 41 4.1.3 高管激勵描述性統計分析 43 4.1.4 其它變量描述性統計分析 46 4.2 相關性分析 50 4.3 R&D投入強度與企業價值關係的回歸分析 52 4.3.1 R&D投入強度對當期企業價值的影響 52 4.4 高管激勵對R&D投入強度與企業價值關係的調節效應回歸分析 54 4.4.1 高管薪酬激勵對 R&D 投入強度與企業價值關係的調節效應回歸分析 54 4.4.2 高管股权激励-持股对 R&D 投入强度与企业价值关系的调节效应回归分析 60 4.4.3 高管股權激勵-股權激勵計劃對 R&D 投入強度與企業價值關係的調節效應回歸分析 64 4.4 實證結果總結 68 第五章 結論與建議 71 5.1 研究結論 71 5.2 政策建議 71 5.3 研究侷限與展望 72 參考文獻 74 附 录 79 图目录 图1 1研究框架 6 圖3 1 調節變量識別檢驗過程 27 圖3 2 調節變量分類 27 圖3 3 同質調節變量及純調節變量概念模型 28 圖3 4半調節變量概念模型 28 表目录 表2 1企業價值衡量方式 10 表3 1 樣本企業分佈情況 32 表3 2 變量總述表 36 表4 1 各年度企業價值描述性統計分析 40 表4 2 按所有權性質分類的企業價值描述性統計分析 41 表4 3 按所屬行業分類的企業價值描述性統計分析 41 表4 4 各年度R&D投入強度描述性統計分析 42 表4 5 按所有權性質分類的R&D投入強度描述性統計分析 42 表4 6 按所屬行業分類的R&D投入強度描述性統計分析 43 表4 7 各年度高管股權激勵情況 43 表4 8 各年度高管激勵描述性統計分析 44 表4 9 按所有權性質分類的高管激勵描述性統計分析 45 表4 10 按所屬行業分類的高管激勵描述性統計分析 46 表4 11 各年度其它變量描述性統計分析 47 表4 12 按所有權性質分類的其它變量描述性統計分析 48 表4 13 按所屬行業分類的其它變量描述性統計分析 49 表4 14 相關性分析 51 表4 15 R&D投入強度與企業價值的回歸結果 52 表4 16 高管薪酬激勵分層回歸結果 54 表4 17 不同所有權性質高管薪酬激勵分層回歸結果 56 表4 18 不同行業分類高管薪酬激勵分層回歸結果 58 表4 19 高管股權激勵-持股分層回歸結果 60 表4 20 不同所有權性質高管股權激勵-持股分層回歸結果 61 表4 21 不同行業分類高管股權激勵-持股分層回歸結果 63 表4 22 高管股權激勵-股權激勵計劃分層回歸結果 64 表4 23 不同所有權性質高管股權激勵-高管股權激勵計劃分層回歸結果 65 表4 24 不同行業分類高管股權激勵-高管股權激勵計劃分層回歸結果 67 表4 25假設驗證結果綜述 69 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 高管激勵對R&D投入與企業價值關係的影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The effect of executive incentives on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise value | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王全三(Quan-San Wang),王瑄(Xuan Wang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | R&D 投入,企業價值,高管激勵,調節效應, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | R&D input,enterprise value,executive incentives,regulatory effects, | en |
dc.relation.page | 80 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000909 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-06-01 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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