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標題: | 董事、執行長間之社會網絡與薪酬品質 Director-CEO Social Network and Compensation Quality |
作者: | Kun-Jie Lian 連堃傑 |
指導教授: | 許文馨 |
關鍵字: | 社會網絡,薪酬品質,薪酬績效敏感度, Social network,Compensation quality,Pay-performance sensitivity, |
出版年 : | 2013 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本文旨在研究董事與執行長(以下稱CEO)間社會網絡(social network)對薪酬品質的影響。董事與執行長間社會網路所帶來的影響,存有兩種不同的觀點:有些認為社會連結(social ties)會使董事會較為被動,且削弱董事會的監督功能 (Dey & Liu, 2010; Hwang & Kim, 2009)。若董事與CEO間存有社會連結,董事對CEO的忠誠度會超過對股東的忠誠度 (Morck, 2007)。這些友誼連結也能用來擴充CEO的權力,使CEO能提升個人意志來影響董事會對自身利益的決策 (Conyon & Read, 2004; Harris & Helfat, 2007)。相較之下,社會連結能消除個人與社會團體間的距離,並能增加信任、忠誠、利他行為與資訊分享 (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Westphal, 1999)。「提供建議」已被視為董事會參與的一種重要形式,而CEO也將更願意向友善的董事會尋求建議與諮詢。董事與CEO之間的社會連結能增加建議的品質,使董事會的偏好與CEO的偏好更加緊密連結 (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999)。
除了「虛擬變數」衡量社會網絡的方法延伸,我另外設計出衡量「董事與執行長間社會網路」的兩個新指標:「有多少公司」與「有多少年」。本研究發現,董事與CEO間的專業社會連結(professional social ties)能降低CEO的薪酬,並提升CEO薪酬與會計、股票報酬間連結敏感度。 This study examines the effect of director-CEO social network on CEO compensation quality. There are alternative views on the influence of direct-CEO social network. Some argue that social ties can promote board passivity and weaken board oversight (Dey & Liu, 2010; Hwang & Kim, 2009). If directors are socially tied to CEO, directors may place their loyalty to the CEO above their loyalty to shareholders (Morck, 2007). These friendship ties can also be used to extend the CEO’s power which could influence board decision-making to his own benefit (Conyon & Read, 2004; Harris & Helfat, 2007). On the contrary, social ties diminish social distance between the individual and some social group, and increase trust, loyalty, altruism, co-operation, and information sharing (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Westphal, 1999). Provision of advice has been recognized as a potentially important form of board involvement, and CEO may be more willing to seek counsel and advice from more “friendly” boards. Director-CEO social ties may increase the quality of the advice that the board provides and make the board’s preferences more closely aligned with those of the CEO (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999). Extending from current research that measure the social network using an indicator variable, I design two new measures: “the number of firms” and “the number of years” involved in the director-CEO social networks. This study finds that director-CEO professional social ties can reduce CEO compensations and improve pay-performance sensitivity using both accounting and stock performance measures. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/62703 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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