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標題: | 過額配售機制對IPO公司原始股東的影響 The Impact of Over-allotment Option on Initial Shareholders |
作者: | Shu-Hung Wang 王舒虹 |
指導教授: | 姜堯民 |
關鍵字: | 過額配售機制,IPO,穩定價格操作,投資人誘因,承銷, Over-allotment option,Initial public offering,Investors’ incentive,Stabilization,Underwriting, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本研究以2013年1月1日至2019年12月31日間公開發行的293家公司做為樣本,探討過額配售機制是否有利於提供股數供承銷商作過額配售的原始股東。研究結果顯示(1)當過額配售比例增加,不論是以IPO前一日興櫃收盤價或承銷價格計算的首日報酬都將下降。(2)當過額配售的比例增加會降低投資人參與公開申購與競價拍賣的意願。(3)過額配售機制與投資人參與公開申購與競價拍賣的意願為非線性關係且當公司採用過高比例的過額配售會降低投資人的投資意願。本研究發現當公司採用過額配售機制,並未傳遞正面的訊號於投資人,反而,當過額配售的比例增加會降低IPO公司的首日報酬,且採用的比例過高會抑制投資人參與公開申購與競價拍賣的意願。 This study examines the impact of over-allotment option (OAO) on initial shareholders. Using 293 firms commit initial public offering issued from 2013 to 2019, the study shows that (1) when OAO increases, the first day return of IPOs which is calculated based on underwriting price or the closing price of TPEx before IPO would decrease. (2) when OAO increase would restrain investors to participate public subscription and competitive auction. (3) the relationship between OAO and investors’ incentive is nonlinear and IPOs using higher OAO ratio would not attract investors to participate their subscription and competitive auction. We find that when IPOs adopt OAO would not deliver positive signal to investor to increase their investment incentive. However, the OAO decreases the first day return of IPOs and restrain investor’s desire to participate public subscription and competitive auction. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/62650 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202000937 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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