設置薪酬委員會對董監薪酬與公司績效關聯之影響

Abstract

本文以2010及2011年台灣資本額100億元以上之上市公司財務資料為樣本，探討董監薪酬與公司績效之關聯性。2011年台灣正式實施薪酬委員會制度，要求上市、上櫃與興櫃公司於該年度設置薪酬委員會，故本文亦探討薪酬委員會之設置是否確實能達到當初之立法目的，強化董監薪酬與公司績效之關聯性。實證結果發現：(1)董監薪酬與公司績效呈顯著正向關係 (2)公司規模、外資持股比例與董事會結構亦為董監薪酬之影響因素 (3)設置薪酬委員會對董監薪酬與公司績效之關聯性無顯著影響，公司對於薪酬委員會之設置僅為適法性之遵循。 本文進一步將樣本分為稅後淨利為正之公司與稅後淨利為負之公司，稅後淨利為正之公司其董監薪酬影響因素大致上與以全樣本進行分析之結果一致；對於稅後淨利為負之公司而言，董監薪酬之影響因素僅剩公司規模與董事會結構，其董監薪酬與公司績效無顯著關聯性，且要求其設置薪酬委員會亦無法使其董監薪酬與公司績效呈正相關。

We investigate the relationship between director compensation and firm performance over 2010-2011 by using Taiwan listed companies whose capital are more than 10 billion Taiwan dollars as the sample for this study. In 2011, Financial Supervisory Commission asked all public companies to establish compensation committee, so we also investigate whether setting compensation committee could enhance the relationship between director compensation and firm performance. The empirical results show that compensation of directors is positively and significantly associated with firm performance. Firm size, the percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors and board structure are also the factors of determining director compensation. The setting of compensation committee has no effect on the relationship of director compensation and firm performance. We also use net income to split the sample into two sub-samples. Using the companies whose net income is positive as the sample, the outcome is the same with the result mentioned above. But for the companies whose net income is negative, we found that the factors which influence director compensation only include firm size and board structure. These firms’ director compensations are not affected by firm performance, and setting compensation committee also doesn’t make director compensation and firm performance related with each other.