公司總部地理區位對於董事會與小股東間代理問題影響之研究

Abstract

本篇研究致力於探討公司總部地理區域位置對於董事會與小股東之間的代理問題之影響。本篇文章從Taylor (2010) 的模型出發，提供一個指標來衡量董事會與小股東之間的代理問題，進一步根據1991年到2010年的實證資料，探討此代理問題與公司總部地理區域位置的關係。我們發現公司總部遠離大都會地區的公司，因其侷限了小股東監督及了解公司營運狀況的能力，有較嚴重的代理問題以及較高的代理成本。利用五個不同的公司總部地理區位之代理變數，實證結果發現公司總部之地理區域位置顯著的影響董事會與小股東之間的代理問題，隨著到大都會區的距離增加將加重此代理問題。

This study explores the relation between the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) and firm location by using the B-E agency proxy developed by Taylor (2010). By employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years, we hypothesize that remotely located firms are more likely to suffer higher B-E agency problem because geographic location limits the ability of minority equity investors to monitor the boards of remotely located firms. We use five different variables to represent location and remoteness of the firm’s headquarters. The empirical results of this study show that a firm’s location significantly affects its B-E agency problem. Higher distance to major city worsens the B-E agency problem.