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標題: | 重省我國匯兌機構之監理架構—以系統性風險控管為中心 Revisiting the Regulatory Framework for Money Transmission Institutions: Focusing on Systemic Risk Control |
作者: | Jui-Hsiang Chu 朱瑞翔 |
指導教授: | 楊岳平(Yueh-Ping Yang) |
關鍵字: | 系統性風險,匯兌業務,電子支付,差異化監理,代收代付,儲值業,資金移轉,資金傳遞法,支付服務指令,電子錢指令, Systemic risk control,Money transmission,Stored-value,Agent of the payee,E-money,Money transmitter,Payment service directive II,E-money directive II, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本文從系統性風險控管的角度出發,針對我國現行法制下匯兌機構監理之問題,從風險控管的角度切入分析,探討我國規範之監理密度是否能對應至規範客體之風險程度。確立規範修正的必要性後,再藉由美國法以及歐盟法的立法設計,觀察對於相關議題有無不同的規範模式,並從中找尋最能在風險控管與產業發展取得平衡的規範架構,以作為我國匯兌法制的修正建議。
於第二章,本文從資金移轉體系的演進出發,整理出若欲發展資金移轉業務,首先必須建立使用者的「信任」。而法規範便可以作為信任建立的一環,透過相關管制與要求,加強使用者對於資金移轉中介機構之信任。然而,在此尚須兼顧業者發展的可能性,避免為建構信任,而過度抑制業者的經營。基於此立場,觀我國匯兌實務的發展現狀,發現取得牌照者的經營狀況並不佳,而多數業者亦不希望在此牌照制度下經營業務,因此本文即欲檢視我國規範上的設計,是否符合監理的必要性。透過諸多實務發展現象、實務上著名的案例,整理出體系面、定義面以及管制面中,值得進一步討論的疑義。 於第三章,主要欲探討匯兌法制之監理目的,其中先回歸系統性風險理論的介紹,包含定義、產生的流程以及相關針對系統性風險的監理規範。再以系統性風險程度為中心,討論匯兌業務所具備的系統性風險,並作為差異化監理架構建立的基礎。於體系面著眼銀行業務與匯兌業務之系統性風險程度差異,分析我國現行法制架構下的區分標準,是否足以區分風險程度以對應至兩種牌照的監理密度差異。於定義面則著眼匯兌業務下不同服務提供模式間之系統性風險程度,討論各該業務類型之要件設計是否妥適。於管制面將基於匯兌業務所具有的系統性風險程度,分析現行採取之管制手段是否為達到規範目的之最小限制手段。 於第四章,分析美國法對於匯兌業務的監理架構,當中發現主要的機構監理要求設計於州法層級。本文即針對統一州法委員會所訂之資金服務法以及美國各州的資金傳遞法一併介紹。於美國各州州法下,立法目的雖然與我國法制相類似,但對於規範客體的區分監理標準卻與我國法有所不同;在管制手段上,亦有不同於我國的設計,即便是相類似的管制手段,也採取不同的管制程度。從立法設計上的不同,亦能反應出美國州立法者對於匯兌業務風險認定上與我國之不同。 於第五章,介紹歐盟法下匯兌機構將受到的監理架構。其主要透過支付服務指令(PSD2)以及電子錢指令(2EMD)共建匯兌機構的規範要求。其中不涉及發行電子錢行為的機構,將受到PSD2的規範,反之則受到2EMD的監理。在立法目的上,兩指令均採取與我國相類似的設定,但於規範客體範圍的劃分卻不同於我國法的設計,豁免標準的訂定也透過與我國不同之方式,區分匯兌機構所受到的監理密度。另外,於管制手段的面向,歐盟法在手段的類型上雖與我國相似,惟管制的密度卻遠低於我國。綜上述可推知,對於匯兌服務的風險評估,歐盟法與我國法有相異的見解。 於第六章,本文將綜合前兩章對於比較法的介紹,並以系統性風險控管為中心,自我國法之體系面、定義面、管制面疑義依序分析。首先在體系面的部分,針對儲值款與存款的區分、匯兌業務的金額限制、電子技術之限定,美國法與歐盟法的設計大抵相同,均是回歸銀行業務與匯兌業務本質上的風險差異進行設計,本文建議改採比較法的立法模式。再者於定義面的部分,關於代收代付業的監理區分標準,本文建議採取歐盟法的設計,透過商業代理人例外加上小額牌照制度劃分系統性風險差異;在儲值業者的監理上,針對多用途支付使用要件的設計,本文建議採取美國法與歐盟法共同的立法技術,透過不確定法律概念搭配主管機關具體化該要件的方式作為區分標準,同時建議採取歐盟法中另外設計的豁免業者通知義務,以衡平可能因業者資金規模而升高的系統性風險;電子支付帳戶間款項移轉業務的「非基於實質交易」要件,則基於比較法研究以及風險控管的考量建議刪除。最後針對管制手段,本文建議首先可以引進營業保證金,搭配最低資本額共建市場進入門檻,另外建議刪除準備金要求以及投資限制當中的投資比例限制。並應將整體的市場進入門檻、資本要求金額降低,且採取浮動式的設計,以合乎風險控管的比例性。 以上即為本文對於現行法制的建議,希望可以透過上述的修正,令我國得以建構一個符合風險控管目的之一般性匯兌機構條例。並且在此條例的監理下,達到平衡風險控管以及產業發展的目標,創造一個適合匯兌業者經營業務的法制環境。 This thesis aims to examine the current regulatory framework of money transmission institutions in Taiwan. From the perspective of systemic risk control, this thesis analyzes whether the degree of regulatory intensity of money transmission institutions is appropriate or not. After affirming the necessity of the regulatory amendment, this thesis will compare the regulatory framework of money transmission institutions in the United States and the European Union. Based on the result of comparative law analysis, this thesis will try to establish a regulatory framework that can not only control the systemic risk but also drive the development of the industry. In chapter II, this thesis will explain the importance of regulation in the money transmission system. The legal framework will play a vital role in the process of making users trust the money transmission system. With some restrictions and obligations, people will trust the intermediaries in the money transmission system easier. However, regulations may result in excessively giving pressures and costs to institutions. Therefore, the optimal regulatory framework can not ignore the aspect of industry development. According to this concept of an optimal framework, Taiwan’s current regulations may need some revisions because the licensees are poor-performed and most money transmission service providers try to avoid providing their services under Taiwan’s regulatory framework. Consequently, this thesis examines the regulations concerning money transmission service providers and concludes three major aspects of the issues, including structure, definitions, and regulatory approaches. In chapter III, this thesis identifies to what extent will money transmission business generates systemic risk. Furthermore, this thesis will analyze all the issues above respectively base on the degree of systemic risk. In the discussion of structural issues, the distinction criteria regarding regulations should depend on the different possibilities of generating systemic risk by banking business and money transmission business. In the discussion of definitions, this thesis will focus on some terms in the provisions which can not meet the risk control functions. In the discussion of regulatory approaches, major concerns will be whether the design of all approaches can correspond to the degree of systemic risk that the money transmission business possesses. In chapter IV, this thesis will introduce the legal framework concerning the money transmission business in the United States. Due to the direction of this research, this thesis will mainly analyze the statutes related to prudential regulations of institutions, including the Uniform Money Service Act (UMSA) and each states’ money transmission law. According to the United States’ statutes, the way they set down the scope and limit of the regulated-entity is not the same as Taiwan’s design. Besides, the United States not only adopts different types but also intensities of regulatory approaches from Taiwan’s regulations. These differences can also reflect the respective risk assessments of the United States’ and Taiwan’s authorities. In chapter V, this thesis introduces the regulation structure regarding the money transmission business in the European Union. Generally speaking, two directives, Payment Service Directive II (PSD2) and E-money Directive II (2EMD) are major regulations under the European Union’s regulatory regime of money transmission institutions. In the aspect of regulated-entity, European directives set down the scope which is different from Taiwan’s. As for the regulatory approaches, the degree of European approaches’ intensity is lighter than Taiwan’s even though most types of approaches in both regulations are identical. The differences of EU’s regulation design imply that lawmakers in the EU didn’t consider the risk of money transmission business the same as Taiwan’s authorities did. In chapter VI, this thesis will conclude all the analyses in comparative law study and find out the best way to solve the three major issues in Taiwan’s regulatory framework base on systemic risk control theory. In the aspect of structural issues, there are three types of sub-issue, including the distinction between deposit and stored-value, the value limit of money transmission business, and the technical requirement of regulated-entity. This thesis suggests that Taiwan’s regulations should follow the way the United States and the EU apply. That is, the design of regulations should focus on the major reason cause different degrees of risks in the banking business and money transmission business. Therefore, all the distinction criterion in Taiwan’s regulations above might need to be derogated. In the aspect of definition problems, this thesis suggests Taiwan’s regulations against the collecting and paying business model should refer to the EU’s two-tier distinction standard, which is using commercial agent exemption and small payment institution license to control the risk of institutions. In terms of the regulation of stored-value business, this thesis argues that instead of enumerating specific types of exemptions, using uncertain legal concepts to distinguish the regulations of prepaid instruments seems to have more flexibilities. Moreover, the authorities should have the mandate to expound the uncertain concepts concretely. In addition to the adoption of uncertain legal concepts, this thesis further suggests following the EU’s directive requiring exempted-entities to notify authorities if their transactions’ value exceeds a certain amount. At last, as for the business of transferring funds between e-payment accounts, this thesis suggests derogating this provision base on the consideration of risk control and comparative law analysis. In the aspect of regulatory approaches, this thesis suggests introducing operation bonds to Taiwan’s regulations. The combination of operation bond and minimum capital requirement can be the optimal market entry threshold design. Furthermore, this thesis argues that reserve requirement and the proportional limit of investment in Taiwan’s regulations should be derogated. Lastly, the market entry threshold and capital requirement should all be lighter and adopt a floating standard to meet each institution’s actual degree of systemic risk. The discussion above is the regulation amendment suggestions given by this thesis. With these amendments, this thesis tries to establish a risk-based regulatory framework and strike a balance between risk control and industry development. Eventually, this thesis expects these suggestions can make some contributions to Taiwan’s money transmission institution law. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61805 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202001087 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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