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標題: | 美國證管會函釋對經理人操弄非GAAP盈餘以達到分析師財測之影響 The Impact of SEC’s Interpretive Guidance on Manager’s Behavior to Meet or Beat Non-GAAP Earnings Forecast |
作者: | Ying-Hsi Wang 王迎曦 |
指導教授: | 劉啟群(Chi-Chun Liu) |
關鍵字: | 非GAAP盈餘,達到分析師財測,美國證管會,遵循揭露解釋, Non-GAAP Earnings,Meet or Beat Analyst Forecasts,SEC,C DIs, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本研究探討美國證管會於2010年1月發布的遵循揭露解釋(C DIs)對於經理人操弄非GAAP盈餘(Non-GAAP Earnings)以達到(Meet or Beat)分析師財測之影響。近20年來,自願揭露非GAAP盈餘的公司逐年攀升,然而非GAAP盈餘可由經理人主觀衡量,使得美國證管會注意到其誤導投資人的潛在風險。2003年美國證管會發布Regulation G並更新Regulation S-K Item 10(e),對非GAAP盈餘加以監管;2010年的C DIs對於非GAAP盈餘採取較為寬鬆的政策,給予經理人較多彈性空間。 在探討是否投機性地達到分析師財測時,本研究採用較為精準的定義,除了非GAAP盈餘預測外,亦加入GAAP盈餘預測的資料以消除衡量誤差。此外,本研究將操弄工具分為一次性項目與重複性項目,並嘗試不同作法來定義操弄行為。樣本期間選用C DIs發布的前後兩年(2008-2011),且在額外測試中選用前後六年(2004-2015)的樣本。實證結果顯示,2010年C DIs發布之後,經理人操弄非GAAP盈餘以達到分析師財測的情形上升,且不論是一次性項目或重複性項目均更加成為操弄盈餘的工具。此結果證明C DIs具有顯著影響力,且使經理人更加容易操弄非GAAP盈餘。 This study examines the impact of SEC’s Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C DIs), which was issued in January of 2010, on manager’s aggressive behavior to meet or beat Non-GAAP earnings forecast. During the past 20 years, the number of companies that have voluntarily disclosed Non-GAAP earnings has increased year by year. Since Non-GAAP earnings are measured at the manager’s discretion, the SEC raised concerns that it may be misleading to investors. The SEC issued Regulation G and amended Regulation S-K Item 10 (e) in 2003 to regulate Non-GAAP reporting; the SEC staff issued C DIs in 2010, which relaxed guidelines on Regulation G and Regulation S-K Item 10 (e), granting managers extensive discretion on Non-GAAP reporting. This study uses a more accurate definition of “meet or beat analyst forecast” by using the data of GAAP earnings forecast besides Non-GAAP earnings forecast to eliminate measurement error. Furthermore, we divide exclusions into transitory items and recurring items, and also use different methods to define aggressive behavior. The sample period is 2 years before and after the issuance of C DIs (2008-2011) and 6 years before and after that (2004-2015) in other analyses. The empirical results show that after the issuance of C DIs, manager’s aggressive behavior to meet or beat Non-GAAP earnings forecast has increased, and both transitory and recurring items are more frequently excluded for meet-or-beat purposes. This proves that C DIs is significantly influential and grants managers more discretion to manipulate Non-GAAP earnings. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/60850 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202001261 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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