請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/60827
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 賴淑青(Shu-Ching Lai) | |
dc.contributor.author | Yi-Chung Chen | en |
dc.contributor.author | 陳怡中 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T10:31:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-07-20 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-07-20 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-07-02 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Chen, J., H. Hong, M. Huang, and J. Kubik, 2004, “Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization,” American Economic Review 94, 1276-1302. Cremers, M., Driessen, J., Maenhout, P., Weinbaum, D., 2005. Does skin in the game matter? Director incentives and governance in the mutual fund industry. Working Paper. Yale University. Del Guercio, D., Dann, L., Partch, M., 2003. Governance and boards of directors in closed-end investment companies. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 111–152. Ding, B., and Wermers, R., 2012. Mutual Fund Performance and Governance Structure: The Role of Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors. Working paper.University of Maryland Ferris, S.,Yan, X., 2007. Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance. Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (2007) 392–420 Huang, S., Hilary, G., 2017. Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance. Working Paper. Singapore Management University Khorana, A., 1996. Top management turnover An empirical investigation of mutual fund managers.Journal of Financial Economics 40 (1996) 403–427 Kihn, J., 1996. To load or not to load? Financial Analysts Journal 28-36. Meschke, J.F., 2005. An empirical examination of mutual fund boards. Working Paper. University of Minnesota. Masulis, R., Wang, C., Xie, F., Zhang, S., 2017. Directors: Older and wiser, or too old to govern?. AFA. Qian, M., 2006. Whom can you trust? A study of mutual fund governance. Working Paper. Boston College. Tufano, P., Sevick, M., 1997. Board structure and fee-setting in the mutual fund industry. Journal of Financial Economics 46, 321–355 Weisbach, M., 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431–460. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/60827 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本文之目的在於探討共同基金之董事會成員結構,與其基金之績效表現之相關性,以董事會高齡成員比例、董事會規模、獨立性、董事監理之基金數量等董事會結構變數,分析其與共同基金之風險調整後收益、投資類型調整後收益、費用比率以及經理人之更換之關聯性。研究樣本選擇2001年最大之35個基金家族,於2008以及2009兩年間於CRSP以及SEC資料庫之基金資料,並以最小平方法進行迴歸分析。本文研究發現,董事會高齡成員比例與投資類型調整後收益有著顯著之負向關係,同時與董事會之費用比例呈顯著之正向關係,此結果顯示高齡之董事會的確會使董事會之運作效率降低。本文同時發現董事會之獨立性與基金之表現有著負向之關係,表示獨立董事比例之提高同時也會使其需支付給獨立董事之報酬提高,提升其費用比率使其基金收益不佳。經理人之更換則主要與前一年度之基金收益負向相關,且迴歸結果也指出規模較大、任期較長且獨立董事比例較高之董事會較易去做出更換經理人之舉動。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The study examines the relations between board structure and the performance of mutual funds. By analyzing the fund data in 35 U.S fund families in 2008 and 2009, we find that fund whose board contains a higher percentage of older directors is more likely to have lower future objective adjusted returns and higher expense ratios. We also find that funds with higher percentage of independent directors have lower future performance. In the analysis of manager turnover, we find that a fund tends to replace its manager when it performed badly last year, and that a board with a higher percentage of independent directors and a larger board also more likely to change its fund manager. Overall, our study provides evidence that aging directors and high board independence have a negative effect on fund performance. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T10:31:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-0207202010294700.pdf: 1262274 bytes, checksum: a2a5d6c342a5c1a8d6fdcdedb38082b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 中文摘要……………………………………………………………… i Abstract……………………………………………………………… ii 目錄……………………………………………………………… iii 表目錄……………………………………………………………… iv 第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………1 第二章 文獻探討………………………………………………………4 第三章 資料來源與研究方法…………………………………………7 第一節 資料來源……………………………………………………7 第二節 被解釋變數…………………………………………………7 第三節 董事會結構變數……………………………………………9 第四節 控制變數……………………………………………………10 第四章 實證結果分析………………………………………………12 第一節 收益率實證結果……………………………………………12 第二節 費用比率實證結果…………………………………………13 第三節 經理人離職實證結果………………………………………14 第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………16 參考文獻……………………………………………………………18 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 董事會結構與共同基金績效之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Relation between Board Structure and Fund Performance | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林姿婷(Tzu-Ting Lin),陳彥行(Yan-Shing Chen) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 共同基金,董事會結構,高齡董事,基金費用, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Mutual Fund,Board Structure,Old directors,expense ratio, | en |
dc.relation.page | 26 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001263 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-07-02 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
U0001-0207202010294700.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 1.23 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。