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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 杜榮瑞 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chi-Hung Yeh | en |
dc.contributor.author | 葉啟宏 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-16T16:19:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-08-14 | |
dc.date.available | 2021-05-16T16:19:23Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2013-08-14 | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2013-08-09 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Ahn, T. S., Y. Choi, and I. Hwang. 2010. How does ratchet effect rise and sag? Empirical evidence with respect to target ambiguity, interactive target setting, and measurement noise. Working Paper, Seoul National University.
Ahn, T. S., and Y. S. Choi. 2010. Performance management under dynamic incentive scheme. Meeting Paper, AAA 2010 Management Accounting Section. Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1): 3-37. Bouwens, J., and P. Kroos. 2011. Target ratcheting and effort reduction. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 (1): 171-185. Chow, C. W., J. C. Cooper, and K. Haddad. 1991. The effects of pay schemes and ratchets on budgetary slack and performance: A multiperiod experiment. Accounting, Organizations and Society 16 (1): 47-60. Ettredge, M. L., J. C. Bedard, and K. M. Johnstone. 2008. Empirical tests of audit budget dynamics. Behavioral Research in Accounting 20 (2): 1-18. Fisher, J. G., J. R. Frederickson, and S. A. Peffer. 2006. Budget negotiations in multi-period settings. Accounting, Organizations and Society 31 (6): 511-528. Guidry, F., A. J. Leone, and S. Rock. 1999. Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26 (1): 113-142. Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (1): 85-107. Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13 (4): 365-383. Holthausen, R. W., D. F. Larcker, and R. G. Sloan. 1995. Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19 (1): 29-74. Kelley, T., and L. Margheim. 1990. The impact of time budget pressure, personality, and leadership variables on dysfunctional auditor behavior. Auditing: Journal of Practice and Theory 9 (2): 21-42. Leone, A. J., and S. Rock. 2002. Empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers’ discretionary accrual choices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (1): 43-67. Otley, D. T., and B. Pierce. 1996. The operation of control systems in large audit firms. Auditing: Journal of Practice and Theory 15 (2): 65-84. Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary: Earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3 (4): 91-102. Simon, H. A. 1955. A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1): 99-118. Weitzman, M. L. 1980. The' ratchet principle' and performance incentives. The Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1): 302-308. Xu, Z., G. Taylor, and M. Dugan. 2007. Review of real earnings management literature. Journal of Accounting Literature 26: 195-228. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/6010 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究主要探討的問題是棘輪預算制度對經理人盈餘管理行為之影響,並延伸Leone and Rock (2002)的研究,進一步在有暫時性盈餘及無暫時性盈餘的情況下,研究棘輪預算制度對盈餘管理行為之影響。故本研究之研究問題為:(1)無暫時性盈餘時,在不同的棘輪預算制度下,經理人是否會有不同的盈餘管理行為。(2)有暫時性盈餘時,在不同的棘輪預算制度下,經理人是否會有不同的盈餘管理行為。
本研究以實驗室實驗的方式,共招募76位大學生及研究生擔任受試者。進行裁決性應計項目之盈餘管理決策工作。研究結果顯示:在對稱的棘輪預算制度下,無論有無暫時性盈餘,經理人皆傾向向上盈餘管理,與研究假說一致;在不對稱的棘輪預算制度下,無論有無暫時性盈餘,經理人亦皆傾向向上盈餘管理,與研究假說不一致。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The primary purpose of this paper is to examine how managers manage earnings under different kinds of ratchet budget, symmetry and asymmetry. In addition, this paper also discusses the ratchet effect under different conditions of transitory earnings, existence and inexistence. We recruit 76 undergraduate students and graduate students as participants in an experiment in which participants perform an accrual-based earnings management decision task.
Consistence with our expectation, our results indicate that managers tend to increase reported earnings with discretionary accruals under symmetry ratchet budget. However, the results don’t support our hypotheses that managers tend to make income-decreasing discretionary accruals to offset transitory earnings surprises under asymmetry ratchet budget. Our results indicate that under asymmetry ratchet budget, managers tend to increase reported earnings with discretionary accruals no matter whether transitory exist or not. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-16T16:19:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-R00722015-1.pdf: 782346 bytes, checksum: 75d5e6c6037b2fd1b3f76099ee868a77 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 I
Abstract II 目錄 III 表目錄 V 圖目錄 VI 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究貢獻 3 第三節 論文結構與研究流程 3 一、 論文結構 3 二、 研究流程 5 第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 6 第一節 棘輪預算制度 6 第二節 棘輪預算制度與盈餘管理 10 第三節 研究假說 13 一、 無暫時性盈餘時,棘輪預算制度對盈餘管理行為之影響 14 二、 有暫時性盈餘時,棘輪預算制度對盈餘管理行為之影響 21 三、 本節彙總 29 第三章 研究方法 30 第一節 變數定義 30 一、 自變數 30 二、 應變數 31 第二節 實驗設計 32 第三節 實驗程序 34 第四節 受試者 39 第五節 統計分析方法 41 第四章 研究結果與分析 42 第一節 分析方法 42 第二節 操弄檢查 44 第三節 假說檢驗 46 一、 排除不認真的受試者 50 二、 分析受試者之決策方式 54 第五章 結論、研究限制與建議 60 第一節 研究結論 60 第二節 研究限制 61 第三節 研究建議 61 參考文獻 62 附錄A 實驗後問卷 1 附錄B 練習題 2 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 棘輪預算制度對盈餘管理行為之影響-實驗證據 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effects of Budget Ratcheting on Employee’s Behavior of Earnings Management: An Experimental Study | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 101-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 許文馨,林孝倫 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 棘輪,預算,棘輪效果,裁決性應計項目,應計盈餘管理,決策行為,實驗室法,管理會計, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | ratchet,budget,ratchet effect,discretionary accruals,earnings management,behavior,experiment, | en |
dc.relation.page | 68 | |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
dc.date.accepted | 2013-08-09 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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