獨立董事之職權、義務與責任

Abstract

在面對公司醜聞凸顯的公司治理問題，各國紛紛以獨立董事作為解決問題之良方，認為獨立董事所具備之獨立性能客觀公正地守護投資人之利益。我國於民國九十四年明文授權公開發行公司得設置獨立董事，同時授權主管機關得強制公司設置獨立董事，於民國一百零二年管會已強制要求全部上市櫃公司應全面設置獨立董事。 獨立董事制度在我國實踐多年仍問題重重，比較法上亦面對諸多質疑，本文擬先從獨立董事之獨立性開始探討，獨立性作為獨立董事最核心之要求，目的在於避免遭受到經營團隊之不當影響，而可對公司事務為獨立判斷與提供客觀意見之董事，因此獨立性之重要性不言可喻。我國制度上設有獨立性要件之限制，卻忽略其他影響獨立性之情形，本文擬討論近年來美國公司治理學界熱門議題－董事任期對獨立性之影響，並以此呼籲董事會與法院在審酌獨立董事是否具備獨立性時，不應設限於法規要求之具體要件。 獨立董事之職權內容廣泛，我國明文引入者僅有審計委員會與薪酬委員會兩種功能性委員會，然而我國法律所描繪之制度與被繼受國－美國不盡相同，致使原本制度目的無法實現，本文對獨立董事之職權內容重新簡介，並介紹英國法上之特殊職位－資深獨立董事，其角色與功能。獨立董事於行使職權時最常遭受之批評，為時間投注不足、缺乏誘因以及資訊依賴經營階層，本文擬從國外經驗試圖找出解決方法。 獨立董事其主要任務在於監督公司，美國德拉瓦州法院自1996年Caremark案設下監督義務之標準後，迄今並未改變見解。美國注意義務之案件與其經營判斷法則發展息息相關，與我國法制並不相同，在參考美國德拉瓦州法院同時，得在何種範圍成為我國借鑑為本文重點之一。 本文第四章為美國法上董事責任之相關法制，包括經營判斷法則、董事責任限制、董事補償法制、董事責任保險，此四種責任法制目的皆在保護董事免受不當訴訟影響，造成董事因懼法律風險而不願出任職務。經營判斷法則與董事責任保險在國內已藉由法院判決和行政命令引入，本文將討論我國現行情形並點出改善之處；相反地，董事責任限制與董事補償法制尚未引入我國，本文將討論是否應引入我國。 最後本文將介紹比例責任制，比例責任在我國證券交易法已出現，亦漸漸有相關判決出爐，比例責任之特點在於被告僅就自己之責任負責，不需擔負共同被告無資力之風險，本文試圖將比例責任套用在獨立董事身上，期待獨立董事所負擔之責任與其權力相符。

Today, many countries rely on independent directors as a panacea for various corporate governance misfires that have received increasing attention because of corporate scandals. Independent directors shall be independent of corporate executives and can be the gatekeeper for shareholders’ interests. The legislators in Taiwan have granted public companies the right to designate independent directors in accordance with its bylaws in 2005, and then authorized the Authority that it may require particular public companies to designate independent directors. In 2013, it has become a mandatory compliance for the listed companies to designate independent directors. There are still several problems on independent director after practice for a decade in Taiwan. This thesis first addresses the independence issue. The core purpose of maintaining the independence of independent director is to avoid undue influence from corporate executives and provide fair advice and decision for the corporation. Hence, the independent directors in Taiwan shall fulfill the legal requirement of independence. However, the legislators fail to consider situations that may influence the director’s independence. This thesis discusses the tenure of the director, one of the most debatable issues among U.S boardroom, and encourages the courts of Taiwan to focus more on the overall circumstances than the legal requirements when determining directors’ independence. The independent directors could be designed to carry out extensive functions, but only two of them are stipulated in Taiwanese law, audit committee and compensation committee. Although the regulation is similar to that of the United States, the difference might severely undermine the goal of the regulation. This thesis reviews the role of the independent directors and then introduces a unique concept which is the senior independent director in the U.K. In addition, the most criticized aspects of the independent director are insufficient time-devotion, lack of incentives to perform on board, and reliance on executives for information. This thesis attempts to find out the solutions to the criticism based on the discussion among scholars. The independent directors’ major mission is to monitor the companies they serve. The Delaware court had established the standards in Caremark case, which still applies nowadays, to review whether the independent directors fulfill their duty to monitor. The cases regarding the duty of care in the U.S court are connected with the Business Judgment Rule, which is different from Taiwan’s civil procedure. Hence, to what extent we could apply the Delaware cases to the cases in Taiwan as a legal principal is contemplated in this thesis. The fourth chapter of this thesis is the relevant regimes governing a director’s liability under the U.S. law, including Business Judgment Rule, the limitation or exclusion of directors’ liability, indemnification and D&O insurance. The purpose of these four regimes is to protect the directors from frivolous lawsuits that might cause qualified candidates to refuse to take the office of board seats. While Business Judgment Rule and D&O insurance have been introduced in Taiwan by court judgment and administrative order, the limitation or exclusion of directors’ liability and indemnification have not. Under such context, I discuss the current situation, points out the shortcomings, and then suggests whether we shall further introduce the other two regimes. Finally, this thesis introduces proportionate liability which has already been incorporated in Securities and Exchange Act of Taiwan and the related cases. Under proportionate liability, the defendant is responsible only for his own fault and does not bear the risk of the insolvency of his co-defendants. This thesis proposes to apply proportionate liability to independent directors both under Company Act and Securities and Exchange Act in order to balance the power and liability of independent directors.