請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/56628
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王宏文(Hong-Wung Wang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Hsiao-Chun Liu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 劉筱君 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T05:38:43Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-02 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-09-02 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-21 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻 壹、中文部分 王宏文、柯昀伶、孫寧,2018,〈地方派系的資源配置策略:以嘉義縣社區營造資源為例的個案研究〉,《人文及社會科學集刊》,30(2):163-205。 王志良、詹富堯 吳重禮,2012,〈鞏固支持或資源拔樁?解析中央對地方補助款分配的政治因素〉,《政治科學論叢》,51:51-90。 王鼎銘,2006,〈政治與經濟間的交錯:政治景氣循環理論的發展評析〉,《公共行政學報》,20:161-172。 王鼎銘、詹富堯,2006,〈台灣地方財政的政治景氣循環分析:固定效果與隨機效果模型的估算比較〉,《台灣政治學刊》,10(2):63-100。 朱鎮明,2010,〈競爭型計畫與臺灣府際夥伴關係的實踐〉,公共行政學報,37: 71-110。 李俊達,2010,〈總統得票率、地方補助款與行程安排之相關性探討〉,《選舉研究》,17(2):71-102。 林怡均、黃紀,2009,〈執政黨資源分配的邏輯:2001-2008年的補助款分析〉,「2009年台灣政治學會年會暨「全球競爭、民主鞏固、治理再造」學術研討會」(2009年11月), 新竹:玄奘大學。 姚名鴻,2012,〈我國一般性與計畫型補助款分配之政治經濟分析〉,《臺灣民主季刊》,9(4):191-225。 紀孟君、鄭夙芬、鄭期緯,2011,〈當我們「同在一起」:旗艦競爭型計畫之社區組織結盟歷程探討〉,《台灣社區工作與社區研究學刊》,1(1):127-168。 陳冠備,2019,〈蔡英文:農民退休制 像軍公教一樣〉,自由時報,政治版,https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1334391,2019/11/25。 張淑珠,2019,〈中央補助款到底有沒有分藍綠?〉,台灣新生報,http://61.222.185.194/ (2019/11/08)。 張紹勳,2016,《Panel-data迴歸模型:Stata在廣義時間序列的應用》,臺北市:五南。 張慈佳,2000,〈地方經濟之政治景氣循環現象:以臺灣地區之縣市長選舉為例〉,《國家科學委員會研究彙刊:人文及社會科學》,10(3):362-377。 陳海雄,2005,〈中央計畫型補助制度執行力之探討〉,《研考雙月刊》,29(2):61-72。 傅彥凱,2002,〈民主政治下的經濟政策制定:政治景氣循環理論之分析〉,《中國行政評論》,11(3):139-163。 傅彥凱,2006,〈地方政府預算制定之政治經濟分析:政治預算循環的觀點〉,選舉研究,13(1):119-162。 游亦安,2011,《中央政府特別預算「常態性」編列之研究》,國立臺灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。 馮永猷,2013,《府際財政》,南投縣:暨大府際關係中心。 黃中憲、林錦慧譯,2014, 政治秩序的起源. 上卷, 從史前到法國大革命(初版),臺北市:時報文化。譯自Fukuyama, Francis, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2014. 黃國敏,2011,〈政治景氣循環理論之實證分析:竹竹苗區域研究〉,《玄奘管理學報》,8(1):1-25。 黃國敏,2014,〈政治景氣循環理論之實證分析:彰化縣個案研究〉,《中華行政學報》,14:127-138。 黃國敏,2015,〈政治景氣循環理論之實證研究:桃竹苗整合資料分析〉,《社會研究學報》,1(2):25-42。 蔡昕俞,2013,〈台灣總統大選與經濟成長的政治景氣循環—1996-2012〉,《臺灣民主季刊》,10(1):36-69。 葉永騫、侯承旭,2019,〈蘇揆宣布高鐵南延屏東 高捷紅線規劃延伸東港潮州〉,自由時報,生活版,https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/paper/1316916 (2019/09/11)。 謝文盛、歐俊男,2003,〈台灣地區政黨政治對地方政府補助收入影嚮之研究〉,《問題與研究》,42(6):97-111。 羅清俊、萬榮水,1999,〈選舉與補助款的分配:綁樁?還是平衡地方財政?〉,《選舉研究》,6(2):121-161。 羅清俊,2000,〈我國一般性與計畫型補助款分配之政治經濟分析〉,《臺灣民主季刊》,9(4):191-225。 羅清俊,2001,《台灣分配政治》,臺北市:前衛。 羅清俊、詹富堯,2012,〈立法委員特殊利益提案與中央政府計畫型補助款的分配:從民國94年至98年之資料探析〉,《公共行政學報》,42:1-31。 黃瓊如、何艷宏、林姿吟,2012,〈選舉、制衡與公共支出配置:我國地方政府的實證分析〉,《選舉研究》,19(2):101-128。 貳、西文部分 Alesina, A. 1987. “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(3): 651-678. Alesina, A., Roubini, N. 1992. “Political Cycles in OECD Economies.” Review of Economic Studies 59(4): 663-688. Baron, D. P. 1991. “Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control.” American Journal of Political Science 35(1): 57-90. Berry, C. R., Burden, B. C., Howell, W. G. 2010. “The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending.” American Political Science Review 104(4): 783-799. Bertelli, A. M., McCann, P. J. C. 2018. “Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll-Call Voting, Decentralized Administration, and Distributive Politics.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 43(1): 69-100. Bill, K. 2018. “Political Business Cycles in Australia Elections and Party Ideology.” Journal of Time Series Econometrics 11(2): 20170012. Bohn, F. 2018. “Political Cycles: Beyond Rational Expectations.” PLOS ONE 13(10). In https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0203390. Latest update 11 Octor 2018. Bohn, F., Veiga, F. J. 2019. “Political Opportunism and Countercyclical Fiscal Policy in election-year recessions.” Economic Inquiry 57(4): 2058-2081. Brender, A., Drazen, A. 2005. “Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies.” Journal of Monetary Economics 52(7): 1271-1295. Cadot, O., Röller, L.-H., Stephan, A. 2006. “Contribution to productivity or pork barrel? The two faces of infrastructure investment. “ Journal of Public Economics 90(6): 1133-1153. Christenson, D. P., Kriner, D. L., Reeves, A. 2017. “All the President's Senators: Presidential Copartisans and the Allocation of Federal Grants.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(2), 269-294. Clark, W. R.,Reichert, U.N. Lomas, S. L., Parker, K. L. 1998. “International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies.” International Organization 52(1): 87-120. Congressional Research Service. 2019. “Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues. (R40638).” in https://crsreports.congress.gov. Latest update 2019. Cox, G. W., McCubbins, M. D. 1986. “Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game.” The Journal of Politics 48(2): 370-389. Downs, A. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper. Drazen, A. 2001. The political business cycle after 25 years. In K. R. In B. S. Bernanke (Ed.), NBER macroeconmics annual (Vol. 15, pp. pp. 75–138). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economics Research. Duverger, M. 1969. “Political parties, their organization and activity in the modern state.” / Maurice Duverger (3rd ed. / translated by Barbara and Robert North ; with a foreword by D. W. Brogan. ed.). London: Methuen. Fisher, R. C. 2007. State local public finance (3rd ed. ed.). Australia: Thomson/South-Western. Fleck, R. K. 1999. “The Value of the Vote: A Model and Test of the Effects of Turnout on Distributive Policy.” Economic Inquiry 37(4): 609-623. Golden, M., Min, B. 2013. “Distributive Politics Around the World.” Annual Review of Political Science 16(1): 73-99. Gonschorek, G. J., Schulze, G. G. Sjahrir, B. S. 2018. “To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia.” European Journal of Political Economy 54: 240-260. González, L. 2016. “Presidential Popularity and the Politics of Distributing Federal Funds in Argentina.” Publius The Journal of Federalism 46, pjw001. Hankins, W., Hoover, G., Pecorino, P. 2017. “Party polarization, political alignment, and federal grant spending at the state level.” Economics of Governance 18(4): Hodler, Roland, and Paul A Raschky. “Regional Favoritism.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129.2 (2014): 995–1033. Web. Healy, Andrew, and Neil Malhotra. “Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy.” The American political science review 103.3 (2009): 387–406. Web. Hibbs, D. A. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy.” The American Political Science Review 71(4): 1467-1487. Hoover, G. A. Pecorino, P. 2005. “The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level.” Public Choice 123(1): 95-113. Horiuchi, Y. Lee, S. 2008. “The Presidency, Regionalism, and Distributive Politics in South Korea.” Comparative Political Studies 41(6): 861-882. Hung, L.-C. Hsieh, Y.-T. 2016. “Political Business Cycle in Taiwan—Evidence from Central Government Expenditures.” International Journal of Public Administration 39(4): 249-257. Joanis, M. 2011. “The road to power: partisan loyalty and the centralized provision of local infrastructure.” Public Choice 146(1/2): 117-143. Joanis, M. 2018. “The Politics of Checkbook Federalism.” Public Finance Review 46(4): 665-691. Kalecki, M. 1943. “Political aspects of full employment.” The Political Quarterly 14(4): 322-330. Kang, W. C. 2015. “Electoral cycles in pork barrel politics: Evidence from South Korea 1989–2008.” Electoral Studies 38: 46-58. Kang, W. C. 2018. “Presidential pork barrel politics with polarized voters.” Political Geography 67: 12-22. Kauder, B., Potrafke, N., Reischmann, M. 2016. “Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program.” European Journal of Political Economy 45: 39-56. Kleider, H., Röth, L. Garritzmann, J. L. 2018. “Ideological alignment and the distribution of public expenditures.” West European Politics 41(3): 779-802. Kriner, D. L. Reeves, A. 2012. “The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections.” American Political Science Review 106(2): 348-366. Kriner, D. L. Reeves, A. 2015. “Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics.” American Political Science Review 109(1): 155-171. Lasswell, H. D. 1958. Politics: who gets what, when, how. With postscript. Cleveland: World Pub. Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L., Testa, C. 2006. “Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The Impact of the President.” The Journal of Politics 68(2): 447-456. Leertourwer, E. Maier, P. 2002. “International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies: A Comment.” International Organization 56(1): 209-221. Levin, A., Lin, C.-F., James Chu, C.-S. 2002. “Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties.” Journal of Econometrics 108(1): 1-24. Levitt, S. D. Snyder, J. M. 1995. “Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays.” American Journal of Political Science 39(4): 958-980. Lowi, T. J. 1964. “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory.” World Politics 16(4): 677-715. Mehiriz, K. 2017. “The use of intergovernmental grants to municipalities for electoral purposes by subnational governments.” Local Government Studies 43(2): 274-290. Nordhaus, W. D. 1975. “The Political Business Cycle.” Review of Economic Studies 42(2): 169. Price, S. 1998. “Comment on 'The Politics of the Political Business Cycle.” British Journal of Political Science 28: 201-210. Reynolds, C. L.2014. “State politics, tuition, and the dynamics of a political budget cycle.” Empirical Economics 46(4): 1241-1270. Rogoff, K.1990. “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles.” The American Economic Review 80(1): 21-36. Rogoff, K., Sibert, A. 1988. “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles.” The Review of Economic Studies 55(1): 1-16. Schick, A. 2007. The federal budget : politics, policy, process. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press. Retrieved April 29, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wpf1f Schultz, K. A. 1995. “The Politics of the Political Business Cycle.” British Journal of Political Science 25(1): 79-99. Taylor, A. J. 2008. “The Presidential Pork Barrel and the Conditioning Effect of Term.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38(1): 96-109. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 2018. “Federal Aid to State and Local Governments.” in https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/federal-aid-to-state-and-local-governments. Latest update 19 April 2018. Wallis, J. J.1987. “Employment, Politics, and Economic Recovery during the Great Depression.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 69(3): 516-520. Wright, G. 1974. “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 56(1): 30-38. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/56628 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 每逢中央選舉年,政治候選人競開補助款支票、追加預算,愈近選舉日,新增建設、福利擴張,執政黨為達勝選目標不惜操縱補助款。本研究探討2008至2020年期間中央補助款分配全國22縣市和政治景氣循環的關聯,了解執政黨利用中央補助款達成其政治目的情況,研究結果顯示: 1、中央政府補助款證實有政治景氣循環現象,其中上級政府補助、一般性補助、社福補助符合選舉年的投機派與政黨派的政治景氣循環,以及總統任期循環,而上級政府補助還符合總統競選連任年的投機性政治景氣循環。 2、中央政府補助款除有政治景氣循環現象也有分配政策情況,其中上級政府補助除呈現政治景氣循環的分配情況,並於縣市執政黨籍立委比例愈高條件下,地方會分配到更多的上級政府補助。另外,一般性補助、教育補助除符合投機派,執政黨為了總統選舉勝選,會將補助款分配予對立選區及垂直分立縣市,藉以擴大選票範圍拉攏選民。 3、過去研究顯示計畫型補助較容易受政治左右,一般性補助受規範性因素影響,但本研究結果卻顯示計畫型、一般性補助都會受政治變數影響。2008至2020年期間民進黨傾向計畫型補助,國民黨青睞於一般性及專案補助,教育、社福補助則屬民進黨的偏好。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Every time before the Presidential and Legislator Election in Taiwan, political candidates compete to write grant checks and supplementary budgets. The closer the election day, the more new construction and expansion of benefits. The ruling party will not hesitate to manipulate and increase subsidies to achieve the goal of winning the election. The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship between the Central Government's distribution of subsidies and the Political Business Cycle from 2008 to 2020 and to understand how the ruling parties manipulate the distribution of subsidies in the central election year and presidential term. The research results show:
1. The Central Government Subsidies confirm that there is a Political Business Cycle phenomenon. The Superior Government Subsidies, General Grants, and Social Welfare Grants conform to the Political Business Cycle of opportunistic and partisan, and the presidential term cycle. The Superior Government Subsidies are also in line with the Opportunistic Political Business Cycle of the presidential reelection year. 2. In addition to the Political Business Cycle, the Central Government Subsidies also present a distribution-based political manipulation. Among them, the Superior Government Subsidies are in line with the Political Business Cycle of opportunistic and partisan, the presidential term, the presidential re-election opportunistic, the county, and city ruling party membership The higher the proportion of legislators, the more meat-barrel subsidies from the superior government. In addition, General Grants and Education Grants are in line with the Opportunistic Political Business Cycle. In order to win the presidential election, the ruling party will allocate subsidies to opposing or swing constituencies and vertically divided government in order to expand the scope of votes to attract voters. 3. Past studies have shown that Programs Grants are more likely to be influenced by politics, and General Grants are affected by normative factors. However, the results of this research show that both Programs and General Grants are affected by political variables. From 2008 to 2020, the ruling party has a policy concept of subsidies. The DPP prefers Programs Grants, the KMT favors General and Project Grants, and Education and Social Welfare Grants are the preferences of the DPP. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T05:38:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-2407202018343600.pdf: 3783235 bytes, checksum: 20be1693d7bdbfb763e69cf03ac7ba29 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄 口試委員會審定書 I 中文摘要 III ABSTRACT IV 目 錄 VI 圖目錄 VIII 表目錄 IX 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究目的與問題 6 第三節 研究範圍 7 第四節 章節安排 7 第二章 文獻檢視 9 第一節 府際補助款 9 第二節 政治景氣循環 23 第三節 分配政治 34 第三章 研究方法 45 第一節 資料來源 45 第二節 研究模型與變數 46 第三節 研究程序 55 第四章 研究結果 59 第一節 資料描述與檢定 59 第二節 補助款與政治景氣循環 73 第三節 補助款、政治景氣循環與分配政治 91 第四節 中央補助款的年度循環 117 第五章 結論與建議 129 第一節 研究摘要 129 第二節 研究結論 132 第三節 限制與建議 134 參考文獻 137 壹、中文部分 137 貳、西文部分 139 附錄:HAUSMAN檢定結果 145 圖目錄 圖 2 1:OECD國家財政分權-府際補助款類型 10 圖 2 2:OECD國家之地方補助款(2010) 11 圖 2 3:OECD國家之地方指定用途補助款(2010) 11 圖 2 4:中央挹注地方財源經費(2008-2019) 18 圖 2 5:各縣市別補助款與補助依存度(2019) 18 圖 2 6:美國的長短期菲利浦估計折抵曲線 24 圖 3 1:縱橫資料迴歸模型檢定流程 57 圖 4 1:各縣市上級政府補助趨勢(2008-2020) 61 圖 4 2:各縣市計畫型補助趨勢(2008-2020) 62 圖 4 3:各縣市一般及專案補助趨勢(2008-2020) 62 圖 4 4:各縣市一般性補助趨勢(2008-2020) 63 圖 4 5:各縣市專案補助趨勢(2008-2020) 63 圖 4 6:各縣市教育補助趨勢(2008-2020) 64 圖 4 7:各縣市社福補助趨勢(2008-2020) 64 表目錄 表 1 1:中央挹注地方財源類型 5 表 1 2:地方補助與協助收入平均補助依存度(2008-2019) 5 表 2 1:美國聯邦政府對各州補助款(2017) 13 表 2 2:美國聯邦政府對州及地方政府補助別(1981-2018) 14 表 2 3:先進工業社會中政黨對經濟政策目標的偏好 26 表 3 1:我國執政黨、總統任期與選舉一覽表(2008-2020) 46 表 3 2:研究變數一覽表 53 表 3 3:縱橫資料迴歸分析不同模型估計法之截距項 57 表 4 1:中央政府補助描述統計(2008-2020) 61 表 4 2:研究變數描述統計 65 表 4 3:消費者物價指數銜接表 68 表 4 4:變異數膨脹因素(VIF)檢定 70 表 4 5:單根檢定結果 71 表 4 6:一階差分調整延遲變數 72 表 4 7:上級政府補助PANEL DATA分析-M1(2008-2020) 80 表 4 8:上級政府補助PANEL DATA分析-M1.CPI(2008-2020) 80 表 4 9:計畫型補助PANEL DATA分析-M1(2008-2020) 81 表 4 10:計畫型補助PANEL DATA分析-M1.CPI(2008-2020) 81 表 4 11:一般及專案補助PANEL DATA分析-M1(2008-2020) 82 表 4 12:一般及專案補助PANEL DATA分析–M1.CPI(2008-2020) 82 表 4 13:一般性補助PANEL DATA分析–M1(2008-2020) 83 表 4 14:一般性補助PANEL DATA分析M1.CPI(2008-2020) 83 表 4 15:專案補助PANEL DATA分析–M1(2008-2020) 84 表 4 16:專案補助PANEL DATA分析–M1.CPI(2008-2020) 84 表 4 17:教育補助PANEL DATA分析–M1(2008-2020) 85 表 4 18:教育補助PANEL DATA分析M1.CPI(2008-2020) 85 表 4 19:社福補助PANEL DATA分析–M1(2008-2020) 86 表 4 20:社福補助PANEL DATA分析-M1.CPI(2008-2020) 86 表 4 21:符合研究假設1之補助款 89 表 4 22:上級政府補助PANEL DATA分析-M2(2008-2020) 99 表 4 23:上級政府補助PANEL DATA分析-M2.CPI(2008-2020) 100 表 4 24:計畫型補助PANEL DATA分析-M2(2008-2020) 101 表 4 25:計畫型補助PANEL DATA分析-M2.CPI(2008-2020) 102 表 4 26:一般及專案補助PANEL DATA分析-M2(2008-2020) 103 表 4 27:一般及專案補助PANEL DATA分析-M2.CPI(2008-2020) 104 表 4 28:一般性補助款PANEL DATA分析-M2(2008-2020) 105 表 4 29:一般性補助PANEL DATA分析-M2.CPI(2008-2020) 106 表 4 30:專案補助款PANEL DATA分析-M2(2008-2020) 107 表 4 31:專案補助PANEL DATA分析-M2.CPI(2008-2020) 108 表 4 32:教育補助PANEL DATA分析--M2(2008-2020) 109 表 4 33:教育補助PANEL DATA分析-M2.CPI(2008-2020) 110 表 4 34:社福補助PANEL DATA分析-M2(2008-2020) 111 表 4 35:社福補助PANEL DATA分析-M2.CPI(2008-2020) 112 表 4 36:符合研究假設2之補助款 113 表 4 37:中央各項補助款PANEL DATA迴歸分析表(2008-2020) 115 表 4 38:中央補助款年度循環迴歸分析 123 表 4 39:符合研究假設3之補助款 127 表 5 1:研究結果摘要-1 131 表 5 2:研究結果摘要-2 131 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 中央對地方補助款分配與政治景氣循環的關聯(2008~2020年) | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Relationship between the Central Government’s Subsidies and the Political Business Cycle (2008~2020) | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 李俊達(Chun-ta Lee),洪綾君(Ling-Chun Hung) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 投機派政治景氣循環,政黨派政治景氣循環,總統任期,分配政治,縱橫資料分析, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Opportunistic Political Business Cycle,Partisan Political Business Cycle,Presidential Term Cycle,Distributive Politics,Panel Data Analysis, | en |
dc.relation.page | 146 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001841 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-21 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
U0001-2407202018343600.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 3.69 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。