請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/56172
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳親恩(Chin-En Wu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Yen-Chun Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 林衍均 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T05:17:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-01 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-24 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-18 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 蔡信義 (1972). 《台北市立法委員首次增選之研究》,臺北:國立臺灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 陳明通 (1990). 《威權政體下臺灣地方政治菁英的流動(1945–1986)—省參議員及省議員流動的分析》,臺北:國立臺灣大學政治學研究所博士論文。. 徐瑞希 (1991). 《政商關係解讀:臺灣企業實用政治學入門》,臺北:遠流。. 黃鴻仁 (1992a).〈新國會富豪列傳〉,《商業週刊》 266 期。. 童清峯 (1992b). 〈蔣經國與商人〉,蘇子琴(編),《權與錢—透視台灣政商關係》, 臺北:新新聞文化,頁 37-46。. 蘇子琴 (1992c). 〈李登輝與商人〉,蘇子琴(編),《權與錢—透視台灣政商關係》, 臺北:新新聞文化,頁 47-57。. 張茂桂 (1992d). 〈人民、資本與國家:立法院與公共政策〉,《中山社會科學季刊 》,7(4): 15-33。. 朱雲漢 (1992e). 〈如何面對民主時代政商關係的挑戰〉,《國策: 國家政策雙周刊》,37: 6-8。. 楊泰順 (1992f). 〈利益團體的理論〉,《中山社會科學季刊》,7(4): 1-14。. 朱雲漢 (1992g). 〈台灣政權轉型期政商關係的再結盟〉,《中山社會科學季刊》,7(4): 58-78。. 董希傑 (1992h). 〈九大財團代主人轉戰立法院〉,《商業週刊》,266期。. 莊素玉 (1993a). 〈新國會的黑色喜劇〉,《天下雜誌》,145 期。. 陳建仲 (1995a). 《政權轉型期政商關係的法制化:台灣「公職人員財產申報法」立法過程之個案分析》,臺北:國立臺灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 胡佛 (1995b). 〈台灣地區政治菁英的參選行為 ~ 歷屆省議員候選人的分析(II)〉,《行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告》,共同作者包含:陳德禹、朱雲漢、吳乃德、陳明通、洪永泰等。. 丁守中 (1995c). 〈一個專業立委對台灣政商關係的觀察〉,《社會大學系列講座》, 臺北:社會大學文敎基金會。. 黃家昌 (1997). 《我國公職人員財產申報法之探討—二屆立委財產申報資料之分析》,臺中:東海大學政治學系碩士論文。. 魏錫鈴、邱沁宜 (1998). 〈財經背景新科立委衝高票〉,《經濟日報》,12月6日. 二版。. 康添財 (1999a).〈政府滿足得了營建立委的胃口嗎?〉,《商業週刊》 586、587 期。. 康添財 (1999b).〈號子立委主宰政府財政大計〉,《商業週刊》 586、587 期。. 李妍慧 (1999c). 《熱門財委會—從一支籤看國會金權政治》,臺北:國立臺灣大學新聞研究所碩士論文。. 李清如 (1999d). 〈下屆立委財富實力大曝光〉,《新新聞雜誌》,619期,1月。. 康添財、鄭金川 (1999e). 〈立委金權關係全面解剖〉,《商業週刊》,586、587 期: 32-38。. 林玉珮 (1999f). 〈錢愈領愈多事愈做愈少〉,《天下雜誌》,213期。. 吳東野 (1999g). 〈我國立法院全國不分區委員制度之研究〉,《選舉研究》,6(1): 143-174。. 黃秀端 (2000).〈立法院內不同委員會的運作方式〉,《東吳政治學報》,11: 35-70。. 蔡育倫 (2002a). 《台灣民主化歷程中政治菁英、選舉機制及媒體的角色探討 ─ 以笫一屆立法委員的退職歷程為個案》,高雄:國立中山大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 尚道明 (2002b). 〈立委身兼營利事業職務大調查〉,《今週刊》,28期。 蕭怡靖 (2003a). 《我國立法委員選擇常設委員會之研究—以第四屆立法委員為例》,臺北:國立政治大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 王建民 (2003b). 《民进党政商关系研究》,北京:九州出版社。. 劉戡宇 (2004). 《國會是非集》,臺北:世理雜誌出版有限公司。. 蔣珮琳 (2005a). 《我國行政菁英社會背景之研究》,臺北:世新大學行政管理學研究所碩士論文。. 林佳旻 (2005b). 《影響現任立法委員連任因素之事件史分析:1992~2004》,嘉義: 國立中正大學政治學系碩士論文。. 胡舜基 (2005c). 《我國立法院全國不分區委員制度之研究 (1992-2004)》,臺北:國立臺灣師範大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 蕭怡靖 (2007a), 〈我國立法委員選擇常設委員會之研究:以第五屆立法委員為例〉,《東吳政治學報》,25(3): 131-182。 瞿海源 (2007b). 〈杜絕不當而惡質的政商關係〉,《臺灣民主季刊》,4(1): 179-186。. 朱元魁 (2008a). 《國會議員之生涯研究-以台灣立委第二屆到第六屆為例》,高雄: 國立中山大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 陳東豪 (2008b). 〈打開連任立委財富的潘朵拉盒子〉,《今周刊》,294 期。. 羅清俊、張皖萍 (2008c). 〈立法委員分配政治行爲分析:選區企業與立法委員企業背景的影響〉,《政治科學論叢》,35: 47-94。. 王智賢、曾姵華 (2008d). 〈勸退參選的賽局分析-政黨利益模型〉,《法制論叢》,42: 193-227。. 簡錫堦 (2008e). 〈解構金權鞏固民主〉,《臺灣民主季刊》,5(3): 185-192。. 趙自齊 (2009a). 《行憲第一屆中央民意代表:爭一時更要爭千秋》,臺北:近代法制研究基金會。. 巫永平、郑振清 (2009b). 〈政治转型与政商关系演变———台湾政商关系的政治经济学分析〉,《经济社会体制比较》,142: 102-107。. 包正豪 (2010a). 〈政黨政治甄補的影響因素:以 1992 到 2008 政黨不分區立委提名人選為範例〉,《選舉評論》,(9): 49-82。. 廖達琪 (2010b). 〈國會議員生涯類型變遷與民主體制的取向分析-以台灣第二到第七屆立法院為例〉,《東吳政治學報》,28(2): 49-96。. 鄭恒昇 (2011). 《候選人背景與選區特質對立法委員競選政見形成及內容的影響 ─ 以第七屆立法委員為例》,高雄:國立中山大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 林倖妃 (2012). 〈新國會的三大問題〉,《天下雜誌》491 期。. 林士涵 (2014). 《立法委員參與股票市場和投資組合偏好之研究》,雲林:國立雲林科技大學資訊管理系碩士論文。. 陳乙棋 (2015). 《臺灣貪汙防治體制研究 (1987-2014)》,臺北:國立臺灣大學國家發展研究所碩士論文。. 佘健源 (2017a). 〈台灣立委選制改革對現任者競選優勢之影響〉,《經濟論文叢刊》,45(3): 453-494。. 林飛帆 (2017b). 《民主與進步的兩難?—社會運動與民進黨不分區立委的提名》,臺北:國立臺灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。. 侯坤宏 (2019a). 〈戰後臺灣政商關係探析〉,《臺北城市科技大學通識學報》,8: 45-72。. 聯合報主筆室 (2019b). 〈專業夾帶財團政客 不分區和總統一樣難投〉,聯合新聞網,https://udn.com/news/story/7548/4176791,2020/06/09。. Albertus, M. Menaldo, V. (2018), Authoritarianism and the elite origins of democracy. Arnesen, S. Peters, Y. (2018), ‘The Legitimacy of Representation: How Descriptive, Formal, and Responsiveness Representation Affect the Acceptability of Political Deci- sions’, Comparative Political Studies 51(7), 868–899. Ashworth, S. Bueno De Mesquita, E. (2008), ‘Electoral selection, strategic challenger entry, and the incumbency advantage’, Journal of Politics 70(4), 1006–1025. Barber, J. D. (1965), The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adoption to Legislative Life, NewHaven: Yale University. Bartels, L. M. (2008), Unequal Democracy: the Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, Princeton University Press. Berg, J. C. (1994), Unequal Struggle: Class, Gender, Race, and Power In The U.S. Congress, Westview Press. Bernstein, J. L. Wolak, J. (2002), ‘A Bicameral Perspective on Legislative Retirement: the Case of the Senate’, Political Research Quarterly 55(2), 375–390. Botero, F. Rennó, L. R. (2007), ‘Career Choice and Legislative Reelection Evidence from Brazil and Colombia’, Brazilian Political Science Review 1(1), 102–124. Brace, P. (1985), ‘A Probabilistic Approach to Retirement from the U. S. Congress’, Leg- islative Studies Quarterly 10(1), 107. Bratton, K. A. Ray, L. P. (2002), ‘Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway’, American Journal of Political Science 46(2), 428. Brunk, G. G. (1982), ‘Turnover and Voting Stability in the Senate’, American Politics Quarterly 10(3), 363–373. Buehler, M. Nataatmadja, R. (2019), ‘A Research Agenda for Studying Legislative Incumbent Turnover in New Democracies, Using Indonesia as a Case Study’, South East Asia Research 27(3), 203–224. Bullock, C. S. (1972), ‘House careerists: Changing patterns of longevity and attrition’, American Political Science Review pp. 1295–1300. Carey, J. (1996), Term Limits andLegislative Representation, Cambridge University Press. Carnes, N. (2013), White-collar Government: the Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making, University of Chicago Press. Carnes, N. (2016), ‘Congressional leadership and social status (class) dataset’. Choi, J. (2017), ‘Leaving Office: The U.S. Senator’s Representation, Ideological Adop- tion, and Strategic Retirement’, Intermation Journal of Social Science Studies 5(10). Diermeier, D., Keane, M. P. Merlo, A. M. (2005), ‘A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers’, American Economic Review . Egerod, B. C. (2018), ‘The Lure of the Private Sector–Career Prospects affect selection out of the Senate’, (2017). Eggers, A. C. Hainmueller, J. (2009), ‘MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics’, American Political Science Review 103(04), 513–533. Fahey, K. (2018), ‘The Perks of Being a Lawmaker: Returns to Office as a Legislative Goal’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 43(1), 37–68. Fenno, R. F. (1973), Congressmen in committees, Vol. 6, Little, Brown. Fisman, R., Schulz, F. Vig, V. (2014), ‘The Private Returns to Public Office’, Journal of Political Economy 122(4), 806–862. Fox, R. L. Lawless, J. L. (2005), ‘To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition’, American Journal of Political Science 49(3), 642–659. Fukumoto, K. (2009), ‘Systematically dependent competing risks and strategic retire- ment’, American Journal of Political Science 53(3), 740–754. Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T. Naticchioni, P. (2010), ‘Moonlighting politicians’, Jour- nal of Public Economics 94(9-10), 688–699. Gandhi, J. (2008), Political institutions under dictatorship, Cambridge University Press New York. Gehlbach, S., Sonin, K. Zhuravskaya, E. (2010), ‘Businessman candidates’, American Journal of Political Science 54(3), 718–736. Gilmour, J. B. Rothstein, P. (1993), ‘Early republican retirement: A cause of democratic dominance in the house of representatives’, Legislative Studies Quarterly pp. 345–365. Gouglas, A., Maddens, B. Brans, M. (2018), ‘Determinants of Legislative Turnover in Western Europe, 1945–2015’, European Journal of Political Research 57(3), 637–661. Habel, P. D. (2008), ‘The Consequences of Electoral Institutions for Careerism’, Legislative Studies Quarterly (August). Hall, R. L. Van Houweling, R. P. (1995), ‘Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives’ Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House’, American Political Science Review 89(01), 121–136. Hibbing, J. R. (1982), ‘Voluntary retirements from the house in the twentieth century’, The Journal of Politics 44(4), 1020–1034. Hibbing, J. R. (1991), Congressional careers: Contours of life in the US House of Representatives, UNC Press Books. Hibbing, J. R. (1999), ‘Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 24(2), 149–171. Katz, R. S. (1997), Democracy and Elections, Oxford University Press on Demand. Keane, M. P. Merlo, A. (2010), ‘Money, political ambition, and the career decisions of politicians’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2(3), 186–215. Kim, J. Park, K. (2017), ‘Prior margins of victory and legislative careers: Competing risks regression analysis in South Korean national assembly, 1988–2015’, Korea Observer 48(4), 669–699. Langston, J. Aparicio, F. J. (2008), The Past as Future: Prior Political Experience and Career Choices in Mexico. Lasswell, H. D. (1948), Power and personality, Transaction Publishers. Lawless, J. L. Theriault, S. M. (2005), ‘Will She Stay or Will She Go? Career Ceil- ings and Women’s Retirement from the U.S. Congress’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(4), 581–596. Lee, D. S. (2001), ‘The Electoral Advantage to Incumbency and Voters’ Valuation of Politicians’ Experience: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Elections to the House’, 8. Lenz, G. S. Lim, K. (2009), Getting Rich(er) in Office? Corruption and Wealth Accu- mulation in Congress. Leoni, E., Pereira, C. Renno´, L. (2004), ‘Political Survival Strategies : Political Career Decisions in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies’, Journal of Latin American Studies 36, 109–130. Livingston, S. G. Friedman, S. (1993), ‘Reexamining Theories of Congressional Re- tirement: Evidence from the 1980s’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 18(2), 231. Matland, R. E. Studlar, D. T. (2004), ‘Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross- National Analysis’, British Journal of Political Science 34, 87–108. Matthews, D. R. (1954), The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers, New York: Random House. Mayhew, D. R. (1974), ‘Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals’, Polity 6(3), 295–317. Moncrief, G. F. (1999), ‘Recruitment and Retention in U.S. Legislatures’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 24(2), 173–208. Murakami, M. H. (2009), ‘Minority status, ideology, or opportunity: Explaining the greater retirement of house republicans’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 34(2), 219–244. Pepinsky, T. B. (2007), ‘Malaysia: Turnover without change’, Journal of Democracy 18(1), 113–127. Polsby, N. W. (1968), ‘The institutionalization of the us house of representatives’, Amer- ican Political Science Review 62(1), 144–168. Prinz, T. S. (1993), ‘The career paths of elected politicians: a review and prospectus’, Ambition and beyond: career paths of American politicians pp. 11–63. Querubin, P. Snyder, J. (2008), ‘The returns to u.s. congressional seats in the mid-19th century’, Working Paper (July). Raymond, C. D. Overby, L. M. (2019), ‘Calling It Quits: Legislative Retirements in Comparative Perspective’, Political Studies 0(0), 1–18. Rohde, D. W. (1979), ‘Risk-bearing and progressive ambition: The case of members of the united states house of representatives’, American Journal of Political Science pp. 1–26. Samuels, D. (2000), ‘Ambition and Competition: Explaining Legislative Turnover in Brazil’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25(3), 481. Schlesinger, J. A. (1966), Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States, Rand MacNally. Squire, P. (1998), ‘Membership Turnover and the Efficient Processing of Legislation’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 23(1), 23. Stone, W. J., Fulton, S. A., Maestas, C. D. Maisel, L. S. (2010), ‘Incumbency reconsidered: Prospects, strategic retirement, and incumbent quality in U.S. house elections’, Journal of Politics 72(1), 178–190. Struble, R. (1979), ‘House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation’, Political Science Quarterly 94(4), 649. Swain, J. W., Borrelli, S. A., Reed, B. C. Evans, S. F. (2000), ‘A new look at turnover in the U.S. house of representatives, 1789-1998’, American Politics Research 28(4), 435– 457. Szakonyi, D. (2016), Renting Elected Office: Why Businesspeople Become Politicians in Russia, PhD thesis, Columbia University. Theriault, S. M. (1998), ‘Moving up or Moving out: Career Ceilings and Congressional Retirement’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 23(3), 419–433. Timothy, G. Keith, K. (1994), ‘Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Re- tirements from the 102d House’, American Journal of Political Science 38(1), 75–99. Winter, D. G. (1987), ‘Leader Appeal, Leader Performance, and the Motive Profiles of Leaders and Followers: A Study of American Presidents and Elections’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52(1), 196–202. Wolak, J. (2007), ‘Strategic Retirements: The Influence of Public Preferences on Volun- tary Departure from Congress’, 32(2), 285–308. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/56172 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本論文以中華民國第二至八屆立法委員為研究對象,分析其進入國會前職業、到任後財富水平等經濟背景及政治生涯選擇—再參選連任與否—之變遷、現況與關聯。
描述分析上,本文發現第二、三屆立法院中許多擁有鉅額財富之企業家立委於近年已漸不復見;歷屆以來,區域立委之平均資產總額先降後增似與其初就任前之職業背景結構變化有關。其次,掌握預算資源較豐富之常設委員會有較高比例成員到任時擁有事業投資,不過該該比例逐年下降、近期甚有反轉之勢;若由委員會成員之事業投資、有價證券或資產總額觀察,資源較豐委員會成員除了於第二屆擁有較高之平均數額,其餘各屆期兩類委員會互有消長。最後,立法院主要政黨—國民黨與民進黨–提名當選之不分區委員,其平均資產總額歷屆以來均有上漲之勢,資產項目上兩黨各有千秋—國民黨歷來擁有事業投資之比例較高、民進黨者之平均有價證券總額穩定增加;若與各黨所提名當選之區域委員相比,不分區委員之資產相對富足—國民黨早期差距較大、近期呈震盪變化,民進黨則是歷年下來穩定成長、區域與不分區委員之越來越大。 實證分析上,本文驗證了企業家背景國會議員較不會也不傾向參與次屆國會大選及區域選舉。儘管經多屆期留任,企業家背景議員之再參選率,相較沒有背景者,依然較高而且有隨著年資增加而放大的現象。國會議員之到任資產水平於其中有顯著調節作用,對於企業家背景之國會議員而言,極為富有者相較他人,並不會隨著年資增加,提升其未參選延續機率,反而降低。 本文一方面回顧及延續我國國會議員既有研究,並從中提供更多的研究素材、視角與可能方向。另一方面亦盼與美國政治及比較政治等研究領域中有關國會議員經濟背景(Economic Class)、企業家政治人物(Businessman Politician)、生涯選擇(Career Decision)之文獻進行對話—以東亞國家議會之例驗證既存理論,並嘗試銜合各文獻理論內涵提出理論假設進行初步探索、驗證。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis takes the second to eighth legislators of the Republic of China as the research object, and analyzes the changes, current situation and relevance of their economic background and political career choices—whether they are re-elected or not—such as their occupation before entering the Congress and their wealth level after arriving.
In terms of descriptive analysis, this article finds that many entrepreneurial legislators with huge wealth in the second and third legislatures have gradually disappeared in recent years; the average total assets of regional legislators has decreased and then increased, which seems to be the same as before they took office. The occupational background structure changes. Secondly, standing committees with richer budget resources have a higher proportion of members who have business investment when they arrive, but this proportion has been declining year by year and has recently been reversed; if the committee members’ business investment, securities or total assets It is observed that in addition to the relatively high average number of members in the second-term committee, the two types of committees have fluctuated in each term. Finally, the main political parties of the Legislative Yuan-the Kuomintang and the DPP-nominated the elected members of the non-district areas, and their average total assets have risen over the years. The two parties have their own merits in the asset item. The Kuomintang has always had a relatively high proportion of business investment. The average total amount of securities of the party members has increased steadily; if compared with the regional committees nominated and elected by the parties, the assets of the non-regional committee members are relatively rich-the Kuomintang has a large gap in the early days and has recently undergone shock changes, while the DPP has grown steadily over the years The number of regional and non-regional members is growing. Based on empirical analysis, this article verifies that congressmen with an entrepreneurial background are less likely or not inclined to participate in the next Congressional elections and regional elections. Although they have been in office for multiple terms, the re-election rate of MPs with entrepreneurial background is still higher than those without backgrounds, and it is magnified as their seniority increases. The level of assets of congressmen has a significant moderating effect. For congressmen with an entrepreneurial background, the extremely wealthy will not increase their chances of continuance without being elected as their seniority increases, but will decrease them instead. On the one hand, this article reviews and continues the existing research of Chinese congressmen, and provides more research materials, perspectives and possible directions from it. On the other hand, I also look forward to dialogue with the literature on the economic background of congressmen (Economic Class), entrepreneur politicians (Businessman Politician), and career choice (Career Decision) in the research fields of American politics and comparative politics. Examples are used to verify the existing theories, and try to combine the theoretical connotations of various documents to put forward theoretical hypotheses for preliminary exploration and verification. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T05:17:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-2707202020250300.pdf: 3887966 bytes, checksum: 18a276d82baacc06fdad00e141615b0c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌謝 iii 摘要 v Abstract vii 圖次 xi 表次 xiii 1 緒論 1 1.1 研究問題 1 1.2 研究途徑 2 1.3 主要發現 2 1.4 章節安排 3 2 文獻檢閱 5 2.1 代議士經濟階級與背景 5 2.2 國會成員之流動與生涯選擇 6 2.3 影響國會議員生涯選擇之因素 9 3 理論假設—企業家背景議員之可能生涯選擇 13 4 研究設計 15 4.1 分析架構 15 4.2 分析素材 15 4.3 資料處理 17 4.3.1 立委過往從業經歷 17 4.3.2 立委任內財富水平 24 4.3.3 立委議會生涯與發展 26 5 立法委員經濟背景與民主化 27 6 立法院成員流動及生涯情形 45 7 企業家背景與政治生涯選擇 51 7.1 實證方法 51 7.2 再參選與否 55 7.3 參選類型與意向 58 7.4 不同調節機制探索 62 7.4.1 國會年資 62 7.4.2 財富水平 66 7.5 綜合討論 70 8 結論 71 8.1 研究發現 71 8.2 研究限制 72 8.3 後續建議 72 參考文獻 73 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 國會議員之經濟背景及其政治生涯選擇:以我國第二至八屆立法院為例 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Legislators' Economic Background and their Political Career Decision: R.O.C. Legislative Yuan, 1992-2016 | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.author-orcid | 0000-0002-3432-4586 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 黃旻華(Min-Hua Huang) | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor-orcid | 黃旻華(0000-0001-8595-5479) | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 楊子霆(Tzu-Ting Yang),蕭怡靖(Yi-Ching Hsiao) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 立法委員,連任,生涯選擇,經濟背景,財產申報, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Legislator,Re-election,Career Decision,Economic Background,Property-Declaration Record, | en |
dc.relation.page | 82 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001932 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-19 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
U0001-2707202020250300.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 3.8 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。