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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王泰昌(Tay-Chang Wang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Lan-Hsin Kao | en |
dc.contributor.author | 高嵐芯 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T05:09:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-08-25 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2014-08-25 | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2014-08-19 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/55861 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究分三部分探討會計師跳槽後,客戶是否跟隨跳槽會計師更換事務所及其市場反應和審計品質之關聯。研究樣本係選取1983年~2010年間會計師更換事務所者,共1753筆觀察值。
在第一部分logistic之非事務所合併實證結果中,若為上市櫃公司,在兩位會計師均更換事務所和僅副查會計師更換事務所狀況下,會計師任期越長,客戶越會跟隨會計師而更換事務所。若為公開發行以上公司,僅副查會計師更換事務所有達顯著水準。兩位會計師同時更換事務所時,若會計師從小(大)型轉大(小)型事務所,則上市櫃公司越會(不會)跟隨會計師更換事務所。若為上市櫃公司,在僅主查會計師更換事務所狀況下,裁決性應計數越大,越會跟隨跳槽會計師而更換事務所。公開發行以上公司在兩位會計師更換事務所之情形亦然。若會計師整組跳槽及跳槽後是否集中在同一家事務所,則在僅主查會計師更換事務所下,公開發行以上公司越會跟隨會計師更換事務所。裁決性應計數越大、會計師任期越長,則在僅主查會計師更換事務情況下,上市櫃客戶越會跟隨會計師更換事務所。若會計師由小型事務所轉到大型,在兩位會計師均更換事務所及僅主查會計師更換事務所情況下均顯示客戶裁決性應計數越大,則越會跟隨會計師而更換事務所。若會計師整組跳槽且集中在同一家事務所,在兩位會計師均更換事務所及僅主查會計師更換事務所的情況下,公開發行以上客戶越會跟隨會計師而更換事務所。 在第二部分logistic的實證結果中,在事務所非合併情況下,在窗期(-1,1)及(-1,2)跟隨產業專家會計師而更換事務所之公司及跟隨跳槽會計師由小型事務所換至大型事務所之客戶,市場反應為正。跟隨乘以會計師由大型事務所換至大型事務所,在窗期(-1,1)下,市場反應為正。 在第三部分logistic的非事務所合併實證結果中,在兩位會計師均更換事務所或僅主查會計師更換事務所情況下,跟隨任期長會計師而更換事務所之公司,上市櫃公司審計品質會較差。跟隨會計師由小型換至大型事務所之公司,審計品質亦有所改善。在事務所合併情況下,若兩位會計師均更換事務所,則跟隨任期長會計師而更換事務所上市櫃公司,審計品質會較差。跟隨會計師由小(大)型換至大(小)型事務所之公司,審計品質會變好(變差)。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This paper is divided into three parts. The first part is that if auditor jumps ship, whether the clients follow them or not. Second part is the relationship between the news of the first part and the market reaction. The last section investigates how audit quality would change after auditor jumps ship.
This study selects 1753 public companies as observation samples which need to decide whether they should follow their jumping-ship auditor to change the accounting firm or not. In the circumstances which auditor change the accounting firm not because two accounting firms merge together, the empirical result of the first part shows that the longer the audiotrs serve the clients, the higher possibility the companies would follow the auditors to change the accounting firm. If two auditors change the accounting firm from Non-Big4 (Big4) to Big4 (Non-Big4), the listed and OTC companies would have higher (lower) possibility to follow auditors. With the higher discretionary accruals, the companies would be more likely to follow the auditors to change the accounting firms. If more than two auditors change the accounting firm and they change to the same accounting firm, the public companies would be more likely to follow them to the new accounting firm only in the situation that the first auditor changes the accounting firm. With the longer auditor tenure and higher discretionary accruals, the listed and OTC companies would have more chances to follow the auditor to change the accounting firm. If two auditors and only the first auditor change the accounting firm from Non-Big4 to Big4, the clients with higher discretionary accruals would have larger possibility to follow auditors to change the accounting firm. In the circumstances that two auditors and only the first auditor change the accounting firm, if more than two aouditors change the accounting firms and they change to the same accounting firm, the public company with higher discretionary accruals would be more likely to follow auditors to the new accounting firm. For the second section, the empirical results indicate that the companies which follow the industry specialist auditor to change the accounting firm and follow the auditor from non-Big4 to Big4 get the positive market reaction in the circumstances which auditor changes the accouting firm not because accounting firms merge together in the window(-1,1) and (-1,2). Besides, the companies which follow the auditor change the accouting firm from Big4 to Big4 also have the positive market reaction. For the last part, in the circumstances which auditors change the accounting firm not because the accounting firms merge together, the empirical results shows that if the listed and OTC companies do not follow the two longer tenure auditors or only the first longer tenure auditor to change the accounting firm, the audit quality would be improved. So does the companies which follow the auditor change the accounting firm from non-Big4 to Big4. In the circumstances which auditors change the accounting firm because accounting firms merge together, if the listed and OTC companies follow the longer tenure auditors to change the accounting firm, the audit quality would be worse. If the clients do follow auditors to change the accounting firm from non-Big4 (Big4) to Big4 (non-Big4), the audit quality would also be improved (worse). | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T05:09:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R99722005-1.pdf: 2394706 bytes, checksum: 5d89f3fc72f6f37771a7a781a13dcbe1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 #
中文摘要 i Abstract ii 目錄 iv 圖目錄 vi 表目錄 vii 誌謝 xii 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景 1 第二節 研究動機與目的 2 第三節 研究架構 4 第二章 文獻探討 6 第一節 會計師選擇/更換 6 第二節 會計師更換和市場反應 9 第三節 審計品質 11 第三章 研究方法 13 第一節 研究假說 13 第二節 研究模型 20 第三節 資料來源與樣本選取 40 第四章 實證結果與分析 54 第一節 會計師跳槽時,客戶跟隨與否之原因 54 第二節 客戶發布是否跟隨會計師跳槽之市場反應(模型二) 84 第三節 客戶是否跟隨跳槽會計師而更換事務所時,對下一期審計品質的變化(模型三) 93 第五章 結論與建議 119 第一節 研究結論 119 第二節 研究限制 120 第三節 研究建議 121 參考文獻 122 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 會計師跳槽後,客戶跟隨與否與市場反應、審計品質之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effect of Auditors Jumping Ship on Clients’ Following, Market Reaction and Audit Quality | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 劉嘉雯(Chia-Wen Liu) | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 洪玉舜(Yu-Shun Hung) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 會計師更換,產業專家,異常報酬,市場反應,審計品質, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | auditor switching,industry specialist,abnormal returns,market reaction,audit quality, | en |
dc.relation.page | 125 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2014-08-19 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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