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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 洪一薰 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hao-Jen Chiang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 姜浩仁 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T04:14:03Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-09-05 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-09-05 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-08-20 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Apple Shipment Shortfall Prompts Cut in 2011 iPad Shipment Forecast. (2011). IHS iSuppli.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/55635 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 目前市場中在上游供應商與下游採購商之間存在各式各樣單位訂購價格與訂購量間關係之合約，本研究重點在探討非稀缺性資源合約以及稀缺性資源合約，此二不同性質之資源最主要差異在於商品單位價格與訂購量之間呈現正向或負向關係。當商品供應鏈上游產能驟減、供給量突然面臨嚴格限制或者下游需求突然超出預期地大幅提昇（亦即供應鏈發生中斷），此時商品稱為“稀缺性資源”，反之則稱為“非稀缺性資源”。由於商品何時會轉變為稀缺性資源無法準確預期，故上游供應商在制定價量關係之合約時應同時考量其商品可能為稀缺性資源或非稀缺性資源之可能。本研究以Stackelberg模型為基礎，應用期望值之觀念，建構兩階層供應鏈模型，並假設存在多家下游採購商，且採購商間彼此可能存在Cournot競爭。以做決策之時序而言，上游供應商分別決定供應鏈是否中斷時之價量關係，係為先行者；而下游採購商則在觀察價量關係之後，決定自身之訂購量，係為跟隨者。在計價收費方面，本研究則探討單一價格收費與區段價格收費兩種不同計價方式對上游供應商利潤之影響。本研究旨在提供上游供應商在面對潛在之供應鏈中斷時，最大化自身利潤之合約設計決策；並研究模型平衡決策之性質與其管理意含，以及進行參數分析探討模型可能存在之趨勢。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In the current business market, there exist several types of contracts describing the relationship between unit purchase price and ordering quantity. This research considers the contracts for “scarce” and “non-scarce” good. Scarce goods behave a positive-slope relation between the purchase price and ordering quantities, while non-scarce goods behave a negative-slope relation. Scarce goods may exist when a very limited capacity constraint, an unexpected production disruption or a sudden surge in demand occurs. This research applies the concepts of Stackelberg-type model to construct a two-tier supply chain model. The upstream supplier, as the leader, decides the price-quantity relationship of potentially scarce goods. Then the downstream purchasers, after learning these relationships, decide their ordering quantities. We also discuss the impact on upstream supplier’s profit caused by two different pricing schemes: the uniform pricing scheme and the block pricing scheme. This research offers strategies for the upstream supplier in order to maximize its profits under the concern of scarce and non-scarce goods. We investigate the characteristics of the equilibrium decisions and its managerial insights, and analyze the parameters to find managerial insights. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T04:14:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R01546018-1.pdf: 1734067 bytes, checksum: b18209b0e767f4b175ee4e06dcbed7e9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審訂書 i
謝辭 ii 中文摘要 iii Abstract iv Contents v List of Figures vii List of Tables viii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Literature Review 5 2.1 The Supply Chain Coordination 5 2.2 Positive Relationship between Price and Quantity 8 2.3 Risk Management of Supply Chain Disruption 9 Chapter 3 Multiple Identical Downstream Purchasers 12 3.1 Model Description 12 3.2 Notation and Price Functions 15 3.3 Uniform Pricing Scheme 16 3.3.1 Centralized Downstream Purchasers 17 3.3.2 Decentralized Downstream Purchasers 20 3.4 Block Pricing Scheme 23 3.4.1 Centralized Downstream Purchasers 23 3.4.2 Decentralized Downstream Purchasers 26 3.5 Analysis of Equilibrium Decisions for the Centralized-downstream-firm Model 28 3.6 Numerical Investigation 32 3.6.1 Centralized Downstream Purchasers 33 3.6.2 Decentralized Downstream Purchasers 35 Chapter 4 Two Different Downstream Purchasers 37 4.1 Model Description 37 4.2 Uniform Pricing Scheme 37 4.3 Block Pricing Scheme 40 4.4 Numerical Investigation 42 4.4.1 The Well-Behaved Profit Function 42 4.4.2 The Impact of and on the Upstream Supplier 45 Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Research 49 References 52 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 存在稀缺性商品現象之兩階層供應鏈合約設計研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Contract Design for a Two-tier Supply Chain with Potentially Scarce Goods | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳文智,黃奎隆 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Stackelberg模型,單位採購價格與數量正相關,稀缺性資源,供應鏈中斷, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Stackelberg Model,Positive relation between price and quantity,Scarce good, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 56 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-08-20 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 工業工程學研究所 | |
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