獨立董事與銷管費用成本僵固性之關聯

Abstract

過去文獻已發現銷管費用具有成本僵固性，並發現盈餘目標能促使經理人基於自利動機，而更強力地削減銷管費用，使銷管費用成本僵固性較為和緩。此前文獻還認為公司治理能有效避免經理人不適度地裁減銷管費用，使銷管費用成本僵固性較為和緩。本文認為獨立董事，能有效遏止經理人為達成盈餘目標而採取不適當的銷管費用支出決策，避免經理人於公司營收減少時過度削減銷管費用，而使盈餘目標對銷管費用成本僵固性的影響較為和緩。本文以我國約一千家上市櫃公司從2006至2012年的年資料作為樣本進行研究，發現盈餘目標確實能促使經理人基於自利動機，而更強力地削減銷管費用，使銷管費用成本僵固性較為和緩。但無法肯定獨立董事於公司營收減少時，能有效遏止經理人為達成盈餘目標而過度削減銷管費用，獨立董事反而加劇盈餘目標對銷管費用成本僵固性的影響。獨立董事比例較高的公司，也不會更有效地遏止經理人過度削減銷管費用，而使盈餘目標對銷管費用成本僵固性的影響較為和緩。

Prior studies have documented the stickness of SG&A costs and that earnings target effectively push managers to expedite downward adjustment of SG$A costs which in turn diminish the stickness of SG&A costs. Other prior studies have found that effective corporate governance could keep managers from not moderately executing downward adjustment of SG&A costs which in turn diminish the stickness of SG&A costs. This paper argues that independent director, with independence and expertise could effectively restrain managers from making inappropriate SG&A expenditure downward adjustment decisions for earnings target when sales decline and in turn diminish the earnings target’s impact on the stickness of SG&A costs. Using firm-year data for about 1,000 firms listed in TWSE and GTSM over the period 2006-2012, we find that earnings target indeed push managers more aggressively cut SG&A costs and in turn diminish the stickness of SG&A costs. Moreover, we couldn’t find any empirical evidence in support of that independent director effectively restrain managers from aggressively cutting SG&A costs when sales decline. Independent director strengthen the impact of earnings target on the stickness of SG&A costs. We also find that companies with higher percentage of independent director in board of directors couldn’t effectively restrain managers from aggressively cutting SG&A costs when sales decline and couldn’t diminish the impact of earnings target on the stickness of SG&A costs.