考量資訊不對稱下運用信用擔保機制於供應商採購模式之研究

Abstract

本研究主要探討配銷商對於其上游中小企業供應商之資金缺乏與供應風險之議題。擁有充沛資金與信用的配銷商，將建構一信用擔保機制，以解決上游中小企業供應商資金取得困難問題。除此之外，供應鏈風險還包含配銷商對於供應商之成本不確定以及其交貨給配銷商之供貨不確定。因此為了降低這些不確定性的傷害，誘因合約於單供應商採購模型及雙供應商採購模型將試圖降低不確定造成的傷害。本研究以配銷商(買方)立場，透過信用擔保機制的建立，採用誘因合約於單供應商採購模型及雙供應商採購模型進行決策。 面臨資金缺乏供應商在供貨不穩定下，配銷商考慮其利潤時，使用雙供應商採購策略會比單供應商採購策略好。無論哪種模式， 銀行的借貸成數、無效率供應商的交貨滿足率的增加或降低配銷商遇到斷鏈機率時，配銷商的利潤增加。配銷商遇到斷鏈機率的降低會比供應商提升交貨滿足率重要，因此身為供應鏈一整合者，配銷商應該擬一策略是能改善銀行的借貸成數、無效率供應商的交貨滿足率與配銷商遇到斷鏈機率，以便整合供應鏈。對於供應商而言，配銷商能利用本身為資金擔保者立場下，要求供應商應該將交貨滿足率改善為條件，並且對於銀行而言，信保機制能讓銀行多一業務，配銷商應該在容許獲利之下，盡可能的保證銀行獲利，並讓銀行提供更高的貸款成數。

In buyer-supplier relationships, financial shortcoming and supply risks are important concerns. To solve a small and median enterprise supplier’s financial difficulty, distributors can offer credit guarantees. To manage supply disruption and cost uncertainties in the supply chain, distributor can adopt incentive contracts. This is a legal strategy in sole sourcing and dual sourcing situations. This study attempts to examine the issue of a credit guarantee mechanism from the buyer’s perspective, with incentive theory under a sole sourcing or dual sourcing strategy. Under cash constraint of the unreliable supplier A, dual sourcing strategy is better than sole sourcing strategy. As loan-to-value increases, fill rate increases or disruption rate decreases, the expected profit of the distributor increases. A decrease of disruption rate is prior to an enhancement of fill rate. As a coordinator, the distributor is expected to take loan-to-value, fill rate and disruption rate into account to integrate supply chain. The distributor may take the enhancement fill rate as a condition to be guarantor and promising the profit for the financial institution. Consequently, the distributor is able to mitigate supply risk by sourcing strategy under the mechanism in which the financial difficulty for the supplier is solved.