請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/54105
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳其美 | |
dc.contributor.author | Shu-Yu Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 林書羽 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T02:40:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-07-29 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2015-07-29 | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2015-07-22 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Allen, F. and Gale, D., 2000. Bubbles and Crises. The Economic Journal, 110(460), 236-255.
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E., 2001. New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 103-120. Ben-David, I., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R., 2010. Managerial miscalibration. Working paper, Duke University. Burmeister, K., Schade, C., 2007. Are entrepreneurs' decisions more biased? An experimental investigation of the susceptibility to status quo bias. Journal of Business Venturing, 22 (3), 340-362. DeBondt, W. F. M. and R. Thaler, 1985. Does the Stock Market Overreact? The Journal of Finance, 40, 793-805. DeLong, J. B., 1990. Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets. The Journal of Political Economy, 98, 703-38. Dixit, A. K., and Pindyck, R. S., 1994. Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press. Gervais, S., 2010. Capital budgeting and other investment decisions. In Behavioral Finance. H. Kent Baker & John R. Nofsinger (Eds.), . Hoboken: Wiley. Gervais, S., & Odean, T. (2001). Learning to be overconfident. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 1–27. Hirsheleifer, D., Low, A. and Teoh, S.H. (2012) Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? The Journal of Finance, 67(4), August, 1457-1498. Jensen, C. M. and Ruback, S.R., 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50. Kyle, A. and F.-K. Wang, 1997. Speculation duopoly with agreement to disagree: can overconfidence survive the market test? Journal of Finance, 52, 2073-2090. Larwood, L., & Whittaker, W., 1977. Managerial myopia: Self-serving biases in organizational planning. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 194–198. Malmendier, U., & Tate, G., 2008. Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 20–43. March, J. G., & Shapira, Z., 1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking. Management Science, 33, 1404–1418. Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F. P. and Stulz, R.M., 2005, Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave. Journal of Finance 60(2), 757-782. Pindyck, R., 1988. Irreversible investment, capacity choice, and the value of the firm. American Economic Review, 78(5), 969-985. Roll, R., 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business, 59(2), 197-216. Samuelson, W., Zeckhauser, R., 1988. Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1, 7– 59. Schneider, C., & Oliver, S., 2010. Acquisitions as lotteries: Do managerial gambling attitudes influence takeover decisions? Working paper, University of Mannheim. Shefrin, H. and Meir Statman, 2000. Behavioral Portfolio Theory. Unpublished paper, Santa Clara University. Svenson, O., 1981. Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? Acta Psychologica, 47, 143–148. 周賓凰、池祥萱、周冠男、龔怡霖,2002。行為財務學:文獻回顧與展望,證券市場發展季刊,第二期,頁1-47。 許培基、葉銀華、邱琦倫、王宛婷,2013,管理者過度自信、完成併購機率與併購後績效,期貨暨證券市場發展季刊,第九十八期,頁129-160。 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/54105 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究透過建構賽局模型,旨在探討一個理性的企業家,面對兩種對相同資訊具有截然不同解讀方式的過度自信企業主管時,將會如何採用產業競爭策略,引進新技術或者進行併購。
本研究獲得以下幾項重要研究結果: 一、 過度自信的企業主管對於市場資訊的錯誤解讀方式,將會成為產業競爭中的一個承諾(commitment),當企業主管對前景預期樂觀時,將會享有競爭優勢。反之,對前景預期悲觀時,則成為劣勢。 二、 若政府實行裁量式貨幣政策(discretionary monetary policy),且在產業競爭中,至少存在一名因應政府政策而調整產出決策的企業主管,則理性類型企業主管所經營的廠商,其股價將上升。 三、 理性類型的企業主管,面對過度自信類型企業主管,可能因而採取看似不理性的「安於現狀偏誤(status quo bias)」行為,但實為一理性決策。 四、 在本研究中,造成併購發生的主因是,以對產品單位成本較樂觀的企業主管取代較悲觀的企業主管,可以提高一家廠商的競爭優勢。 五、 併購發生後,理性類型的主併公司以及被併公司的股價皆會上升,而其對手廠商的股價則會下跌。此外,對於市場中的消費者而言,消費者剩餘將上升。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The objective of this paper is to propose a model that allows for the presence of over-confidence, with over-estimate information type and under-estimate information type, and that incorporates the empirical and experimental findings as an evidence to illustrate the effect of managerial traits towards the industrial competitive advantage, the timing of technology update, and the merger. The main results are listed below:
1. The wrong belief of the information of the over-confidence entrepreneurs in a duopoly Cournot quantity-setting competition, via strategic complementarity, constitutes a commitment, which brings them a competitive advantage if they are optimistic about the future, and othterwise a disadvantage if they are pessimistic about the future. 2. With the discretionary monetary policy proposed by the Government, the output adaption decision made by at least one of the entrepreneurs will lead to the increase of the volatility of the equilibrium product price. 3. The rational entrepreneur facing the overconfident entrepreneur will not take an irrational status quo bias action but make a rational profit maximization decision. 4. The reason why the merger happens is that, in the duopoly market, the firm operated by the optimistic entrepreneur will be the acquiring firm and the other firm operated by the pessimistic entrepreneur will be the target firm, and that their action will enhance the firm’s competitive advantage. 5. After the merger succeeded, the stock price of both the rational acquiring firm and target firm will increase, and that of the rival firm will decrease. In addition, the consumer surplus will increase. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T02:40:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R02723044-1.pdf: 3337412 bytes, checksum: ae5daebd4624a6eec313894da0f4e221 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 iii
中文摘要 iv 英文摘要 v 表目錄 vii 第一章. 緒論 1 1.1 研究動機 1 1.2 研究目的 3 1.3 研究方法與研究結果 3 第二章. 文獻探討 7 2.1 經理人的過度自信行為特質 7 2.2 經理人的安於現狀偏誤行為 8 2.3 影響企業技術更新發生之因素 10 2.4 影響併購發生之因素 11 第三章. 企業主管過度自信與裁量式貨幣政策以及企業技術更新 13 3.1 模型一:賽局描述 13 3.1.1 第零期(T=0) 13 3.1.2 第一期(T=1) 13 3.1.3 第二期(T=2) 14 3.1.4 信息假設與資訊解讀假設 14 3.2 模型一:均衡分析 15 3.2.1 第二期雙佔競爭 15 3.2.2 過度自信對於產品市場競爭的影響 19 3.2.3 裁量式貨幣政策(discretionary monetary policy) 20 3.3 模型二:賽局描述 23 3.3.1 第一期(T=1) 23 3.3.2 第二期(T=2) 24 3.3.3 信息假設與資訊解讀假設 24 3.4 模型二:均衡分析 24 3.4.1 第二期雙佔競爭 24 3.4.2 第一期技術更新 24 第四章. 企業主管過度自信與企業併購 27 4.1 模型三:賽局描述 27 4.1.1 第一期(T=1) 27 4.1.2 第二期(T=2) 28 4.1.3 信息假設與資訊解讀假設 28 4.2 模型三:均衡分析 28 4.2.1 第二期雙佔競爭 28 4.2.2 第一期併購決策 28 第五章. 結語 38 5.1 結論 38 5.2 管理意涵 39 5.3 研究限制與未來研究方向 40 附錄 41 參考文獻 50 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 企業主管過度自信與企業技術更新、併購行為關聯性之研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Strategic Roles of Managerial Over-confidence: a Behavioral Theory of Mergers and Technology Updates | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 周善瑜 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 池祥麟,王泰昌 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 過度自信,裁量式貨幣政策,安於現狀偏誤,技術更新,併購, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | over-confidence,discretionary monetary policy,status-quo bias,technology update,merger, | en |
dc.relation.page | 52 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2015-07-22 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-104-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 3.26 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。