法院外債務協商的賽局分析

Abstract

對於真實世界中的企業來說，財務困難 (financial distress)的發生，無疑地將對企業的永續經營產生立即性的威脅。財務困難企業 (financially distressed enterprises)面臨此一難關，必須盡其所能地與債權人進行法院外債務協商，以期完成負債重組 (financial restructuring)。另一方面，對於債權人而言，除了必須與財務困難企業進行債務協商，亦必須與其他債權人針對可能出現的利益衝突，尋求解決之道。 本研究的目的，即是針對債權人之間最常見的利益衝突：「無擔保債權人對有擔保債權人實施要脅」，以賽局理論的觀點模擬參賽者的思維邏輯，並選擇以靜態賽局及動態「最後通牒賽局」(Ultimatum Game)為分析架構，預測參賽者理性的策略選擇，以及賽局的均衡結果，並與實務觀察結果加以比較，若有不同，探討其中差異之原因。 本研究發現，賽局理論預測的結果，與實務中所觀察到的現象並不完全相同。即使不利於短期利益，現實世界裡的銀行債權人，還是願意以互惠式的合作，取代賽局理論所假設的理性自利，在看似對立的賽局中達成合作性的結果。 針對前述的差異，本研究認為，現實世界中的銀行債權人於進行決策選擇時，並非完全理性地只比較可量化的利益，還會考量銀行債權人因違反社會規範及行業規範所衍生的無形成本，以及因違反規範而失去自未來重複賽局中獲益的機會成本。

The occurrence of financial distress will undoubtedly pose immediate threat to the survival of enterprises. Challenged by difficult situation, financially distressed enterprises need to initiate out-of-court restructuring, or “workout” process, to restructure their debts. On the other hand, creditors of financially distressed enterprises not only need to be in negotiation with the debtor, but sometimes, voluntarily or not, deal with the potential conflict of interests with their peers. The purpose of this study is to examine, from a game theoretic perspective, one of the most frequently observed conflicts among creditors- a hold-up by an unsecured creditor against a secured creditor. A static game and a dynamic “ultimatum game” model are used as the analytic framework to predict players’ rational choices and the equilibrium of the game. The differences, if any, between the theoretic prediction and practical observation will be discussed. The study finds that, what’s suggested by theories doesn’t make it a reality. Bank creditors in a seemingly hostile situation are willing to tango with each other reciprocally when there are potential mutual benefits that can be shared in the future, even at the cost of a short-term loss. A probable explanation may be seen from the perspective of “social norms”. Other than quantifiable benefits that can be derived from total rationality, bank creditors do take into consideration of unquantifiable cost, including the punitive cost incurred from violating social norms and business protocol, and the opportunity cost of potential long-term gain as a result of being expelled from the repeated games in the future.