審計委員會和薪酬委員會成員重疊程度、財務報導品質與審計公費的關聯性

Abstract

本論文從查核人員的角度探討審計委員會和薪酬委員會成員重疊程度的影響。以2003到2010年的美國公司為研究對象，本論文實證結果發現（1）審計委員會和薪酬委員會成員重疊程度較高的公司，財務報導品質較高;（2）財務報導品質較高的公司，審計公費較低;（3）審計委員會和薪酬委員會成員重疊程度較高的公司，審計公費較低;（4）審計委員會和薪酬委員會成員重疊程度會直接影響審計公費，同時也透過財務報導品質間接影響審計公費。

This thesis examines the effect of overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees from the perspective of auditors. Using 6,550 firm-year observations in the U.S. during 2003-2010, the results show that（1）firms with higher overlapping audit and compensation committee members have higher financial reporting quality;（2）firms with higher financial reporting quality have less audit fees; （3）firms with higher overlapping audit and compensation committee members have less audit fees; and（4）overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees not only directly affects audit fees, but also indirectly affects audit fees through financial reporting quality.