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標題: | 以薛普利值為基礎公用電網與微電網間電力交換之對價計算 Shapley Value-based Payment Calculation for Energy Exchange between Micro- and Utility Grids |
作者: | Robin Pilling 羅賓 |
指導教授: | 張時中 |
關鍵字: | 以薛普利值,公用電網,微電網,電力交換,對價計算, Payment Calculation,Energy Exchange,Shapley Value,Microgrid,Utility Grid, |
出版年 : | 2015 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 近年來,微電網間的整合發展改善了電力系統的效能以及提供經濟、可靠且持續性的電力供輸。其特徵在於以單一可控制的整體來管理相較於現有的電力系統會帶來一些好處,並且需要在幑電網與其托管事業間聯合操作和共享利益。然而,為了提高和分享兩者間藉由電力交換帶來的效益,如何公平的計算單一個體在聯合操作中的成本分配以及補償是一個重要的議題。
本論文主要探討如何在微電網與其公用電網聯合操作時,透過能量的交換來最小化每日的發電成本。本文提出一個用來補償能量交易的支出計算方法,而能量的交易係基於縮減後的發電成本之公平分配。儘管公用電網和微電網是彼此連接運作的發電系統,本研究假設它們各自的發電量與負載仍然與其獨立運作時相當。我們以合作對局理論的薛普利值設計使電力交換聯盟節省發電成本的誘因,並提出參考獨立發電成本與聯合發電成本之能量交易支出計算方法。 我們根據微電網和公用電網個別擁有的發電單位,在無電力交換的情況下計算 “as if” 的獨立發電成本。為了計算微電網的每日發電成本,我們將機組發電量(UC)和經濟調度(ED)規劃為一個取決於固定配置的分佈式發電,一種可再生能源的來源與儲存系統的混合整數規劃問題。對於電力公司的發電成本,我們採用了可用機組在不同負載量下的每小時發電成本函數可透過機組發電量和經濟調度取得的聚合機組。 為了盡量減少與電網之間的電力交換的發電成本,我們提出了一個理想的集中式決策模型,其中微電網和其託管效用的產生都集中調度。通過利用獨立和聯合發電成本,我們計算聯合儲蓄和運用薛普利值模型,基於個人邊際成本對電力交換聯盟的貢獻,分配微型和公用電網之間的降低系統發電成本。為了公平地補償能量交換,我們計算以薛普利值和每個網格在聯合發電下實際發電成本的差值作為支付電力交易。 透過德州奧斯汀微電網與台灣電網間的互動模型,我們展現了理想狀況下,集中式決策電力交換模式降低了系統成本;並且建立了微電網與電廠間,發電盈餘能公平共享的對價基礎。為了能在夏季與冬季,系統皆能皆創造並共享每日發電盈餘,我們採用了基於薛普利值的對價計算模型,針對電力交換雙方各自所貢獻的盈餘做等價交換,以刺激微電網與電廠間的合作,進一步結合為集中化市場統合者下的可控制整體。 In recent years, microgrids developed as an integral to improve power systems and provide an affordable, reliable, and sustainable supply of electricity. Each microgrid is managed as a single controllable entity with respect to the existing power system but demands for joint operation and sharing the benefits between a microgrid and its hosting utility. This thesis focuses on the joint operation of a microgrid and its hosting utility which cooperatively minimizes daily generation costs through energy exchange, and proposes a payment calculation scheme that compensates for power transactions based on a fair allocation of reduced generation costs. This research assumes that although the utility and the microgrid are operating as interconnected power systems, they have their own generation and loads and are still able to undergo standalone operations. To incentivize generation cost savings that can be realized by a power exchange coalition, we adopt the cooperative game theoretic solution concept of Shapley value and suggest a fair payment calculation scheme for power transactions which requires the evaluation of standalone and joint generation costs. Our approach first calculates the “as-if” standalone generation cost for both the micro- and the utility grids based on the minimized cost of their individually owned generation units with no power exchange. To calculate the microgrid’s daily generation costs, we formulate its unit commitment (UC) and economic dispatch (ED) as a mixed integer programming problem given a fixed configuration of distributed generation, a renewable energy source and an energy storage and apply a commercial solution package. As for the utility grid’s generation cost, we model it as an aggregated unit, of which the hourly generation cost function for the available generation units over different load levels has been given. To minimize the generation costs with power exchange between the grids, we then propose an ideally centralized decision model where the generation of the microgrid and its hosting utility are jointly dispatched. By exploiting the standalone and joint generation costs, we calculate joint savings and apply the model of Shapley value to distribute reduced system generation cost between the micro- and utility grids based on their individual marginal cost contributions to the power exchange coalition. To fairly compensate for energy exchange, we calculate the payments for mutual power transactions as the difference of the Shapley values and the actual generation cost of each grid under joint generation. We design a fictitious interconnection model between the Mueller microgrid in Austin, Texas and the utility grid in Taiwan for case study to share the savings from their coalition through fair payments for energy exchange. Our case study shows that compared to standalone generation, both the micro- and utility grids are better-off when they collaborate in power exchange regardless of their individual contributions to the power exchange coalition. Fair payments for both a summer and winter generation scenario, however, show that joint savings through energy exchange depend on variations in load profiles and ask for different cost reimbursement schemes during summer and winter. To incentivize sharing the savings from energy exchange, we compensate microgrid saving contributions from solar power and distributed generation during summer by utility to microgrid payments, and mutually beneficial energy exports from the utility to the microgrid during winter by microgrid to utility payments. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/53048 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
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