兩岸簽署貨幣清算合作備忘錄之研究

Abstract

兩岸幾經磋商終於在2012年8月31日簽署了《海峽兩岸貨幣清算合作備忘錄》，然由於兩岸政治因素的干擾，加上近來國際貨幣局勢的不穩定，兩岸貨幣合作雖有初步成果，卻也產生了諸多問題。 透過文本分析與對學者專家的訪談，論者發現兩岸二十餘項協商文本當中，由「官方對官方」具名簽署的總計四個，均以「備忘錄」命名，與兩岸兩會所簽署的「協議」有所區隔，此在文本立法體例上不無疑義。其次，在文本末段兩岸官方具名簽署並未使用中央銀行、人民銀行代表等字眼，而是模糊的以台灣、大陸方面貨幣管理機構來稱呼彼此，此與台灣政府所稱的「互不否認」、「對等協商」有所出入。 在文本的生效日期方面，大陸政府並未遵守備忘錄中的約定，清算機制正式運作的日期因其遲未選定清算行而延宕了半年，此顯見大陸於兩岸貨幣合作中具有高度的主導權，台灣始終處於被動，與台灣政府所謂「務實對等」有相當的落差。 最後，關於文本簽署後的影響方面。清算機制正式運作前，央行不顧市場機制強行壓低了人民幣在台灣境內的存款利率，然開辦人民幣業務一年後，央行卻改口說要符合國際行情而促請業者調高利率，此種前後不一的干預手段如何使人民信賴令人質疑。而除了央行的政策作為受到兩岸貨幣合作影響之外，台商、人民幣存戶、觀光地區的商家，也都受到了的影響。較之於其他兩岸合作的議題，論者認為兩岸貨幣合作的影響最為深遠，台灣政府對於新台幣與人民幣的相關效應尤須審慎應對。

After several negotiations, Cross-Strait finally signed 'the MOU on Cross-Strait Currency Settlement Cooperation' in August 31, 2012. Cross-Strait currency cooperation reaped first fruits, but it also brought many problems due to the interference of political factors and the recent instability of the international monetary situation. Through textual analysis and interviews, we could find that in the more than twenty negotiated text of Cross-Strait, a total of four signed by the 'Official to Official' which all named 'Memorandum', and it was different from the 'Agreement' signed by SEF-ARATS. This was not no doubt about the legislative style. Secondly, in the last paragraph of the text signed by the official of Cross-Strait did not use the word 'The Central Bank representative' nor 'The People's Bank representative', but vaguely used 'The Monetary Authorities of Taiwan' and' The Monetary Authorities of Mainland China' to call each other. It varied from the government of Taiwan so-called 'Do Not Deny Each Other' and 'Peer Negotiation'. Then, in the aspect of the text’s commencement, the government of Mainland China did not comply with the agreement in the memorandum, and the date of the formal operation of currency settlement mechanism had delayed six months due to its settlement bank’s selection. It was apparent that Mainland China had a high degree of dominance in the currency cooperation between Cross-Strait, and Taiwan had always been passive. This kind of situation differed from the government of Taiwan so-called 'Pragmatic and Equality'. Finally, in the aspect of the influence after signing the text, the Central Bank, regardless of the market mechanism, lowered the RMB deposit rates in the territory of Taiwan before the settlement mechanism’s formal operation. But when RMB business began after a year, the Central Bank was changed to say that to meet the international markets, it would urge the industry to raise interest rates. How to make people trust this inconsistent intervention is questionable. In addition to the Central Bank's monetary policy, the currency cooperation of Cross-Strait also had influence on Taiwan’s industry which invested in Mainland China, RMB depositors and the businesses in tourist regions. Comparing to the other issues of Cross-Strait cooperation, the impact of the Cross-strait’s currency cooperation was the most far-reaching, and Taiwan’s government should carefully respond to NTD and RMB-related effects.