歐洲議員投票行為分析：以Six-Pack立法為例

Abstract

近年研究文獻證實，歐洲議員投票行為主要受到歐洲議會跨國黨團影響，即跨國黨團黨籍而非會員國國籍身份決定歐洲議員投票偏好。本研究旨在探討，當立法表決議案內容大幅限縮會員國的財政與經濟政策自主權時，歐洲議員的投票行為究竟是受到個人政治意識型態、國內政黨、會員國國籍或歐洲議會跨國黨團影響？ 本文以第七屆歐洲議會於2011年針對Six-Pack的11項修正案與6項決議案的記名表決紀錄為研究對象，蒐集歐洲議員的個人政治意識型態指數、其所屬國內政黨競選政見之特定政策偏好程度、其所屬會員國的經濟利益與民調結果、其所屬跨國黨團黨籍，以檢證既有歐洲議員投票行為理論。 多項勝算對數模型顯示，在前述 Six-Pack的記名表決紀錄中，首先，跨國黨團黨籍對歐洲議員投票行為有顯著影響，來自中間偏右黨團的歐洲議員傾向支持Six-Pack法案，而來自中間偏左黨團的歐洲議員則傾向反對；其次，歐洲議員所屬會員國國內民眾信任歐洲執委會的程度對歐洲議員投票行為亦有顯著影響，若會員國民眾越傾向信任歐洲執委會，該國歐洲議員越支持Six-Pack法案及其財政紀律的嚴格規範內容。

Empirical research reveals the party membership of European party group (EPG) is a strong predictor of the voting behaviour of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Yet, we know little about whether this still holds true if the legislative proposals were strongly tied to constrain national budget autonomy and macroeconomic policies. The Lisbon Treaty has significantly enhanced the EP’s formal role in the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance law-making process by allowing the EP to have co-decision powers under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). However, there is little research that provides an analysis of MEP voting behaviour in this policy area. This research focuses on the case of the Six-Pack because it is the first fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance legislative package ever to pass through the EP. This research attempts to answer the following questions: When making stronger rules for fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance, do MEPs vote along with political ideologies, national parties, national affiliations or European party groups? To understand the determinants of MEPs vote on the Six-Pack, this thesis looks at 11 amended proposal votes and 6 legislative resolution votes in the Seventh European Parliament. Using multinomial logit regression model, this paper identifies several determinants which affect how MEP vote. First, it finds that the EPG membership variables are highly significant determinants of which way MEPs vote on the Six-Pack. The MEPs from the centre-right EPGs are much more in favour of the Six-Pack, while the MEPs of the radical left or centre-left EPGs are more likely to vote against. Second, the statistic results indicate that MEPs from a member state with a high percentage of public trust in the European Commission are more likely to support for the provisions of stringent fiscal rules in the Six-Pack.