美國與中共軍事交往之研究（1979-2015）：從戰略合作到風險管控

Abstract

本研究旨在探討美「中」軍事交往之戰略目標、發展變化與發展限制，藉由結構現實主義、普特南之雙層賽局的分析架構，解釋1979年以來美「中」軍事交往發展與限制，並分析其戰略競合關係變化。回顧研究文獻，美「中」軍事交往基本上受到國際結構、國內政治及其雙邊關係互動之影響。冷戰時期，美國為制衡蘇聯擴張，採取聯「中」制蘇策略，維持戰略平衡下，逐步開展對中共軍事交往，中共則有共同抵禦蘇聯侵略、獲取美國先進軍事裝備與技術、實現國防現代化等戰略考量。 美「中」經過多年交往與磨合，逐步建立互信機制，美「中」軍事交往逐步朝向制度化、機制化趨勢發展及軍事行為準則規則化，雙方透過戰略暨經濟對話、國防諮商會談、海上軍事諮商協定會議、「中」美國防部工作會晤、人道主義救援減災交流、軍艦互訪、軍事熱線、美「中」兩軍舉行聯合演習頻率增加等，以合作對話管控分歧，避免誤判風險，建立長遠與務實的對話。惟美「中」在南海爭端之權力競逐，雙方對區域秩序主導權的競合態勢日益明顯。隨著美「中」機艦在大陸周邊海域摩擦事件頻傳，雙方均需透過風險管控處理雙邊關係，簽署重大軍事行動相互通報信任措施機制和海空相遇安全行為準則，旨在增進互信、防範風險、管控危機。隨著中共的權力穩步上升，北京與華府在亞太區域秩序主導權競爭日益激烈，近年北京「核心利益」內涵不斷廣化，為中共處理周邊問題設定底線。當前北京維持美「中」關係穩定發展的重要性，遠高於國家統一之「核心利益」。北京倡議建構「中」美新型大國關係、新型軍事關係，試圖取得主動權。研究發現，美「中」軍事交往的合作基礎，在於建構軍事交往的制度化溝通機制與開展合作領域、增加兩邊軍事互信，避免軍事衝突降低誤解與誤判之可能，此有助雙方的共同利益。在實踐中，中共將臺美軍售視為雙邊議題，有效阻止美國對臺重大軍售，「核心利益」似已發揮示警與外交槓桿效果。長遠而言，未來美「中」兩強在亞太區域秩序之變化，將取決於經濟及軍事實力。

This dissertation contains two major themes: analyzing the U.S.-PRC military engagement of its strategic objectives and constructing a dynamics theory from a structural realist perspective by accounting for structural factors, such as the international system, domestic constituency and interactions between U.S. and PRC. Previous studies tend to focus on the differences in U.S.’s military engagement policy toward PRC under different political leaders. I put forward two models of institution robustness for democratic and non-democratic states based on Putnam's two-level game concept to explain the development of the U.S. and PRC military engagement and its behavior approach to strategic cooperation and risk management between 1979 and 2015. In order to balance against the expansion of Soviet, the U.S. gradually promoted military engagement with PRC since the late 1970s. PRC aligned with the U.S. against the Soviets for acquiring advanced U.S. military equipment and technology, the domestic modernization rather than intent on threatening Soviets interests via a military bloc with U.S. The U.S. and PRC continued bilateral military technology cooperation and arms sales so as to prevent the Soviet threat, and the U.S. suspended its military cooperation with PRC in 1989. As PRC’s power continues to grow, it has steadily broadened the substance of its PRC has also linked its “core interests” and “new model of military relations” treatises in an attempt to achieve a dominant country status commensurate with its rising power. Over the past decade, the relationship between the U.S. military and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forms the core of the U.S.-PRC strategic relationship. Both sides’ defense and military officials meet more regularly under the currently existing dialogue and consultation mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, the Defense Consultation Talks, the Defense Policy Consultation Talks, as well as through newly formed dialogue channels between each side’s strategic planning departments and armies. After the analysis of the two cases studies on the South China Sea disputes and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the study found that, in practice, PRC views US arms sales to Taiwan as a bilateral issue. It has effectively prevented major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and apparently achieved warning and diplomatic leverage effects in the defense of its “core interests.” Beijing has also adopted a more proactive external strategy since Xi Jinping came into power. These initiatives aim to consolidate PRC's power position in the international structure and weaken the economic and trade influence of the United States. It provides us a better understanding of the dynamics of decision-making preference change, the role of leaders in government, and the politics of domestic, constituency-driven military engagement institutionalization under the governance of an international structure.