審計與薪酬委員會及其他董事會成員權益薪酬與盈餘管理之研究

Abstract

本研究旨在探討董事會成員股權基礎給付之薪酬與盈餘管理的關聯。過去研 究發現高階經理人因股權基礎給付薪酬所形成的權益誘因,會提高公司盈餘管理 之情況;權益誘因若作用於獨立董事身上,則會與盈餘管理程度呈反向關係。配 合董事會結構的強化,本研究不僅將董事樣本劃分為審計委員會成員、薪酬委員 會成員、以及其他董事會成員三個群組,更將衡量董事之權益誘因分別以權益薪 酬總金額和權益薪酬占總薪酬之比例代理,且以裁決性應計數衡量公司盈餘管理 程度,結果顯示審計委員會、其他董事會成員、以及以權益薪酬比例衡量之薪酬 委員會,其權益誘因與下年度盈餘管理程度呈反向關係。本文再進一步將權益薪 酬拆分成選擇權型與股票型,發現僅選擇權型在三個群組樣本內皆與盈餘管理程 度呈負向相關,而股票型薪酬與盈餘管理之負相關只存在於審計委員會。最後, 再將選擇權型與股票型薪酬各劃分成獨立董事與內部董事兩組,發現獨立董事之 選擇權型薪酬在各群組皆與盈餘管理程度有負向相關,股票型僅在審計及薪酬委 員會身上與盈餘管理程度有負向相關。本研究之穩健性測試係將兼任審計與薪酬 委員會的董事成員剔除,藉以消彌其對本研究回歸式之影響,結果顯示回歸式的 結論與原來的差異不大。

In this paper, I examine how directors’ equity-based compensation affects earnings management by decomposing directors into audit committee, compensation committee, and other members of the board, who are not in the audit or compensation committees. Initially, I respectively test the relationship between income-increasing earnings management, measuring by discretionary accruals, and equity incentives of the three directors’ groups. The result suggests that there is a significant negative relation between income-increasing earnings management and equity incentives of three sample groups measured by ratio of equity compensation to total compensation. However, when equity compensation amount measure is used, the relation only exists in audit committee and other members of the board. Next, I decompose the equity-based compensation into options and stocks. A negative relation is found between options compensation of three sample groups and income-increasing earnings management. On the other hand, the unfavorable effect on the relation between stock compensation and income-increasing earnings management only exists in audit committee. Lastly, I separate compensation into independent and inside directors, finding that inside directors do not maintain the unfavorable effect on the relation between compensation and income-increasing earnings management. Regarding independent directors, the option compensation of three sample groups are negatively associated with income-increasing earnings management. Nevertheless, as for the stock compensation, the unfavorable effect is observed only in audit and compensation committee. As a robustness test, I eliminate the impact of overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees. The results are unaffected by the elimination of overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees.