Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/50749Full metadata record
| ???org.dspace.app.webui.jsptag.ItemTag.dcfield??? | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林世銘 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ching-Jen Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張敬人 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T12:56:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2016-08-02 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2016-08-02 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2016-07-15 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 林宛瑩、許崇源、戚務君、陳宜伶，2009，公司治理與信用風險，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第S2期，頁71-98。
卓佳蓉，2013，董事長、總經理任期與經營績效之探討—以國內上市（櫃）公司為例，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第101期，頁105-114。 高蘭芬、盧正壽、黃冠智、陳安琳，2012，公司治理、公司績效與投資策略，中山管理評論，第20卷第3期，頁849-878。 陳宜伶，2009，董事會之獨立、專業、參與對企業績效及風險之影響，政治大學會計系未出版博士論文。 黃智聰、羅光達、陳寶惠，2013，中小企業薪資不均程度對其經營績效之影響─以台北縣製造業為例，管理與系統，第20卷第3期，頁459-480。 葉銀華，2015，公司治理─全球觀點、台灣體驗，滄海圖書。 Adams, R., H. Almeida, D. Ferreira. 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies 18: 1403-1432. Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholder. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31(3): 377-397. Amihud, Y., and B. Lev. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. The Rand Journal of Economics 12: 605-618. Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, and T. L. Neal. 2009. The audit committee oversight process. Contemporary Accounting Research 26(1): 65-122. Bebchuk, L., and A. Cohen. 2005. The cost of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics 78: 409-433. Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan. Berle, A., and G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporate and Private Property, New York：Macmillan. Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law. 27(2): 231-273. Bruynseels, L., and E. Cardinaels. 2014. The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO? The Accounting Review 89(1): 113. Bushee, B. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopia rand investment behavior. The Accounting Review. 73(3): 305-333 Carcello, J. V., and T. L. Neal 2003. Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following new going-concern reports. The Accounting Review 78(1): 95-117. Carcello, J. V., D. R. Hermanson, T. L. Neal, and R. A. Riley, Jr. 2002. Board characteristics and audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research 19 (3): 365-384. Chaganti, R. S., V. Mahajan, and S. Sharma. 1985. Corporate board size, composition and corporate failures in retailing industry. Journal of Management Studies 22(4): 400-417. Chi, H. Y., and C. L. Chin. 2009. Reducing Restatements with Increased Industry Expertise. Contemporary Accounting Research 26(3): 729-765. Chung, K. H., and S. W. Pruitt. 1994. A Simple Approximation of Tobin's Q. Financial Management 23(3). Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. Lang. 2000. The separation of Ownership and control in East Asian Corporation. Journal of Financial Economics 58(1): 81-112. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. H. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57(6): 2741-2772 Coase, R. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica. New Series 4(16): 386-405. Cohen, J. R., G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2008a. Form versus substance: The implications for auditing practice and research of alternative perspectives on corporate governance. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 27(2): 181-198. Coles, J., N. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87: 329-356. Conger, J. A., D. Finegold, and E. E. Lawler. 1998. Appraising boardroom performance. Harvard Business Review. 76: 136-148 Cyert, R., S. Kang, and P. Kumar. 2002. Corporate governance, takeovers and top-management compensation: theory and evidence. Management Science 48: 453-469. Dahya, J., O. Dimitrov, and J. McConnell. 2008. Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics. 87(1): 73-100. Davenport, T. H. and J. C. Beck. 2001. The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business. Publisher: Harvard Business Review Press; Revised edition. ISBN: 1578518717 DeAngelo, L. E. 1986. Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: a study of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Review 61(3): 400-420. DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3(3): 183-199. Defond, M. L., R. N. Hann, and X. Hu. 2005. Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors? Journal of Accounting Research. 43(2): 153-193. Dhaliwal, D., V. Naiker, and F. Navissi. 2010. The association between accruals quality and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research 27: 787-827. Faleye, O. 2007. Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Financial Economics 83(2): 501-529. Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288-307. Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325. Fan, J. P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33(3): 401-425. Fan, J. P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2005. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research 43(1): 35-72. Fich, E., and A. Shivdasani. 2006, Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance 61: 689-724. Fich, E., and A. Shivdasani. 2007. Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 86: 306-336. Field, L., M. Lowry, and A. Mkrtchyan. 2012, Are Busy Boards Detrimental? Journal of Financial Economics forthcoming. Fracassi, C., and G. Tate. 2012. External networking and internal firm governance. Journal of Finance 67: 153-194. Francis, J. R., and M. D. Yu. 2009. Big 4 office size and audit quality. The Accounting Review 84: 1521. Francis,R., K. Schipper, and L. Vinecnt. 2005. Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights ate separated from voting rights. Journal of Accounting Economics 39(2): 329-360. Gillan, S. L. 2006. Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview. Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3): 381-402. Gordon, L. and J. Pound. 1993. Information, ownership structure, and shareholder voting: evidence from shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal. Journal of Finance 48(2): 697-718. Grinstein, Y., and P. Hribar. 2004. CEO compensation and incentives-evidence from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics 73: 119-143. Harris, I., and K. Shimizu. 2004. Too busy to serve? An examination of the influence of overboarded directors. Journal of Management Studies 41: 775-798. Haunschild, P., and M. Beckman. 1998 When do interlocks matter?: Alternate sources of information and interlock influence. Administrative Science Quarterly 43: 815-844. Huang, S. 2013. Zombie Boards: Board Tenure and Firm Performance. SSRN Working Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2302917 Hwang, B., and S. Kim. 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics 93: 138-158. Imhoff, E. A. 2003. Accounting quality, auditing, and corporate governance. Accounting Horizons. Supplement: 117-128 Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control system. Journal of Finance 148: 831-880. Jensen, M. C., and R. Buback. 1983. The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11(3): 5-50. Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm：Managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360 Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economic Review 76: 323-329. Jiraporn, P., W. Davidson, P. DaDalt, and Y. Ning. 2009. Too busy to show up? Analysis of directors absences. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49(3): 1159–1171. Jiraporn, P., Y. Kim, W. Davidson, and M. Singh. 2006. Corporate governance, shareholders rights, and firm diversification: An empirical analysis. Journal of Banking and Finance 30: 947-963. Johnson, J. L., C. Daily, and A. Ellstrrand. 1996. Board of directors: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management 22(3): 409-438. Kesner, I. F. 1987. Director stock ownership and organization performance: An investigation of fortune 500 companies. Journal of Financial Economics. 43(3): 245-395. Klein, A. 1998. Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law and Economics. 41(1): 275-303. Krishnan, G. V., and G. Visvanathan. 2008. Does the SOX definition of an accounting expert matter? The association between audit committee directors accounting expertise and accounting conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research 25: 827-858. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance. 54(2): 471-517. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2000. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics. 58(1-2): 3-27. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance. 57(3): 1147-1170. Lanham, R. A. 2007. The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information. Publisher: University Of Chicago Press. ISBN: 0226468674 Larcker, D. F., S. A. Richardson, and I. Tuna. 2007. Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review 82(4): 963-1008. Lemmon, M. L., and K. V. Lins. 2003. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance 58(4): 1445-1468. Lindenberg, E. B., and S. A. Ross. 1981. Tobin's q ratio and industrial organization. Journal of Business (January): 1-32. McConnell, J. J. and H. Servaes. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 595-612. McDaniel, L., R. D. Martin, and L. A. Maines. 2002. Evaluating financial reporting quality: the effects of financial expertise vs. financial literacy. The Accounting Review 77: 139-167. Meyer, M., P. Miligrom, and J. Roberts. 1992. Organizational prospects, influence costs, and ownership changes. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1: 9-35. Mitton, T. 2002. A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 64(2): 215-241. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2004. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Oviatt B. M., 1988. Agency and transaction cost perspectives on the manager-shareholder relationship: incentive for congruent interests. Academy of Management Review 13(2): p.214-225. Pfeffer, J., and G. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper and Row. Pound, J. 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20(2): 237-264. Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall. Scharfstein, D., and J. Stein. 2000. The dark side fo internal capital markets: Divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment. Journal of Finance 55: 2537-2564 Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. 1987. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52(2): 737-783. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52: 737-783. Srinidhi, B. N., S. He, and M. Firth. 2014. The effect of governance on specialist auditor choice and audit fees in U.S. family firms. The Accounting Review 89(6): 2297. Tarkovska, V. 2012. Busy boards, corporate liquidity and financial risk: evidence from UK Panel Data. Working Paper. http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2013-Reading/papers/EFMA2013_0034_fullpaper.pdf Vafeas, N. 2000. Board structure and the informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19(2): 139-160 Vafeas, N. 1999. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53: 113-142. World Bank. 1999. Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation-Overview. The World Bank, Washington D. C. Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. J. DaDalt. 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9(3): 295-316. Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics. 40: 185-212. Zahra, S. A., and J. A. Pearce. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance：A review and integrative model. Journal of Management. 15: 291-334. Zahra, S., and J. Pearce. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management 15: 291-334. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/50749 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文旨在探討獨立董監事的品質與特性是否能有效提升企業經營績效。結果顯示，(1)高「專業性」或(2)高「獨立性與聲譽效果」的獨立董監事能有效提升「營運績效」、「市場價值」、「財務健全程度」。本文進一步發現，若是企業專注於提升「營運績效」時，應優先考慮聘僱具有「四大會計師事務所合夥人經歷」者擔任企業的獨立董監事職務；若是專注於提升企業「市場價值」時，應優先考慮聘僱具有「會計或財務專長背景」者；若是專注於改善「財務健全程度」或是提升企業創新與銷售能力時，應優先考慮聘雇「大專院校之教授職人員」。最後，本文實證結果指出，即使在中小企業、家族企業、董事長兼任總經理等公司治理或投資人保護機制較差的環境中，高品質的獨立董監事更可以顯著的發揮其職能。本研究的結論能提供實務界更為具體的獨立董監事選任策略。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis investigates the impacts of the quality and characteristics of independent directors and supervisors on the firm performance. The results show that companies hiring more professional, independent and reputationable independent directors and supervisors can improve operating performance, market value and financial health. This thesis also discovers that companies aiming to enhance operating performance should hire independent directors and supervisors who have been the partners of big 4 audit firms; companies aiming to enhance market value should hire independent directors and supervisors who are accounting or financial experts; companies aiming to improve financial health, innovation, or selling capacity should hire independent directors and supervisors who are professors. Finally, this thesis indicates that the above mentioned results are still significant in the same direction when companies are small and median entities, family firms or duality CEO and Chairman as one role, which are regarded as worse corporate governmance. Our empirical results might provide useful implications for companies to hire appropriate independent directors and supervisors. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T12:56:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-P01744013-1.pdf: 2066508 bytes, checksum: 274545f79fb886304a4380004ed2c511 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
口試委員會審定書 i 謝辭 ii 中文摘要 iii 英文摘要 iv 目錄 v 表目錄 vi 圖目錄 vi 第壹章、緒論 1 第一節、研究背景與動機 1 第二節、研究問題與目的 4 第三節、研究流程圖 5 第貳章、文獻探討 6 第一節、概述代理理論的發展 6 第二節、介紹內部公司治理的相關研究成果 10 第三節、探討獨立董監事特性對企業經營績效的影響 13 第四節、建立研究假說 16 第參章、研究設計 18 第一節、變數標準化法 18 第二節、平均數t檢定法 20 第三節、樣本選取 21 第四節、變數定義 22 第肆章、實證結果 28 第一節、獨立董監事概況 28 第二節、敘述性統計分析 32 第三節、平均數t檢定分析 35 第四節、子樣本之平均數檢定分析─ 中小企業、家族企業、董事長兼任總經理 41 第五節、額外測試與敏感性分析─ 財報品質、學歷分析、內生性問題、選樣問題 47 第伍章、結論與建議 54 第一節、研究結論 54 第二節、研究建議 55 參考文獻 56 附錄：相關法規整理 62 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 市場價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 獨立董監事 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 營運績效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 財務健全程度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 獨立董監事 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 營運績效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 市場價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 財務健全程度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Market Value | en |
| dc.subject | Operating Performance | en |
| dc.subject | Market Value | en |
| dc.subject | Financial Health | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en |
| dc.subject | Operating Performance | en |
| dc.subject | Independent Directors and Supervisors | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en |
| dc.subject | Financial Health | en |
| dc.subject | Independent Directors and Supervisors | en |
| dc.title | 獨立董監事特性與企業經營績效之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Relationship between the Characteristics of Independent
Directors and Supervisors and Firm Performance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳韻珊,曾智揚 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 獨立董監事,營運績效,市場價值,財務健全程度,公司治理, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Independent Directors and Supervisors,Operating Performance,Market Value,Financial Health,Corporate Governance, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 66 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201600808 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2016-07-15 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計與管理決策組 | zh_TW |
| Appears in Collections: | 會計與管理決策組 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-105-1.pdf Restricted Access | 2.02 MB | Adobe PDF |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.