薪酬顧問獨立性與 CEO 薪酬及審計公費之關聯

Abstract

本文主要探討薪酬顧問獨立性對於CEO薪酬及審計公費之影響，薪酬顧問的獨立性問題可能是由於薪酬顧問同時提供非薪酬服務予公司所導致。本研究利用2009年SEC對於薪酬顧問費用的揭露規定，以S&P 500作為樣本，並使用四組變數衡量薪酬顧問獨立性，觀察在樣本期間2009年至2014年間，薪酬顧問獨立性對於CEO總薪酬、固定薪酬、現金紅利、權益基礎薪酬及審計公費的影響。研究結果發現當薪酬顧問獨立性較低時，CEO 的固定薪酬及現金紅利較高，權益基礎薪酬較低，與 CEO 為風險趨避者的觀點一致，薪酬顧問在提供薪酬建議時確實受 CEO 的偏好所影響。而在審計公費方面，研究結果發現當薪酬顧問獨立性較低時，審計公費較高，顯示審計人員在查核過程中確實將薪酬顧問獨立性問題納入考量，並且認為此議題會增加查核風險及查核工作，因而提高審計公費。

This thesis examines two issues related to compensation consultant independence due to the conflict of interest arising from provision of non-compensation related service, in addition to the compensation consultancy. The first issue is regarding the association between compensation consultant independence and CEO total compensation, salary, and equity-based compensation. The second issue is whether compensation consultant independence is associated with audit fee. Using the data about compensation consultancy fee and non-compensation consultancy fee disclosed by companies that were required by SEC in 2009, this study uses S&P 500 as the sample for the period 2009-2014 and uses four proxies for compensation consultant independence for investigation. The results indicate that when compensation consultant independence is lower, salary and cash bonus are higher, and equity based compensation is lower, consistent with the view that CEOs are risk averse and dislike exertion of effort and that compensation consultants tend to conform to CEO preference when the independence is low. As to the consequence in audit fee, the results indicate that when compensation consultant independence is lower, auditors charge a higher audit fee, consistent with the view that auditors incorporate compensation consultant independence into consideration, which leads to higher assessed audit risk and higher audit effort.