論《尼科馬哥倫理學》中的幸福觀

Abstract

本論文以亞里斯多德的《尼科馬哥倫理學》作為研究題材，藉由重新爬梳整個著作，探究其核心概念「幸福」（εὐδαιμονία）之定義與實質內涵。 在當代亞里斯多德倫理學的討論上，對於幸福的詮釋大致上可以區分為包容觀（an inclusive view）與獨佔觀（a dominant view）兩種觀點。前者認為亞里斯多德的「幸福」作為最終善及最終目的，應至少包含所有具有內在價值的善在內，該幸福才得以稱為完滿；後者則認為，亞里斯多德的「幸福」作為最終善及最終目的，實指那被亞氏稱為最好及最具神性的活動—默觀活動。 筆者認為，兩者的觀點之所以有所衝突，與學者們對於《尼科馬哥倫理學》中的幾個關鍵概念之理解的不一致有相當的關聯。因此在本論文中，筆者藉由梳理亞氏倫理學、目的與善、快樂、德性等議題，企圖還原亞里斯多德本人對於幸福的理解，並指出這樣的理解，有助於當代的倫理學討論，亦有助於我們重新審視既有的價值排序。

This thesis proposes to inquire the core concept of Happiness (εὐδαιμονία) in Aristotle’s ethics by examining his work of Necomachean Ethics as main text. There are two popular interpretations in contemporary studies on Aristotle’s idea of happiness: the inclusive view and the dominant view. The former claims Aristotle’s happiness, as the final good and the final end, should include all intrinsic goods to be complete. The latter argues that this happiness in fact solely refers to the one best and most divine activity, that is, contemplation. In this research, I would like to point out the fact that the inappropriate interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of happiness lie in scholars’ inconsistent understandings of his crucial concepts. In order to reconstruct Aristotle’s own idea of happiness, I shall look into several ethical terms such as End, Good, Pleasure, and Virtue etc. in Nicomachean Ethics. In addition, this approach should be conductive to contemporary ethical discussions as well as our own civil lives.