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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 林火旺(Huo-Wang Lin) | |
dc.contributor.author | Li-Yuan Ko | en |
dc.contributor.author | 柯力元 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T11:20:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-08-25 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2016-08-25 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-08-19 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、專書與期刊
Annas, J., The morality of happiness, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. --- Intelligent Virtue, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. --- “Happiness as Achievement”, On Happiness, 133(2), 2004: p.44-51. --- “Virtue and Eudaimonism”, in Steven M. Cahn and Christine Vitrano (ed.), Happiness: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008: p.245-261. Attfield, R., “The Good of Trees”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 15(1), 1981. Feldman, F., Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Hardie, W. F. R., Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Haybron, D. M., “Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness”, The Journal of Happiness Studies, 1(2), 2000: p.207–225. --- The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Hursthouse, R., On Virtue Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 Irwin, T. H., “The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s Ethics”, In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980: p.35-53 Korsgaard, C. M., The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Kraut R., “Two Conceptions of Happiness” The Philosophical Review, 88(2), 1979, p.167-197. Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Rawls J., Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Russell, D. C., Happiness for Humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. --- The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Sumner, W., Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Taylor P. W., Respect for Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Taylor, R., “Virtue Ethics”, in Steven M. Cahn and Christine Vitrano (ed.), Happiness: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008: p.224-226. 二、翻譯作品 Aristotle., Nicomachean Ethics, translated with an introduction, notes, and glossary by Terence Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000. --- The Nicomachean Ethics, translated with an introduction by David Ross, revised by J. O. Urmson and J. L. Ackrill, Oxford University Press, 1998. --- Metaphysics. South Bend, US: Infomotions, Inc., 2000. Accessed August 18, 2016. ProQuest ebrary. Plato. Republic. Auckland, NZ: The Floating Press, 2009. Accessed August 18, 2016. ProQuest ebrary. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/49247 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 什麼生活是好生活?許多哲學家對此問題提出主張,本文的目的是探討其中一種理論──幸福論。幸福論者將好生活稱為幸福,而對於幸福,幸福論者有三個主要宣稱:第一,幸福是人行動與選擇所追求的最終目的;第二,幸福蘊含著功能的良好發揮;第三,幸福與德行相關。本文將依序探討這三個宣稱。首先,筆者試圖為第一個宣稱辯護,並透過形式限制的說明來限縮幸福生活的可能選項。接著,筆者試圖為第二個宣稱辯護。幸福論者一般以功能論證來支持第二個宣稱,但功能論證飽受批評。跟隨著柯絲佳(Christine Korsgaard),筆者以亞里斯多德在形上學上對形式、質料的說明來釐清功能的意義,並藉此回應功能論證面臨的諸多反駁。最後,說明德行是幸福的必要條件,並論證學者是否同時相信德行是幸福的充分條件取決於對實用智慧的理解。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | What kind of life counts as good life? Many philosophers have tried to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. This thesis aims to reflect on one of the prominent theories concerning this issue: Eudaimonism. Eudaimonists define good life as happiness, and make three claims about this very concept. First, happiness is the final end of action and decision. Second, happiness implies human fulfillment. Third, happiness is correlated with virtue. This thesis defends the three claims sequentially. First, I will defend the first claim from some criticisms, and explain the formal constraints that happy life should meet. Secondly, Eudaimonists presented the function argument to support the thesis. There are a lot of criticisms against this argument. Following Christine Korsgaard’s approach, I appeal to Aristotle’s account of form and matter to clarify the meaning of “function”, and respond the criticisms accordingly. At the end, I will strengthen the third claim by showing that virtue is a necessary condition of happiness, and further argue that whether philosophers take virtue to be the sufficient condition for happiness depends on our understanding of practical wisdom. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T11:20:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R02124004-1.pdf: 1439781 bytes, checksum: 9975a19e256a494fe7129fc4ca9dac9d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書………………………………………………………….i
誌謝………………………………………………………………………ii 中文摘要………………………………………………………………...iii 英文摘要………………………………………………………………...iv 目錄……………………………………………………………….……...v 前言………..……………………………………………………………..1 第一節 釐清「好生活」……………………………………………1 第二節 釐清「幸福」……………………………………...…….…2 一、「幸福」一詞的兩種意義………………………..………4 二、混淆兩種意義「幸福」造成的問題……………..………5 三、「幸福」一詞在中文上也有兩種意義嗎…………..……6 第三節 本文架構……………………………………………………7 第一章 論幸福作為最終目的…………………………………………..8 第一節 所有選擇與行動都是以幸福為目的………………………8 一、 前提一………………………………………….……..10 二、 前提二………………………………………….……..12 三、 前提三………………………………………….……..13 四、 前提四………………………………………….……..15 第二節 最終目的的形式限制……………………………….……17 一、 幸福是最終的……………….………………….……18 二、 幸福是自足的…………………………………….….19 三、 幸福是主動的……………………………………..…19 四、 幸福是屬於人類的那種幸福………………………..21 五、 幸福是穩固的………………………………………..21 第三節 小結………………………………………….…………....22 第二章 功能論證與幸福………………………………………………25 第一節 功能論證…………………………………………………..25 第二節 可能的反駁………………………………………………..27 第三節 人類功能的良好發揮……………………………………..30 一、 形式與功能…………………………………….……..30 二、 人類的功能…………………………………….……..31 三、 人類功能的良好發揮………………………….……..33 四、 回應反駁………………………………………..…….35 第四節 小結………………………………………………………..38 第三章 德行與幸福的關聯……………………………………………41 第一節 德行概念………………………………..…………………41 一、 亞里斯多德的德行概念……………………………...42 二、 當代幸福論者的德行概念…………………………...44 第二節 幸福與德行的關聯………………………………..………46 一、 分辨幸福生活與德行生活…………………………...47 二、 兩種自我概念──羅素對於德行與幸福關聯之爭論 的說明…………………….………………………….49 三、 另一種對於德行與幸福關聯之爭論的說明………...57 第三節 小結………………………………………………………..60 結論……………………………………..………………………………63 參考文獻………………………………………………………………..67 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 論幸福論者對好生活的說明 | zh_TW |
dc.title | On the Eudaimonist’s Explanation of the Good Life | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王榮麟,林雅萍 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 最終目的,最高善,好生活,幸福論,功能,德行,亞里斯多德, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | final end,highest good,the Good Life,Eudaimonism,function,virtue,Aristotle, | en |
dc.relation.page | 68 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201602771 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2016-08-19 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 |
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