請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/48785完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 徐斯勤(S. Philip Hsu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hui-Fang Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳慧芳 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T11:09:19Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-02-08 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2017-02-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2016-10-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/48785 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 國家常採取威逼(Compellent Threat)這一強制性策略,使用有限武力以迫使別國服從其要求。一般認為威逼成功的條件至少有報復性力量和可信度,實力不對稱結構中的大國就小國而言已具備報復性力量,但大量弱國在面對強國威脅時仍選擇了抵抗而非服從。廣泛應用於解釋威逼威懾有效性的信號理論認為,民主國家發出的有「觀眾成本」的及使用武力造成「沉沒成本」的威逼,向目標國傳遞了可信信號,將使目標國基於迴避戰爭風險而順服。
本文探究以下問題:上述由演繹邏輯推論而來的信號理論對目標國因應威逼之選擇的解釋是否符合現實案例?存在哪些因素影響著目標國在面對威逼時的因應選擇為抵抗?各因素是否有所關聯?如果是,它們又是如何結合起來,影響著目標國在面對威逼時的因應選擇? 本文先透過對來自數據庫戰後1946年至2001年共83個威逼案例的整理與實證資料分析,發現信號理論因不區分威逼雙方的相對實力關係而無力解釋小國抵抗大國威逼的現實案例。 在此基礎上,本文再運用清晰集質性比較分析方法(Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, csQCA)分析大國威逼小國的69個案例,發現:威逼雙方實力不對等、被威逼之目標國無強國同盟、威逼雙方地理位置接近、威逼雙方間存在持續敵對根源、威逼發起國處於軍力動態增長期,這五個因素會對目標國選擇如何因應來自強國的威逼產生重要影響,且任一單因素均不構成導致結果變項的必要條件。不同的條件因素相互聯結,構成使被威逼目標國抵抗威逼發起國的充分條件組合。 本文對第二次印巴戰爭、蘇南衝突以及美對伊空襲的案例分析表明,前景理論能夠解釋小國為何抵抗:構成充分條件組合的條件因素相互牽連,各施影響,使目標國將面臨威逼的情況框定在「損失框架」,因此其選擇因應策略將基於「損失厭惡」及「風險承受」的行事邏輯,會為彌補已受損失、避免未來遭受更多損失而採取冒險的行動,即使面臨強大國家實施其所威脅的懲罰,也不懼選擇抵抗以因應。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Power states often adopt compellent strategies, threatening or using limited force to convince weak states to comply with their demands. It is generally believed that with retaliatory power and credibility, compellent threats from relative powerful states would be easily complied. While there remains a number of weak states have chosen to resist. Signaling Theory argues that threats from democratic states with audience cost and threats with sunk cost deliver cost signals are more credible for target states to comply.
This thesis raises these questions: Whether the logic of Signaling Theory accounts for cases in reality? Under which conditions and why relative weak states resist demands from disproportionately stronger powers? Do these conditions related to each other? If so, how are they related to affect target states’ response options to compellent threats under power asymmetry? Using a cross-national dataset of 83 compellent threats issued between 1946 and 2001, the thesis evaluates the Signaling Theory and find: the relative power between the dyads is ignored in Signaling Theory, neither threats with audient cost issued by democratic states nor threats with sinking cost showed by demonstration of force are effective to deter resistance of weak states. To identify the key conditions behind this counterintuitive empirical pattern, I perform a Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) with 69 cases to analyze the relationship between the presence of various conditions and the outcome, resistance. The result of csQCA shows these 5 conditions have impact on target states’ resistance: 1. the adversaries are in power disparity, 2. the target state has no strong alliances, 3. the adversaries are geographically close, 4. the adversaries are rivalries and 5. the challenger’s military power is in an up-rising trend. However, no single condition is the necessary condition accounts for the resistance. Different condition factors are interconnected, constitute a sufficient conditional configuration combination to explain weak states’ resistance. Drawing on the Prospect Theory, I argue that encountered with related conditions in configurations, when receiving a compellent threat form a tremendous stronger challenger, the target states would frame the situation as the Frame of Loss. So its response strategy will be based on the logic of 'loss aversion' and 'risk acceptance'. In order to compensate for the loss and to avoid future losses, the target state is willing to resist. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T11:09:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R02322049-1.pdf: 4454273 bytes, checksum: 027c9cee797406b637e30deb3f857811 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員會審定書…………………………………………………....……i 謝辭………………………………………………………………. …….…iii 中文摘要……………………………………………………………….… vii 英文摘要………………………………………………………………...…ix 目錄……………………………………………………………….…..……xi 圖目次…………………………………………………………….………xiii 表圖目次………………………………………………………….………xiv 第一章 緒論 第一節 研究動機與目的…………………………………...………1 第二節 文獻回顧……………………………………………...……6 第三節 概念定義與研究假說………………………………...…..35 第四節 研究方法…………………………………..………...……40 第五節 研究架構…………………………………..………...……47 第二章 檢證信號理論 第一節 信號理論與威逼…………………………………...…..…49 第二節 實證資料檢視……………………………………….……53 第三章 質性比較分析 第一節 變項操作、數據來源與案例選擇…………..………...…73 第二節 分析過程、研究發現與討論……………………….……82 第四章 案例驗證 第一節 前景理論的分析途徑……………………………...…..…95 第二節 第二次印巴喀什米爾戰爭………………………..…...…99 第三節 蘇南衝突………………………………………..…….…109 第四節 美對伊「沙漠之狐」行動………………………….…..119 第五節 小國為何抵抗………………………………………...…130 第五章 結論 第一節 研究發現與假說檢證……………………..…….…........131 第二節 理論對話與研究展望………………..………..…...........137 參考文獻………………………………………………………….…..…141 附錄……………………………………………………………….…..…155 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | ?性比?分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 信?理? | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 威逼 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | QCA | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 前景理? | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | compellent threats | en |
| dc.subject | Prospect Theory | en |
| dc.subject | QCA | en |
| dc.subject | Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis | en |
| dc.subject | Signaling Theory | en |
| dc.title | 國家為何抵抗?
——實力不對稱下小國因應大國威逼之策略的清晰集質性比較分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Why states resist?
A Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of States' Response to Compellent Threats under Power Asymmetry | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 105-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 張登及(Teng-Chi Chang),盧業中(Yeh-Chung Lu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 威逼,信?理?,?性比?分析,QCA,前景理?, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | compellent threats,Signaling Theory,Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis,QCA,Prospect Theory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 158 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201603711 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2016-10-27 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 | |
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