促進捐獻效率自願參與的機制設計:兩個人的囚犯困境遊戲, 公共財捐獻, 外部性

Abstract

無論是對捐助者或是非捐獻者, 公共財代表的是社會上的每一個分子均擁有權利享有公共財帶來的福利。私人提供的公共財通常有帕累托效率不高的詬病。這種低效率的問題是由於一般人總是較偏好追求自身利益，加上沒有足夠的誘因一般人對增進公共財的價值都不會主動的有所捐獻。本論文會以“誘因”作為軸心，針對目前公共財的問題提出一些機制設計。以擬議的存放和補償機制化解公共財在捐獻者及非捐獻者之間所產生的問題，進而成功地提昇公共財從納許均衡至帕 改进均衡。

Public goods are goods or services that benefit all the members of a society, not just those who are willing to pay for them. Private provision of public goods usually leads to Pareto inefficiency. The inefficiency happens because pursuing his own interest, each individual has an insufficient incentive to contribute to the public goods. Focusing on this incentive problem, this thesis presents solutions to the public goods problems. Proposed deposit and compensation mechanisms enable societies achieve Pareto optimality or at least Pareto improvement. Applying these mechanisms to a game theory, voluntary provision of the public goods, and externalities, this thesis proves that the problem of the under-provision of public goods can be solved. Not only leading to an equilibrium which is Pareto superior to an original Nash equilibrium, but proposed mechanisms also induces vlountary participation in the public goods contribution in the first place.