金融業作業風險管理有效性與董監組成關聯性之探討

Abstract

本研究主要目的係探討金融業作業風險管理有效性與企業董監組成之關聯性。透過代理理論與資源依賴理論之討論並利用TEJ作業風險資料庫之樣本，本研究探討企業董監結構是否能影響作業風險事件之發生與否、事件次數、損失金額與事件發生後之累積異常報酬。結果顯示，獨立董事佔董監席次比率或法人持股比率越高之企業，其作業風險管理之有效性越低；相反的，董監席次及董事兼任經理人佔董監席次比率越大者，其作業風險管理越有效。由本研究結果推論，企業應根據自身需求調整董事會組成，以發揮董事們在作業風險管理之能力與貢獻，另外，由於外部人士對企業營運之熟悉度可能不高，容易造成決策與監督上之困難，故，在董事選任上應考慮如何帄衡外部與內部董事之比例，以同時達到提高企業盈餘表現與降低企業作業風險之目的。

This thesis focuses on the association between the effectiveness of operational risk management and the composition of the board. We build our hypotheses on the agency theory and the resource dependence theory. Using the data from TEJ operational risk database, we investigate how the composition of the board could affect the occurrence of operational risk events, the loss of such events, and the market reactions to the events. Our results demonstrate that as the percentage of independent directors and, institutional holdings increases, the effectiveness of operational risk management decreases. On the contrary, the size of the board and the board duality improve the effectiveness of operational risk management. Our findings suggest that firms should hire appropriate directors and supervisors based on the consideration of improving the firm’s performance and better managing operational risks. The firm needs to have a balanced composition of outside/independent and inside directors in order to manage operational risks while achieving earnings goals at the same time.