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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 何耕宇(Keng-Yu Ho) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Christina Ponimin | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 李麗虹 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T06:45:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2014-07-07 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2011-07-07 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2011-06-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | References
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Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70, 295-311. Travlos, N.G., 1987. Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firms’ stock returns. Journal of Finance 42, 943-963. Wohlstetter, C., 1993. Executive action. Harvard Business Review, Jan/Feb., 78. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/48049 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文旨在研究機構投資人的持股變化對主併公司股價及經營績效的影響。本研究認為機構投資人之持股變化可表達其對主併公司的信心，因此透過主併公司之短期、長期股價表現以及長期經營績效作為衡量指標，以便研究機構投資人持股之變化是否影響主併公司之併購活動。實證結果發現機構投資人持股變化與長期股價表現有顯著之正向關係，而短期股價表現及長期經營績效結果則相對不顯著。由實證結果得出，當主併公司之機構投資人持股增加時，該公司將會更加有效地監控其收購。同時，實證結果也顯示，機構投資人較重視公司之股價表現，而非公司之經營績效。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the relationship between change of institutional shareholding and the post-merger performance. We examine acquirers’ short-run and long-run stock performance as well as the operating performance. We find that institutional shareholding is significantly positive related to the long-run stock performance, while there is insignificant evidence on the short-run stock performance and the operating performance. Our findings conclude that acquirers with the increase in institutional shareholding prior to the acquisitions will be more effectively in monitoring the acquisitions. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T06:45:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R98723072-1.pdf: 310971 bytes, checksum: c691e71283a3f6854622d985b76522e3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Content
1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 3 2.1. Stock Performance 3 2.2. Operating Performance 5 2.3. Other Literature Review 7 3. Data and Methodology 8 3.1. Data Sources 8 3.2. Measures of Short-Run Stock Performance 9 3.3. Measures of Long-Run Stock Performance 11 3.4. Measures of Long-Run Operating Performance 13 3.5. Other Control Variables 14 4. Empirical Findings 15 4.1. Institutional Holding and Short-Run Stock Performance 15 4.2. Institutional Holding and Long-Run Stock Performance 17 4.3. Institutional Holding and Long-Run Operating Performance 20 5. Conclusion 23 References 25 Appendix: Variable Definitions 28 List of Tables Table 1 Sample Distribution by Announcement Year and Institutional Holding 29 Table 2 Summary Statistics 30 Table 3 Short-Run Abnormal Returns for Acquirers 31 Table 4 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Three-Day Stock Returns 32 Table 5 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Five-Day Stock Returns 33 Table 6 Long-Run Abnormal Returns for Acquirers 34 Table 7 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Long-Run Stock Returns: Using Size Matched Firm as Benchmark 35 Table 8 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Long-Run Stock Returns: Using Size and B/M Matched Firm as Benchmark 36 Table 9 Changes in Operating Performance 37 Table 10 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Long-Run Operating Performance: △ROA Using Two-Digit SIC and Pre-Event Performance as Benchmark 39 Table 11 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Long-Run Operating Performance: △ROE Using Two-digit SIC and Pre-Event Performance as Benchmark 40 Table 12 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Long-Run Operating Performance: △ROA Using Size and B/M Matched Firm as Benchmark 41 Table 13 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Long-Run Operating Performance: △ROE Using Firm Size and B/M Matched Firm as Benchmark 42 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 機構投資人持股；合併與收購；股價表現；經營績效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Operating Performance | en |
| dc.subject | Stock Performance. | en |
| dc.subject | Institutional Shareholding | en |
| dc.subject | Mergers and Acquisitions | en |
| dc.title | 機構投資人持股變化與主併公司績效之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Change in Institutional Holding and Post Merger Performance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 周冠男,石百達 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 機構投資人持股；合併與收購；股價表現；經營績效, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Institutional Shareholding,Mergers and Acquisitions,Operating Performance,Stock Performance., | en |
| dc.relation.page | 42 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2011-06-28 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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