論我國企業併購法制與利害關係人之保護─由公司社會責任理論出發

Abstract

本文由公司社會責任理論的論辯出發，首先探究公司行事除極大化股東利益外，是否「得」或「應」將利害關係人之利益乃至公共利益，納入其決策之考量；進而以此研究結果為基礎，進一步探究在我國現行企業併購法制上若干利害關係人保護之議題，包括股東、債權人、勞工及投資人，並試圖以所建構之公司社會責任理論內容，印證並補充我國現行法制在企業併購時對利害關係人保護不足之處。 於第二章，本文探討公司社會責任理論的論辯，檢視股東優位論者以及公司社會責任論者之各項主張，並觀察比較法例上如美國、歐盟、英國、德國、日本、中國大陸之相關法制發展、國際法上對於公司社會責任之實踐情形，以及國內學者相關文獻。本文由法人本質理論出發，以法人實在說為基礎，認為公司與股東各有獨立之人格，其利益亦不應互相依附，並且以促進社會總體最大經濟利益、賦予公司自由空間為中心思想，使公司利益與股東利益脫勾，進而採公司社會責任理論之見解，並建議增訂公司法第1條第2項明文化公司社會責任理論之意涵；本文更進一步將公司法第23條第2項定性為義務型利害關係人條款，期能突破傳統侵權責任之框架，課予公司及公司負責人承擔社會責任之義務，於特定利害關係人之基本利益遭受侵害時，得透過本項主張其權益。 於第三章，本文簡介我國企業併購法制之基本概念，包括企業併購之意義、種類、功能、程序，以及我國企業併購相關規範，以作為後續章節探討企業併購中特定利害關係人（即股東、債權人、勞工、及投資人）保護法制之基礎。 於第四章，本文研究企業併購下股東保護之議題，並著重於股東四項基本利益：表決權、股份收買請求權、董事責任追究權及直接訴權。就表決權之部分，本文一方面檢討現行企業併購法第18條第5項下衍生之股東迴避議題，並建議以事後審查交易公平性，取代事前迴避制度，另一方面引用國內學者之重大性判斷原則，檢視現行併購法制下要求併購經各當事公司股東會特別決議之必要性；就股份收買請求權之部分，本文建議刪除現行企業併購法第12條下要求異議股東放棄表決權以取得股份收買請求權之要件，並同樣引用國內學者之重大性判斷原則，檢視現行併購法制下之於各併購類型設計股份收買請求權之必要性；就董事責任追究之部分，本文透過公司社會責任理論之觀察，建議修正現行企業併購法第5條第1項之規定，明定董事於併購時仍應以公司之利益為依歸，而非以全體股東之利益；就直接訴權之部分，本文全面審查股東直接訴訟之判斷基準，就不同之併購類型及所涉議題，探討股東是否得依公司法第23條第2項提起直接訴訟。 於第五章，本文研究企業併購下債權人保護之議題，建議參考美國法上就營業或財產收購發展出之繼受人責任例外法則，在我國法通謀虛偽意思表示及詐害債權之框架下，引入合意例外、事實上合併例外、單純存續例外及詐欺例外等例外法則；並且分析現行合併及分割法下，所設之債權人之通知公告制度與債權確保制度，建議刪除其中併購相對無效之規定，及進一步類推適用至收購程序；最後本章並研究比較法上發展出的董事對債權人責任之法制，分析我國法下既有之債權人之代位訴訟及直接訴訟制度，並建議類推適用公司法第214條第2項引入債權人代表訴訟制度，以供目標公司債權人於董事違反受託人責任時，以代位或代表訴訟訴追，及於目標公司未踐行上開通知公告與債權確保制度時，依公司法第23條第2項以直接訴訟訴追。 於第六章，本文研究企業併購下勞工保護之議題，並著重於併購時新舊雇主之商定留用權以及新雇主之勞動條件不利益變更。於考量雇主與勞工各自之權益後，本文主張不應全面禁止雇主為商定留用或變更勞動條件之權利，但應透過現行勞動法上既有之一般原則，如解僱最後手段性原則、合理性變更法則等，配合訴訟上舉證責任之轉換，限縮雇主上述權限，並且肯定勞工在面臨解僱或勞動條件不利益變更時，除可依相關勞動法規定救濟外，尚可基於公司社會責任之理念，依公司法第23條第2項尋求救濟。 於第七章，本文研究企業併購下投資人保護之議題，並著重於公開發行公司之資訊揭露義務與不實陳述責任。本文參考美國法制相關發展，建議於實定法下，原則上發行公司於簽署確定併購協議時，即屬足資確定交易金額及交易對象時，故有即時揭露資訊之義務；另於可歸責於發行公司致市場有併購傳聞時，發行公司亦有澄清義務。如發行公司違反此揭露義務而不為揭露，將構成證券交易法第20條第2項之財報不實；如發行公司自發性提前揭露其併購活動，但揭露內容不實，則構成證券交易法第20條第1項之證券詐欺。 本文期待經過如上之分析，得在理論層面建構公司社會責任理論，並在法制層面檢討現行企業併購法制下之利害關係人保護規範，而能對於我國公司法制有進一步之貢獻。

Commencing from on the debates about corporate social responsibility theory, this thesis firstly explores whether a company, when making decision, “may” or “shall” take into account the stakeholders’ interests and even public interests into its decision in addition to maximizing shareholders’ interests. Based on the research result, this thesis further explores numerous stakeholders protection issues under Taiwan’s current legal system of business mergers and acquisitions, inclusing shareholders, creditors, labours and investors. This thesis also tries to supplement the deficiency in Taiwan’s current legal system with respect to the stakeholders protection in business mergers and acquisitions by the corporate social responsibility as constructed above. In Chater II, this thesis explores the corporate social resposnsibility theory debates, examines individual argument of shareholder primacy theory and corporate social responsibility theory, and observes the development of related legal system under comparative laws such as United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Mainland China, the implementation status of corporate social responsibility under international law level, and related academic papers put forward by domestic scholars. From the perspective of legal person nature theory and based on the real entity theory, this thesis argues that a company has its independent entity from its shareholders, and their interests are not attached to each other. In addition, from the central idea to promote the best aggregate interests of the society and to vest free space to companies, this thesis adopts the corporate social responsibility theory to unhook the company interests from shareholders’ interests, and suggests to add Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act to regulate the concepts of corporate social responsibility in statutes. Furthermore, this thesis characterizes Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act as a mandatory constituency clause anticipating to break through the restriction of traditional tort liability and impose companies and their responsible persons social responsibility, which specific stakeholders may base on to assert their rights when their basic interests are infringed. In Chapter III, this thesis briefly introduce the basic concept under Taiwans’s legal system of business mergers and acquisitions, including the definition, categories, functions, procedures of business mergers and acquisitions, and relevant regulations as well, which may serve as the foundations to explore the legal systems of specific stakeholders protection (i.e. shareholders, creditors, labours, and investors) in business mergers and acquisitions in subsequent chapters. In Chapter IV, this thesis researchs the shareholders protection in business mergers and acquisitions, and focuses on four basic shareholders rights: voting rights, appraisal rights, rights to claim directors duties, and right to bring direct actions. With respect to voting rights, this thesis on the one hand comments on the shareholders avoidance issues arising from Article 18, Paragraph 5 of the Business Merger and Acquisition Act and suggests to replace the ex ante avoidance system by the ex post facto review of fairness of transaction, while on the other hand introduces the materiality judgment principle as provided by domestic scholar to review the necessity to require the merger or acquisition to go thorugh special resolution process in each parties’ sahreholders’ meetings under current laws. With respect to appraisal rights, this thesis suggests to remove the requirements that dissenting shareholders shall waive their voting rights to acquire appraisal rights as provided in Article 12 of the current Business Merger and Acquisition Act, and introduces the materiality judgment principle as provided by domestic scholar to review the necessity to design appraisal rights in each mode of merger and acquisition under current laws. With respect to the right to claim directors duties, this thesis, based on the corporate social responsibility, suggests to amend the current Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Business Merger and Acquisition Act to provide that shareholders shall pursue the company’s interests when handling mergers and acquisitions, instead of the interests of shareholders as a whole. With respect to direct actions, this paper examines the testing standard of shareholders direct actions, and explores whether shareholders may bring direct actions pursuant to Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act in different issues as involved in different modes of mergers and acquisitions. In Chapter V, this thesis researchs the creditors protection in business mergers and acquisitions. This thesis suggests to take reference to the exceptional doctrine to the successor liability in business or asset acquisitions as developed in United States, and introduce the agreement exception, de facto merger exception, mere continuance exception, and fraud exception into Taiwan’s laws in the context of fictious expression of intent in collision and prejudice to creditors’ rights. This thesis also analyzes the creditors notification and announcement system and creditors’ rights maintenance system under current merger and secession laws, suggests to remove the regulation that parties may not assert merger or secession as a defense once failing to comply with these procedures, and suggests to analogize the above rules to acquisition. This thesis further researchs the legal system of directors duties to creditors as developed in comparative laws, analyzes the existing credtors derivative suit and direct suit system under Taiwan’s laws, and suggests to analogize Article 214, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act to introduce the creditors representative suit system, so that the creditors of the target company may on the one hand claim their rights by derivative or representative suits when directors breach their fiduciary duty, and on the other hand claim their righst by direct action pursuant to Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act when the target company fails to perform the above notification, announcement and creditors’ right maintenance system. In Chapter VI, this thesis researches the labour protection in business mergers and acquisitions, and focuses on the employers’ right to agree on the continuance of employment and modify the labour conditions to the disadvantages against labours. After considering each right and interest of the employer and labour, this paper argues that the employers’ right to the continuance of employment and modify the labour conditions to the disadvantages against labours shall not be completely prohibited, while the existing general principle under current labour laws, such as the principle of last resorts to termination of employment and the principle of reasonable modification, shall be exercised, accompanied with the shift of burden of proof in litigation, to restrict the employers’ above rights. This thesis also affirms that labours, when faced with termination employment or modification of labour conditions to their disadvantages, may based on the corporate social responsibility to claim remedies pursuant to Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act in addition to related labour laws. In Chapter VII, this thesis researchs the investors protection in business mergers and acquisitions, and focuses on the public companies’ duty to disclose information and misrepresentation liability. This thesis takes reference to the related developments under United States laws, then suggests that under statutory laws, only when a public company has enteres into a definitive merger and acquisition agreement, i.e. the transaction amount and the parties are identifiable, will it be under a duty to timely disclose relevant information. In addition, when there are merger and acquisition rumors in the market which is attributable to that public company, it is also under a duty to clarify such rumor. In the event that a public company fails to disclose it, which breaches such duty to disclose, this will become the misrepresentation in statements as provided in Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Securities Exchange Act. In the event that a public company voluntarily discloses its merger and acquisition activity advancedly, but the disclosure is misrepresented, this will become the securities fraud as provided in Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the Securities Exchange Act. Based on the above analysis, this thesis anticipates that on the theory level, the corporate social responsibility may be constructed, while on the regulation level, the stakeholders protection system under the current business mergers and acquisitions laws may be reviewed, so as to provide further contribution to Taiwan’s company laws.