公司董事之選任與解任

Abstract

觀察各國立法例發現，無論是採董事會優位主義公司治理模式，或者是採股東會優位主義公司治理模式者，均強調股東選任、解任董事權係不可剝奪之固有權。儘管公司所有與公司經營分離已成為現代大型公司之趨勢，令人困擾的代理問題也應運而生，為解決股東與董事間資訊不對等、利益不一致之情形，保留股東對公司之最終控制權，由股東選任最適宜治理公司之人作為公司董事、解任不適任董事，係從監督機制著手處理股東與董事間之代理問題。是以，理論上股東對於董事選任、解任權可謂股東監督公司經營之最有力手段，亦是股東表達對公司經營表現滿意與否之最直接手段。 2008年下半年金融海嘯掀起一股檢討坐領高薪卻無實際作為的董事應如何處置之浪潮，輿論多著重於要求「肥貓」瘦身；然而，要求高薪董事減薪只是治標，而非治本，治本之道應是將不適任的董事解任，重新選任董事。本文認為此時正是重新檢討各國公司法對於股東選任、解任董事整個制度架構之契機，現行實務運作下，股東選任、解任董事權究竟是中看不中用的權利空殼，還是股東汰換公司董事之利器？即是本篇論文探討之主題。本文將參酌美國、英國、德國等立法例、法院判決及相關學說，檢討我國現行公司董事選任與解任制度，並提出本文建言，以供日後修法之參考。 首先是董事資格之研究，我國現行公司法第27條第1項規定，允許法人股東當選董事，因此，董事提名人選不僅可以是自然人，還可以是法人股東。然而，本文對於我國現行法人董事及法人代表人董事制度之妥當性有所質疑，認為此一制度不單是疊床架屋之設，更有雙重委任關係下利益衝突之疑慮，是以，本文主張董事資格應限於自然人，禁止法人董事。 接著是董事提名選任制度之設計，我國公司法於2005年增訂「董事候選人提名制度」，因此，股東提名權在我國已是普遍之共識。惟修法至今已五年有餘，公開發行公司修改章程採用董事候選人提名制度選舉一般董事者，寥寥無幾，雖然法律本身立意良善，但不受公司歡迎卻是不爭之事實。本文參考美國法上股東提名董事候選人之改革與發展，以2009年美國證管會所提出之「促進股東提名董事」草案為主，重新檢視我國董事候選人提名制度之規定，提出本文建議作為日後董事候選人提名制度修正之參考。至於董事選舉方式，由於我國實務係以競爭選舉為常態，不同於美國是以無競爭同額選舉為常態，況且我國股權結構屬集中型，故公司治理之首要課題，係避免少數股東受到控制股東所侵害，相較於絕對多數決強調個別董事須獲得大多數股東所認同，我國採行累積投票制，反而有助於保障少數股東參與公司經營之機會，對我國公司治理之發展更具實益。 最後則是董事解任制度之設計，先是解任董事主體適格性之探討，我國公司法以股東會決議解任董事作為公司內控機制，以法院裁判董事作為公司外控機制，基本上即足以保護公司免於董事不當行為之侵害，而無須另外授予董事會或監察人解任董事權。其次，股東會決議解任董事，關於解任是否須附理由之問題，參酌美國、英國及德國等立法例，作為將來我國實務判斷解任有無正當理由之參考；至於表決方式，本文建議採取如美國法對於累積投票制選出之董事解任所設之特別規定──在累積投票制下有足以使董事當選之選舉權數反對該董事之解任者，該董事不得予以解任。如此一來，董事選任與解任之門檻及決議方式不僅體系一致，均採普通決議出席門檻並按累積投票制計算表決權數，更能貫徹法律保護少數股東之意旨。另外，如果被解任之董事同時兼具股東身分，面對股東會決議解任，本文認為該董事無須迴避表決。此外，本文基於提前改選全體董事必然產生董事解任效果之立場，不但主張兩者之決議方式應一致，並認為公司法第199條之1視為提前解任之董事，得援引第199條第1項後段規定訴請損害賠償，無庸回歸民法委任規定請求損害賠償。不過，由於我國公司法股東會決議解任董事之規定簡陋，對於被解任董事之程序保障略顯不足，故參酌英國法對於被解任董事之事前程序保障、美國司法實務所發展之正當法律程序，以及德國法對被解任董事之保護，供我國借鏡。關於訴請法院裁判解任，鑑於實務運作與禁止董事執行職務假處分密切相關，法院對於假處分之審查即成為當事人爭訟之前置程序，是故，有必要將此種假處分一併納入進行研究，並參酌美國法上裁判解任之發展與假處分之審查標準，以及英國公司董事失格法之規範，作為將來我國法院裁判解任之參考。

Shareholders’ rights to elect and remove directors are absolute rights under both director primacy and shareholder primacy in most corporate laws traditions. In order to solve the agent problem, shareholders are authorized with final supervisory power to elect fit directors and to remove the unfit ones. Late in 2008, the lucrative salaries and bonuses received by top management in financial institutions were under plenty of criticism during last financial crisis; however, from the author’s view, it is only a short-term solution by cutting down salary packages; a more efficient way shall remove unfit directors and then re-elect other directors. The thesis covers: (1) the legislation, cases and theories in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany; (2) the current system of directors’ election and removal in Taiwan; (3) the author’s suggestions. In Chapter 2, the author points out the drawbacks of Taiwan corporate system with several cases, such as the question of the Company Act article 27, only a few public companies adopt the director candidates nomination system, the battle of cumulative voting and straight voting, and the debate of the Company Act article 199 and article 199-1. Chapter 3 studies directors’ qualifications. The Company Act article 27 paragraph 1 permits corporate shareholders to elect directors; therefore, the director candidates would be either natural persons or corporate shareholders. However, the author suspects that the appropriateness of corporate directors and corporate shareholders’ representative directors. Chapter 4 discusses the design of director nomination and election system. The author refers to the reform and development of the shareholder nomination right in the United States, especially the 2009 version: the SEC proposed “Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations,” and then the author reviews Taiwan director candidates nomination system. On the other hand, the process of electing directors differs from nation to nation. The competitive election is the main practice in Taiwan, compared with the non-competitive election in the United States; in addition, the existence of controlling shareholders is the dominant characteristic in most Taiwan corporations; therefore, the main issue of corporate governance in Taiwan is to avoid majority shareholders to expropriate the rights and interests of minority shareholders. The author believes the cumulative voting is suitable to Taiwan corporations. Chapter 5 talks the design of director removal system. First of all, who has the right of removing directors? Secondly, it is whether shareholders remove one or more directors with cause or not. Thirdly, what resolution of director removals should adopt? Besides, the author considers that the effect of re-election of all directors prior to the expiration of the term is the same to the removal of directors, so both resolutions ought to be consistent and the directors which were removed by the Company Act article 199-1 could address article 199 paragraph 1 to make a claim against the company for any damages. However, it is lack of director’s right to protest removal in Taiwan, so the author refers to the Companies Act 2006, the judicial development of minimum due process in the United States and the Germany laws. On the other hand, the judicial removal of directors is closely related to the preliminary injunction for prohibiting directors from carrying out their duties; therefore, the author refers to the judicial removal of directors and the standard of preliminary injunction in the United States as well as the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Finally, Chapter 6 is the conclusion and prospect. The author sums up the discussion of each chapter, provides the suggestions of director election and removal systems, and wishes shareholders’ supervisory rights became a more powerful approach to remove and re-elect directors.