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DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 柯承恩(Chen-en Ko) | |
dc.contributor.author | Wang-Ling Chiang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 蔣宛陵 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T03:54:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-12-31 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2010-06-30 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2010-06-29 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, et al. 2004. Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting & Economics 37(3): 315-342.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/44760 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究旨在探討公司治理機制與現金增資宣告市場反應之關聯性。以1998年至2009年在台灣證券交易所上市且有辦理現金增資之公司,共204筆樣本為研究對象,尌公司所有權結構、董事會組成兩面向切入,探討公司治理機制是否能有效發揮其功能,建立良好的聲譽及降低代理問題,進而影響投資人之反應。
實證結果顯示,董事會規模、最終控制股東所掌握之董事席次以及控制股東控制權與現金流量權之偏離程度與現金增資後市場反應呈現顯著負相關;獨立董事人數與席次則與現金增資後市場反應呈現顯著正相關,至於董事長兼任CEO則與現金增資後市場反應呈現負相關,但是卻不顯著。 本研究結果發現當董事會規模較小、獨立董事比例較高、控制股東所掌握之董事席次較少以及控制權與現金流量權偏離程度較小時,現金增資宣告後的股價累積異常報酬較高。此結果顯示當公司有較健全的公司治理機制,投資人會認為公司有足夠的能力降低代理問題以及逆向選擇問題,且會將此良好的公司治理機制視為反應公司未來價值將增加的可靠訊號,因此會有較積極、正面的市場反應。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and the market reaction following the announcement of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). This study use ownership structure and composition of board related variables to examine whether good corporate governance mechanisms can affect investors’ perception and reduce agency problems under seasoned equity offering context. Namely, this study expect firms with better corporate governance mechanism will invoke less negative cumulative abnormal return than their counterparts.
The empirical results reveal that board size, board occupancy ratio of controlling shareholders and control-cash flow right deviation of controlling shareholders have significant negative effect on market reaction of seasoned equity offerings. Further, independent directors have significant positive impact on market reaction under seasoned equity offering context. However, empirical results reveal insignificant coefficients of board chairman-CEO duality. The above empirical findings have the following implications. First, for firms with stronger corporate governance mechanism, market reacts favorably as if investors believe firms have the ability to reduce agency problems or adverse selection under seasoned equity offering context. Second, based on my findings, firms can improve their corporate governance to signal that they will utilize the new capital properly in the future to enhance firms’ value. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T03:54:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R97722026-1.pdf: 529457 bytes, checksum: 2cb8e7e623962a6146d9dce6a6dfb17f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
謝辭………………………………………………………………………........................I 中文摘要………………………………………………………………………...............II ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………........III 第一章 緒論………………………………………………………………………...1 第一節 研究背景……………………………………………………………...1 第二節 研究動機與目的……………………………………………………...3 第三節 研究架構……………………………………………………………...5 第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………………………...7 第一節 公司治理……………………………………………………………...7 第二節 公司治理與公司價值……………………………………………….13 第三節 現金增資…………………………………………………………….22 第四節 公司治理與現金增資宣告市場反應……………………………….29 第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………………….33 第一節 研究假說…………………………………………………………….33 第二節 迴歸模型與研究變數……………………………………………….38 第三節 事件研究法………………………………………………………….44 第四節 樣本選取與資料來源……………………………………………….47 第四章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………………….50 第一節 敘述性統計………………………………………………………….50 第二節 迴歸結果分析……………………………………………………….53 第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………….63 第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………………….63 第二節 研究限制…………………………………………………………….66 第三節 後續研究建議……………………………………………………….67 參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………….68 圖目錄 圖1-1 研究流程圖……………………………………………………………………...6 圖2-1 世界銀行之公司治理架構…………………………………………………….11 圖2-2 常用籌資管道募集之金額比較圖…………………………………………….22 圖2-3 上市公司現金增資作業流程圖……………………………………………….24 圖3-1 研究之事件期、估計期及事件窗口………………………………………….45 圖4-1累積異常報酬率趨勢圖………………………………………………………..50 表目錄 表2-1公司治理修改內容……………………………………………………………..12 表2-2 1998-2008現金增資籌資金額…………………………………………………23 表3-1變數彙總表……………………………………………………………………..43 表3-2 樣本選取表…………………………………………………………………….48 表3-3 現金增資時間序列表………………………………………………………….48 表3-4產業別分類……………………………………………………………………..49 表3-5 資料來源彙總表……………………………………………………………….49 表4-1敘述性統計量表………………………………………………………………..52 表4-2 各解釋變數間之Pearson相關係數分析表…………………………………..57 表4-3 模型1之迴歸結果分析表………………………………………….. ………..58 表4-4 模型2之迴歸結果分析表…………………………………………………….59 表4-5 模型3之迴歸結果分析表…………………………………………………….61 表4-6 模型4之迴歸結果分析表…………………………………………………….62 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 公司治理與現金增資宣告市場反應之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Corporate Governance and the Market Reaction Following SEOs’ Announcement | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 98-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蘇裕惠,廖芝嫻 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,現金增資,董事會,獨立董事,股權結構, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Corporate Governance,seasoned equity offerings,board of directors,Independent directors,ownership structure, | en |
dc.relation.page | 75 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2010-06-29 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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