金融危機與美國經濟政策典範移轉--1929與2008年的比較

Abstract

2008年一場發生於美國的金融海嘯迅速席捲全球，由於全球經濟緊密連結使得危機蔓延至全世界，其幅度之大、由金融面影響到實質面，重創了美國經濟。本文發現這次的金融危機是1929年大蕭條之後最嚴重的一次，因此採社會科學比較研究的「最大相似系統設計」為研究方法，並由四個面向判斷：一、以GDP衰退幅度、失業率、道瓊工業指數跌幅等三個指標建立的痛苦指數；二、危機的本質都是嚴重的生產過剩和信用危機；三、兩次的危機都源於美國華爾街股市崩盤；四、兩次的危機都有美國國內擴及到全世界。藉此建立了可比性之後，本文嘗試回答兩個問題：1929年的大蕭條發生之後，為何美國經濟政策發生典範性的移轉？又，將1929年與2008年兩次危機進行比較，美國政府是否有可能揚棄新自由主義，重回凱因斯主義的懷抱，經濟政策也發生典範性移轉？ 本文第三章解釋了第一個問題，答案在於制度性因素、理念因素與外生因素的配合，由於1938-1939年的二次衰退使羅斯福總統開始承認擴張性支出的重要，使制度面因素轉移成凱因斯經濟學得主張；而後由於戰爭的爆發提升政府監管的能力與正當性，使得理念因素也轉變了，無論政治人物、知識社群、大眾期待，都認為政府有必須介入經濟發展，使凱因斯典範持續了三十年之久。本文以為，只有制度面的移轉是不夠的，要由外生因素提供關鍵時刻之後，才會造成理念因素也隨之轉變，因此三個因素的配合才能導致典範移轉。 本文第四章、第五章回答了第二個問題：答案是否定的，從制度面因素來看，兩次危機發生之初政府皆對金融部門與大公司進行紓困，且2008年的危機因為有了前車之鑑，在危機一開始就能採取全面性、大膽的作為，而不似1929年大蕭條是到後期的財政政策才真正完全落實凱因斯經濟學，因此制度面的因素的確發生重大改變；從外生因素觀之，兩次危機的背景都是因為全球市場緊密連結，自由放任論述主導美國經濟政策，又因經濟過度繁榮而導致泡沫化，但不同之處在於，大蕭條時期因為危機蔓延速度較慢，各國採取以鄰為壑的政策不願合作，致使 1938年發生二次衰退，隨後又爆發了二戰，致使美國政府終於承認凱因斯命題且延續了30年。但2008年的危機因為蔓延快速，美國政府有所警惕，反而提早發生復甦的跡象，這樣的外生條件對於典範移轉產生不利的因素；最後是理念因素，大蕭條時期的領導人物起初並不承認凱因斯命題，因再次衰退才逐漸改變思維，而2008年的美國政府不願意與新政多所連結，其紓困案卻多有凱因斯之風。在政治學術菁英社群之間，大蕭條時期的學術圈與政治圈結合，這些學者進入政府任職，致使典範發生移轉，2008年卻無此現象，多數經濟官僚只是轉向金融監管，防止政府失靈。在大眾期待的層次上，大蕭條時期的工人們基本上支持政府的干預，但2008年儘管大眾也支持政府干預，卻因經濟復甦較快，政府的紓困措施就愈傾向短期政策波動。結論是，制度因素改變了，卻因沒有戰爭爆發的外生因素改變，提供理念因素轉變的契機，使得2008年的紓困措施並沒有造成長期經濟政策典範移轉。 儘管2008年的金融危機並未造成經濟政策典範移轉，本文以為，這次的金融危機對美國的國際地位無疑是種挑戰，特別是來自開發中國家（如中國）的挑戰，卻不影響其當前的地位；其次，美國也會為了預防下次金融危機的發生，將新自由主義重視監管、披露資訊的面向大肆發揮，無論如何，要求美國徹底加強金融部門的監管已是無法抵擋的趨勢。

The 2008 financial crisis, gaining greater intensity since September 2008, spread to the whole world. Due to the tight connection of global economy, the crisis damaged heavily the American domestic economy and the world economy, and its influence remained not only in the monetary aspect but in the real aspect as well. This thesis contends that the 2008 financial crisis is the most serious meltdown since the 1929 Great Depression, and it uses “Most Similar Systems Designs” as its research tool to build up the comparability between the two crises in terms of their scale, essence, root, and effect. This thesis tries to answer two questions: 1) Why did the American government alter its economic policy paradigmatically after the Great Depression? 2) In comparison with the Great Depression, will the American government shift its economic policy from Neo-Liberalism to Keynesian, leading to another paradigm shift? Chapter 3 answers the first question. The answer lies in the institutional factors, the idea factors, and the exogenous factors. Institutionally, due to the second recession between 1938-1939, President Roosevelt commenced to acknowledge the importance of expansionary fiscal policy. In the idea aspect, because of the outbreak of the Second World War, the ability and the legitimacy of governmental interference had been affirmed, and be it politicians, epistemic community, or the public all admitted that the government should intervene in the economy when it comes to catastrophic crisis. Consequently, it is the exogenous factors (the second recession and the Second World War) that provided the key element changing the institutional and the idea factors, and the American economic policy had been shifted from Neo-classical School of Economics to Keynesianism and lasted for 30 years. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 answer the second question. No, the American government will not make another paradigm shift. When the two crises broke out, the government institutionally bailed out the financial sectors and main enterprises. But the Obama administration took the Great Depression as an object lesson and reacted fundamentally and confidently. We could say the American economic policy during the 2008 crisis has been changed dramatically. The uncontrollable spread of the 2008 crisis stimulated the American government to react swiftly, but such a reaction ironically did not lead to a second paradigm shift that the nation has seen since the Great Depression. The second recession and the Second World War pushed the American government to adopt the Keynesian way. During the Great Depression, the American leaders did not switch its economic policy to Keynesianism until the second recession. They worked with the epistemic community while acquiring public support. On the contrary, the Obama administration’s bail-out policies carried the Keynesian ideology while deliberately denying the connection with the New Deal. Most of the economic bureaucracy remains neo-liberal to focus on financial regulatory reform instead of the Keynesian expansionary fiscal policy. Without the public fiercely condemning the bail-out policies, and due to the rapid recovery in early 2009, the governmental interference to stop the 2008 crisis remained a short-term policy change instead of a grassroots paradigm shift. Anyways, the 2008 financial crisis did change institutionally. Lack of the idea factors and the exogenous factors resulted in the failure of a paradigm shift in American economic policy. Although the 2008 financial crisis did not generate a paradigm shift, it still plays an important role economically and politically. Chapter 6 suggests that the crisis has no doubt challenged the American hegemony in the international society, especially from the emerging world such as China. However, it only represents one of the challenges rather than a replacement of its hegemonic status. From now on, the American government will strengthen the neo-liberal idea to supervise the financial market in order to avoid moral hazards and to reveal market intelligence. Keynesianism is fading out.