真之概念在形上學中的角色

Abstract

在本文中，我將論證一個好的真之理論必須能夠彰顯「真」概念的形上意涵，而藉由戴維森的真之理論，我們可以清楚掌握真在形上學中的所扮演的角色。 戴維森的真之理論有三個特色：首先、其以塔斯基的真之語意概念為基礎，提供一個形式化的方式來呈現真概念；再者、將「真」視為一種原始概念可以避免許多真之理論所面對的難題，我們不需要去解釋真概念的本質為何，亦不需嘗試去定義真概念，因為「真」是我們所擁有的最基本的概念之一，是無法被定義的。最重要的是，戴維森藉由原始的真概念將語言與外在世界成功連結，這不但彰顯了真概念的形上學意涵，亦回應了人類對古典真概念的直覺。 我將在本文中回顧幾種重要的真理理論。第一章將談論塔斯基的真之語意概念。眾所皆知，塔斯基主張一個令人滿意的真之理論必須符合兩個判準：材料適當性以及形式正確性。其理論核心的真之語架獲得了大多數哲學家的認可，其後不管是採取去括號理論的蒯恩、原始概念進路的戴維森、或以極簡主義揚起許多爭論的霍維奇，都接受塔斯基的真之語架，以其為形式基礎來發展各自的真之理論。 費爾德對塔斯基的理論提出了強烈的質疑，我將在第二章中闡述費爾德的批評以及其對塔斯基理論的改善。他認為單就語意學的方面來探討真是不夠的，真概念之所以重要是因為反映了外在世界的情況，而物理論恰好可以補足語意概念的不足之處，使真與外在世界產生連結。 第三章將討論蒯恩的去括號理論以及霍維奇的極簡主義。這兩種理論都是以真理緊縮態度來理解塔斯基的真之語架。我將論述這樣的理解並不恰當，因為塔斯基所提供的是一個在不同語言中談論真述詞的方法，這樣的方法卻無法談論到真概念本身。 而在第四章中，我將完整呈現戴維森的真之理論。戴維森認為真是一個無法被定義的概念，但透過建立一個真之理論，我們可以建構一個合適的形上學方法來了解外在世界。此方法以成功的溝通為出發點，指出在溝通的當下我們便是藉由真概念來詮釋外在世界。我將論證戴維森的進路是目前為止眾多真之理論中最完善的，並嘗試回應其所可能受到的批評。

In this article, I argue that, if metaphysics concerns the way things are, the concept of truth plays a significant role in understanding reality. So far as I know, Davidson’s theory of truth provides us a better way to understand the role of truth in metaphysics, compared with other theories. There are three features of Davidson’s theory of truth. In the first place, Davidson’s theory is based on Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, presenting the concept of truth in a formal way. Furthermore, taking truth as a primitive and indefinable concept avoids several predicaments. Most importantly, Davidson successfully correlates language with the external world via the primitive truth concept, which not only exhibits the metaphysical significance but also reflects our intuition of a classic concept of truth. I will investigate several influential theories of truth. Chapter One is devoted to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth. Tarski offers two criteria to a satisfactory theory of truth, namely, material adequacy and formal correctness. Many philosophers accept the core of his theory -- the T-schema, which in turn plays a crucial role in Quine’s disquotationalism, Davidson’s primitivism, and Horwich’s minimalism. In Chapter Two, I shall formulate Hartry Field’s criticism to Tarski’s theory of truth and his refinement. He argues that the significance of truth lies in its reflection of the external world. A merely semantic conception is not sufficient for illuminating the concept of truth. The import of physicalism is his prescription to Tarski’s work. I intend to compare Quine’s disquotationalism and Horwich’s minimalism in Chapter Three. Both theories hold a deflationary attitude in construing Tarski’s truth definition. But that is a misconception, as I shall argue. Since what we expect is a theory of the concept of truth, rather than a mere investigation into the truth predicate. In the final chapter I will present Davidson’s theory of truth. Davidson proposes that in terms of constructing a theory of truth, we can construct a metaphysics to understand the external world. The programme begins with successful communication, followed by the idea that via the concept of truth we can interpret the external world and thus understand it. I argue that Davidson’s approach is the most satisfactory theory of truth so far as it presents.