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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/43830完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 魏宏宇 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wei-Che Hsu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 許維哲 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T02:29:54Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-08-20 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2009-08-20 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009-08-15 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | [1] BitTorrent. http://www.bittorrent.com/.
[2] eDonkey. http://www.edonkey.com/. [3] Gnutella Forums. http://www.gnutellaforums.com/. [4] E. Adar and B.A. Huberman. Free riding on gnutella. firstmonday.org, 2000. [5] B. Cohen. Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent. In Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, volume 6, 2003. [6] M. Piatek, T. Isdal, T. Anderson, A. Krishnamurthy, and A. Venkataramani. Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent. In Proc. of NSDI, 2007. [7] Y. Yan, A. El-Atawy, and E. Al-Shaer. Ranking-based optimal resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks. In IEEE INFOCOM 2007. 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, pages 1100–1108, 2007. [8] M. Hefeeda, A. Habib, and B. Bhargava. Cost-profit analysis of a peer-to-peer media streaming architecture. In Proc. of Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences (HICSS-37). [9] P. Golle, K. Leyton-Brown, I. Mironov, and M. Lillibridge. Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 75–87, 2001. [10] R.T.B. Ma, S.C.M. Lee, J.C.S. Lui, and D.K.Y. Yau. A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 32(1):189–198, 2004. [11] R.T.B. Ma, S.C.M. Lee, J.C.S. Lui, and D.K.Y. Yau. Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), 14(5):978–991, 2006. [12] S. Sanghavi and B. Hajek. A new mechanism for the free-rider problem. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 53(5):1176–1183, 2008. [13] M. Feldman, K. Lai, I. Stoica, and J. Chuang. Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 102–111. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2004. [14] M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica. Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 24(5):1010–1019, 2006. [15] S. Jun and M. Ahamad. Incentives in bittorrent induce free riding. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems, pages 116–121. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2005. [16] D. Levin, K. LaCurts, N. Spring, and B. Bhattacharjee. Bittorrent is an auction: analyzing and improving bittorrent’s incentives. 2008. [17] SA Baset and HG Schulzrinne. An analysis of the skype peer-to-peer internet telephony protocol. In INFOCOM 2006. 25th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications. Proceedings, pages 1–11, 2006. [18] H. Xie, Y.R. Yang, A. Krishnamurthy, Y. Liu, and A. Silberschatz. P4P: Provider portal for (P2P) applications. In Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM, 2008. [19] Joost. http://www.joost.com/. [20] Livestation. http://livestation.com/. [21] R.B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, pages 58–73, 1981. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/43830 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 同儕網路是一種被廣泛應用於各種網路服務的技術，然而同儕網路卻常常遇到'搭便車問題'。有很多機制藉由提供動機給各節點使他們願意貢獻出自己的資源。我們介紹了一個簡單的同儕網路串流系統的模型包含一個服務提供者並利用賽局理論來分析這個模型。此外，我們也找出了這個模型的奈許均衡並證明了其所含的一些性質。而為了解決同儕網路的問題，我們也設計了一個最佳化機制來讓服務提供者的期望效益能夠被最大化，這個機制也能保證個體願意加入服務，同時也願意誠實顯露自己的資訊。我們證明了這些特性，提供了含有服務提供者的同儕網路激勵機制設計一個全新的方向。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Peer-to-peer(P2P) networking is a widespread technology for scalable networks which is already applied to various kinds of network service. However, P2P networks always harms suffered from free-rider problem thus there are many mechanism which is aimed to provide incentives for peers to contribute their own resource. We described a simple model for P2P streaming system with a system provider and also use game theory as a tool to formulate and analyze our model. We also found out the Nash equilibria of the game and prove several properties attained to the equilibria. To solve the problem of P2P networks, we proposed a P2P streaming auction model and designed an optimal mechanism for the model, which maximized the expected utility of the service provider while also ensures the individual rationality and incentive compatibility. We proved these properties of the mechanism and thus provide a brand-new orientation of incentive mechanism design for P2P network with service provider. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T02:29:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-R96921032-1.pdf: 2219625 bytes, checksum: 841212b9ad0306853eaa664e537a0df5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | List of Figures 1
1 Introduction 2 1.1 Game Theoretic Analysis of P2P Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 Incentive Mechanism Design for P2P Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4 Scope of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 P2P Video Streaming System Overview 6 2.1 Peer-to-peer Video Streaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2 Basic System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 Game Formulation 9 3.1 Brief Introduction to Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2 Game Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4 Equal Allocation Scheme 13 4.1 2-Players Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 iv 4.2 n Players Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.3 n+1 Players Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5 Properties of Nash Equilibrium in Equal Allocation 35 5.1 Pareto Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5.2 Social Welfare Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.3 Individual Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6 Brief Introduction to Incentive Mechanism Design 39 6.1 Introduction to Mechanism Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.2 Desirable Properties of Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6.2.1 Allocatively Efficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6.2.2 Individual Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6.2.3 Truthfulness Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.4 Myerson’s Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7 Incentive Mechanism of P2P Video Streaming Service 46 7.1 P2P Auction Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.2 P2P Streaming Model with Bandwidth Allocation and Payment Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.3 Truthful Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation Game . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.3.1 Bandwidth Allocation Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.3.2 Bandwidth Allocation with One Service Quality . . . . . . . . . 50 v 7.3.3 Bandwidth Allocation with Two Service Qualities . . . . . . . . . 51 8 Properties of the Proposed Mechanism 53 8.1 Truthfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.2 Individual Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.3 Expected Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 9 Conclusion 57 Bibliography 58 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 利益最大化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 同儕網路 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 奈許均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 最佳化機制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | en |
| dc.subject | profit maximization | en |
| dc.subject | optimal mechanism | en |
| dc.subject | Peer-to-peer(P2P) | en |
| dc.title | 適用於同儕網路之賽局理論分析及激勵機制設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Game Theoretic Analysis and Incentive Mechanism Design on Peer-to-peer Networks | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 黃寶儀,鄭振牟,林宗男,張時中 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 同儕網路,奈許均衡,最佳化機制,利益最大化, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Peer-to-peer(P2P),Nash equilibrium,optimal mechanism,profit maximization, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 60 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2009-08-17 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 電機資訊學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 電機工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 電機工程學系 | |
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