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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/43194
標題: | 奢侈品的交易行為分析 Learning Behaviors in Trading Luxury Good |
作者: | Shi-Jie Wei 魏士傑 |
指導教授: | 莊委桐 |
關鍵字: | 奢侈品,學習,獨占者,訂價,長期均衡, Luxury good,Learning,Monopolist,Pricing,long-run equilibrium, |
出版年 : | 2009 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 當一件物品--特別是奢侈品—的當期需求會隨著物品的價格而變動時,身為賣家要如何調整售價,以達到最大的利益?為了回答這個問題,我們考慮賣家販賣一種具有獨占特性的奢侈品,而且他的品質是保持一定的。在每一次的交易媒合裡,僅有一位新買家到商店購買商品。賣家透過觀察這位買家的衣著或是談吐等等,來決定他要以什麼價格販賣。交易結束後,不管有沒有交易成功,賣家可以藉此來更新他對購買這件商品的客源組成的想法,並將之導入價格的訂定方式,回應未來顧客以得到最大利潤。在數期的交易之後,當賣家蒐集到足夠的資訊時,有可能會對不同類型的顧客維持一樣的售價。因此,我們可以得到此商品的長期均衡價格。文中討論出會產生長期均衡價格的區間,並有考量當期與未來折現的期望利潤;如果是追求長期報酬的話,賣家會盡量調高售價以賺取未來的期望利潤。 How does a seller manipulate the price of luxury goods in order to maximize his profit, given that the demand for luxury goods may fluctuate with regard to the selling price during each trading period? We discuss this question by considering the seller as a monopolist who produces exclusively one type of the luxury goods which are identical. During each trading period, a buyer with no pre-knowledge of the good comes to buy one. The seller then considers his dress and/or appearance to determine the price he wants to sell. After the trade, the seller may update his belief in the buyers who could accept higher price. By an appropriate learning mechanism we characterize the conditions under which the seller would sometimes induce an informational cascade such that he sells at the same price regardless of the signal and the conditions under which the seller would increase the price gradually whenever he observes a 'high' signal till the price reaches its long-run equilibrium. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/43194 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 數學系 |
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