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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 梁孟玉(Meng-Yu Liang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Ya-Han Chuang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 莊亞涵 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T01:26:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-27 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2009-07-27 | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2009-07-23 | |
dc.identifier.citation | [1] Ali, S. Nageeb M. (2006) Waiting to Settle:Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases, Journal of Economic Theory, 130, 109-137.
[2] Ariel Rubinstein. (1982), Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 97-109. [3] Babcock Linda, George,Loewenstein . (1997) Explaining Bargaining Impasse: TheRole of Self-Serving Biases, Journal of Economic Perspectives,11, 109-126. [4] Li, Duozhe, Yat Fung, Wong. (2009), Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical, Vol.9: Iss. 1, Article 12. [5] Muhamet Yildiz. (2003), Bargaining Without a Common Prior-an Immediate Agreement Theorem, Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 3, 793-811. [6] Raymond Deneckere and Meng-Yu Liang. (2008), Imperfect durability and the Coase Conjecture, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39: Iss. 1,pp. 1-19. [7] Richard A. Posner.(1972), The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 305-347 [8] Robert J. Aumann. (1976), Agreeing to Disagree, The Annals of Statistics, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 1236-1239 [9] William M. Landes. (1971), An Economic Analysis of the Courts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 61-107. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/42863 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本文旨在分析「樂觀的預期」會如何影響交易時間的延遲。此篇模型
是先固定交易物品的耐久性,再在這段物品使用期限內,將時間細分 為許多期。擁有這個耐久財可以享受其所提供的服務,在每一期都得 到相同效用。買賣雙方對於未來他是否能出價,各自有一個主觀上的 認定。我們證明在某些情況之下,延遲交易的時間是顯著的。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyze the role of optimism in bargaining delay as
Yildiz(2003) did. Given the life time of the durable goods, owner can obtain the same value every period. Each player may hold his subjective belief about being recognized in the future. We find possibility that delay is significant when bargaining periods grows into infinite. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T01:26:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-R96323010-1.pdf: 333540 bytes, checksum: 3d21e3139b0c9546181255a70e11d506 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 1 Introduction 2
2 Model 3 3 Equilibrium 5 4 Efficiency 9 5 Conclusion 12 6 Appendix A 12 7 Appendix B 14 8 Reference 15 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 預期樂觀對交易時間的影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Optimism and Bargaining Delay | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王道一(Joseph Tao-yi Wang),袁國芝(Kuo-Chrh Yuan) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 樂觀,預期,出價,耐久財,延遲交易, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | optimism,bargaining delay,durable goods,recognized,subjective belief, | en |
dc.relation.page | 16 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2009-07-23 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
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