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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陶儀芬(Yi-Feng Tao) | |
dc.contributor.author | Chia-Chien Chang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 張珈健 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T00:37:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-31 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2008-12-30 | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2008-11-27 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/41911 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究嘗試建立官僚自主性與金融改革表現的因果關係,並找出影響官僚自主性的制度性因素,藉此對台灣金融自由化所面臨之危機提出整體一貫的解釋。
官僚體系經常必須解決自主性過強或太弱導致的危機,亦即「國家自主性的雙重面貌」,於是政經行為者如何處理官僚自主性內在矛盾將直接影響金融改革表現。追求官僚體系內部團結會降低金改政策執行的制衡力量,增加官僚獨斷濫權的風險;強化官僚體系內部制衡時,則相對減少官僚推動金改時面臨外來干預的抗衡力量,提高政策被滲透或扭曲的可能性。 1949年來台的國民黨政府疏離於本土社會,迅速國有化金融體系輔以專制暴力隔絕外在的尋租壓力;另方面則將分屬不同派系的黨籍官僚混編至重要金融及行庫要職,藉由派系相互監視的機制避免官僚濫權。這種利用非正式制度因素如派系關係、外來政權特性所構建的金融治理網絡,亦即「網絡化金融統御」,兼顧官僚體系的組織一致與內部制衡,於焉確保金融官僚既獨立又自律的統理金融改革。 隨著冷戰終結、威權轉型,國民黨政府內的主要統治派系在權力繼承鬥爭時,基於政權維繫而選擇鞏固網絡化金融統御的團結,以中常會/黨管會為樞紐凝聚黨、政、商三系一體主導1990年代的金融自由化。組織一致的黨籍金融官僚指揮金改時高度獨立自主,卻無可避免的籠罩於黨國濫權陰霾。 拜國民黨內部分裂而在2000年猝然執政的民進黨政府,缺乏駕馭官僚體制的經驗於是廣泛結盟外部政、商、學界力量,雖然意外的重現網絡化金融統御之派系制衡,卻沒有及時演化弭平政策衝突的機制。內部分歧的金融官僚在改革過程經常面臨政令不一致,因而傾向自我約束甚至放棄管理市場秩序,讓金融自由化不可或缺的再管制付之闕如,也就使兩次金改受迫於各方勢力的扭曲與滲透。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Why does the financial liberalization in Taiwan tend to engender crises? This thesis is an attempt at providing a coherent explanation by not only establishing a causal relationship between the bureaucratic autonomy and the performance of the financial reform but also by investigating the institutional factors that exert influence on the bureaucratic autonomy.
All bureaucratic systems are confronted with an inherent tension between autonomy and accountability, namely the “Janus-faced State Autonomy”. The strategy that the political and economic actors choose to deal with this intrinsic dilemma determines the performance of financial reforms. Although emphasizing on the organizational cohesiveness of a bureaucratic system strengthens the bureaucratic autonomy of the system, it nevertheless weakens the power of check-and-balance on policymaking and therefore heightens the risk of power abuse. In contrast, laying stress on the internal checking mechanism, which erodes the countervailing power of the bureaucratic system that aims to protect the bureaucrats from the external intervention, may result in policy distortion or penetration by various social interest groups. Due to the alien nature of the émigré regime and the consequent (sub)ethnic cleavages between the settlers and the locals, the KMT regime, after arriving at Taiwan in 1949, did not hesitate to nationalize the financial system and to exert the despotic coercion power so as to avoid rent-seeking from the societal groups; on the other hand, the regime assigned the bureaucrats from different party factions to critical positions in the financial and banking systems, anticipating that the competition among factions would rule out the possibility of power abuse. This kind of financial governance, which is based on the informal institutional factors such as factionalism and the émigré regime characters, namely “Network-based Financial Discretion(NBFD)”, successfully retained both the organizational cohesiveness and the internal check-and-balance in the bureaucratic system and therefore guaranteed the bureaucratic independence and prudence in the process of financial reforms. After the end of the Cold War and with the loosening authoritarian rule in Taiwan, the ruling clique of the KMT regime, under the pressure of the political succession struggle, decided to improve the organizational cohesiveness of NBFD. With the Central Committee and Business Management Committee as the pivot, the KMT regime dictated the financial liberalization in 1990s by the “party-bureaucrat-business” trinity. However, while the highly cohesive bureaucratic system enjoyed high independence during the process of financial policymaking, it was haunted by the party-state corruption. Benefiting from the division within the KMT, DPP unexpectedly came into power in 2000. Without the experiences of running a country and coordinating with the bureaucratic elites, the DPP government widely formed alliances with politicians, business entrepreneurs and scholars outside of the bureaucratic system. Although such kind of coalition strategy brought about the unintentional side effect that recovered the internal check-and-balance of NBFD, the DPP government never made enough effort to devise proper mechanisms to solve the ideological differences, policy disputes and power struggles within the state apparatus. It is the internal conflicts and the inconsistent policies, which compelled the financial bureaucrats not only to be over- self-restraining but also to withdraw from performing the indispensable regulatory capacity required by the financial liberalization, that gave rise to the crises of policy distortion and penetration by external forces during the “Two Rounds of Financial Reforms”. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T00:37:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-R94322010-1.pdf: 3727906 bytes, checksum: 6eee33fbf105b8a00ab332ea925fe93f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員審定書………………………………..………………………………………..i 誌謝………………………………..…………………………………….………………ii 中文摘要………………………………..…………………………………….………...iv 英文摘要………………………………..…………………………………….………....v 第一章 緒論………………………………..…………………………………….……1 第一節 問題意識:台灣金改模式的延續與危機….…………………..………1 第二節 文獻檢討:金融改革中的國家自主性………………………………...4 第三節 分析架構:台灣金融官僚自主性的制度特徵—網絡化金融統御……………………………..…………………………….…………..16 第四節 資料來源與研究限制…………………………..…………………...…27 第五節 章節安排:從國民黨政府到民進黨政府的金改危機:一個制度性解釋…………………………………...…………………………………..28 第二章 威權時期「網絡化金融統御」之制度內涵及歷史形構…………………….30 第一節 金融體制的編排邏輯—威權家父長、侍從家族與官商資本..……….30 第二節 穩定發展的根源:系統壓力下的國家自主性………………………...56 第三章 民主進程中的網絡化金融統御變遷……………………………...………..63 第一節 李登輝時期的網絡化金融統御與金融官僚自主性……………….....64 第二節 政黨輪替之網絡化金融統御……………………………………….....90 第四章 民進黨的金融改革—缺乏團結的網絡化統御………................................111 第一節 「一次金改」中的制衡與團結(2000-2004)…………………………....111 第二節 「二次金改」的團結困境(2004-2007)………………………………...130 第五章 結論………………………………………………………………………...152 第一節 國家自主性、網絡化統御與金融改革…………………………….…152 第二節 反事實(Counterfactual Analysis)的嘗試性省思……………………..161 參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………...163 附錄一 銀行業的歷史發展………………………………………………………...185 附錄二 「一次金改」中爭議的金控公司經營個案………………………………...191 附錄三 「二次金改」中爭議的金控併購個案……………………………………198 表圖目錄 表目錄 【表1-1】Wilson的管制政治類型學………..…………………………………………..6 【表1-2】管制革新路徑…………………..…………………………………………….9 【表1-3】東亞經濟奇蹟的制度多樣性……………………………………………......11 【表1-4】研究步驟…………………………………………………………………….26 【表2-1】接受日本殖民遺緒改組而成的公營金融事業與其他………………..…...32 【表2-2】整體企業融資結構(%).………………………………….……………..…...34 【表2-3】各種金融機關的結構(1964年12月)…………………..…………………35 【表2-4】各銀行(庫局)的資本、存貸款結構(1964年末)………..…………………37 【表2-5】主要銀行的存放款結構(1966-1975)…………………………………..…...37 【表2-6】金融機構存款、放款、貨幣供給量與外債餘額(1961-1990)………….……40 【表2-7】銀行存款利率與民間利率之比較(1964-1990)……………………..……...49 【表2-8】台灣對外貿易情況(千美元)…………………………………..…………….50 【表2-9】公營行庫主要放款對象(1973年)…………………………….……..……...52 【表2-10】威權時期(1949-1987)金融官僚任期………………………………….…..59 【表3-1】1980年代的超額儲蓄率(百萬元)………………………………………......67 【表3-2】民營企業國內借款來源(%)………………………..……………………….67 【表3-3】提出申請的19家新銀行…………………………..………………………..75 【表3-4】台灣地區存款貨幣機構家數變動情形…………………………………….76 【表3-5】徐立德時期國民黨投資金融服務業一覽表…………………………..…...78 【表3-6】上市「黨營事業」股東人數(1995-1998)……………………………….……83 【表3-7】1997/98金融危機前韓、台、日、美製造業資產負債比……………………..88 【表3-8】危機後韓、台企業資產負債比……………………………………….…......89 【表3-9】三十六家問題農漁會信用部與接收行庫………………………………….94 【表3-10】金融機構逾放比…………………………………………………………...95 【表3-11】民進黨政府執政初期政策反覆與官僚受責紀要…………………………99 【表3-12】民進黨政府重要財經官僚背景分析………………………..…………...100 【表3-13】我國加入WTO金融服務業開放承諾概要………………………..…….106 【表3-14】台灣經濟基本結構(2000-2007) ………………………..………………..107 【表3-15】銀行業中公私企業市佔率………………………..……………………...107 【表3-16】證券市場中本國自然人的影響力………………………..………………110 【表3-17】五大金控最終控制權與擁有董監事席次比例…………………………..110 【表4-1】民進黨政府基層金改政策態度變遷過程………………………..………..117 【表4-2】「二次金改」政策主軸的制訂系譜………………………..……………….149 【表5-1】威權時期網絡化金融統御………….…………………………………......158 【表5-2】民主化時期國民黨政府網絡化金融統御…………..…………………….159 【表5-3】民進黨政府網絡化金融統御……………………………………………...160 圖目錄 【圖1-1】研究架構圖………………………………………………………………….26 【圖2-1】1964年國民黨政府的金融系統………….………..…………………..........38 【圖2-2】1990年(未開放商銀新設前)台灣的金融體系………………………..……39 【圖3-1】1949-2000年國際儲備總資產………………………....................................65 【圖3-2】「三元困境」示意圖……….............................................................................66 【圖3-3】企業集團的關係類型……….............................. ……………………….....110 【圖4-1】行政院金融改革專案小組組織架構圖………............................................119 【圖4-2】中信金「插旗」兆豐金鎖股暨儲水策略與佈局…………………………...146 【圖5-1】威權時期網絡化金融統御……………………...........................................158 【圖5-2】民主化時期國民黨政府網絡化金融統御……….......................................159 【圖5-3】民進黨政府網絡化金融統御…………………...........................................160 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 官僚自主性與金融改革表現—台灣金融自由化的歷史制度分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Bureaucratic Autonomy and the Performance of Financial Reform: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis on Financial Liberalization in Taiwan | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 97-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蕭全政(Chyuan-Jenq Shiau),楊雅惠(Ya-Hwei Yang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 國家自主性的雙重面貌,金融改革,網絡化金融統御,組織一致,派系制衡,獨立,自律., | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Janus-Faced State Autonomy,Financial Reforms,Network-Based Financial Discretion,Organizational Cohesiveness,Check and Balance among Factions,Bureaucratic Independence,Self-Restraining State., | en |
dc.relation.page | 208 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2008-11-28 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
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