請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/41300完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 曾郁仁(Yu-Ren Tzeng) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Young-Lang Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張永郎 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T00:15:28Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-07-31 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2009-06-23 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009-06-16 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Essay I:
Barber, B. M., Lyon, J.D., 1996, Detecting Abnormal Operating Performance: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics, Journal of Financial Economics, 41: 359-399. Cole, C. R., and K. A. McCullough, 2006, A Reexamination of the Corporate Demand for Reinsurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73: 169-192. Christensen, T. E., R. E. Hoyt, and J. S. Paterson, 1999, Ex Ante Incentive or Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earning, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 26: 807-832 D’Arcy, S. P., and J. R. Garven, 1990, Property-Liability Insurance Pricing Models: An Empirical Evaluation, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 57: 391-430. Das, M., W. K. Newey, and F. Vella, 2003, Nonparametric Estimation of Sample Selection Models, The Review of Economic Studies, 70: 33-58. Fitzgerald, J. F., 1973, Demutualization of Mutual Property and Liability Insurers, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 40: 575-584. Esho, N., A. Kirievsky, D. Ward, and R. Zurbruegg, 2004, Law and the Determinants of Property-Casualty Insurance, Journal of risk and Insurance, 71: 265-283. Garven, J. R., and J. Lamm-Tennant, 2003, The Demand for Reinsurance: Theory and Empirical Tests, Assurances, 71: 217-238. Gaver, J. J., and J. S. Paterson, 1999, Managing Insurance Company Financial Statements to Meet Regulatory and Tax Reporting Goals, Contemporary Accounting Research, 16: 207-241. Grace, E. V., 1990, Property-Liability Insurer Reserve Errors: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 57: 28-46. Hoyt, R. E., and H. Khang, 2000, On the Demand for Corporate Property Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67: 91-107 Jeng, V., G. C. Lai, and M. J. McNamara, 2007, Efficiency and Demutualization: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry in the 1980s and 1990s, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74: 683-711. Klaauw, B. V. and R. H. Koning, 2003, Testing the Normality Assumption in the Sample Selection Model With an Application to Travel Demand, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 21: 31-42. Kim, W. J., Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith, 1996, On the Choice of Insurance Distribution Systems, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 63: 207-227. Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith, 1990, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, Journal of Business, 63: 19-40. Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith, 2004, Incentive for Managing Accounting Information: Property-Liability Insurer Stock-Charter Conversions, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 71: 213-251. McNamara, M. J. and S. G. Rhee, 1992, Ownership Structure and Performance: The Demutualization of Life Insurers, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 59: 221-238. Nohel, T. and V. Tarhan, 1998, Share Repurchases and Firm Performance: New Evidence on the Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Journal of Financial Economics, 49: 187–222. Petroni, K. R., 1992, Optimistic Reporting in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15: 485-508. Powell, L. S., and D. W. Sommer, 2007, Internal Versus External Capital Markets in the Insurance Industry: The Role of Reinsurance, Journal of Financial Services Research, 31: 173-188. Smith, C. W., and R. Stulz, 1985, The Determinates of Firms’ Hedging Policies, Journal of Financial Economics, 32: 263-292. Studenmund, A. H., 1997, Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide, 3rd ed., New York: Addison-Wesley. Viswanathan, K. S. and J. D. Cummins, 2003, Ownership Structure Changes in the Insurance Industry: An Analysis of Demutualization, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 70: 401-437. Viswanathan, K. S., 2006, The Pricing of Insurer Demutualization Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73: 439-468. Weiss, M., 1985, A Multivariate Analysis of Loss Reserving Estimates in Property-Liability Insurers, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 52: 199-221. Weiss, M. A., and J. Chung, 2004, U.S. Reinsurance Price, Financial Quality, and Global Capacity, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 71: 437-467. Essay II Baranoff, E. G., and T. W. Sager (2003). “The Relationship among Organizational and Distribution Forms and Capital and Asset Risk Structures in the Life Insurance Industry,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 70(3): 375-400. Baranoff, E. G., D. Baranoff, and T. W. Sager (2000). “Non-Uniform Regulatory Treatment of Broker Distribution Systems: An Impact Analysis for Life Insurers,” Journal of Insurance Regulation 19(1): 94-129. Barrese, J., and J. M. Nelson (1992). “Independent and Exclusive Agency Insurers: A Reexamination of the Cost Differential.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 59: 375-397. Berger, A. N., J. D. Cummins and M. A. Weiss (1997). “The Coexistence of Multiple Distribution Systems for Financial Services: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance.” Journal of Business 70: 515-546. Brockett, P. L., W. W. Cooper, L. L. Goldern, J. J. Rouuseau, and Y. Wang (1997). “DEA Evaluation of the Efficiency of Organizational Forms and Distribution Systems in the U.S. Property and Liability Insurance Industry.” International Journal of Systems Science 29: 1235-1247. Brockett, P. L., W. W. Cooper, L. L. Goldern, J. J. Rouuseau, and Y. Wang (2004). “Evaluating Solvency versus Efficiency Performance and Different Forms of Organization and Marketing in U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Companies.” European Journal of Operational Research 154: 492-514. Brockett, P. L., W. W. Cooper, L. L. Goldern, J. J. Rouuseau, and Y. Wang (2005). “Financial Intermediary versus Production Approach to Efficiency of Marketing Distribution System and Organizational Structure of Insurance Company,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 72(3): 393-412. Chiappori, P. A., and B. Salanie (2000). “Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Market,” Journal of Political Economy 108(1): 56-78. Cole, C. R., and K. A. McCullough (2006). “A Reexamination of the Corporate Demand for Reinsurance.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 73: 169-192. Cummins, J. D., M. F. Grace, and R. D. Phillips (1999). “Regulatory Solvency Prediction in Property-Liability Insurance: Risk-Based Capital, Audit Ratios, and Cash Flow Simulation,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 66(3): 417-458. Cummins, J. D., and J. Vanderhei (1979). “A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems.” Bell Journal of Economics 10: 709-719. Cummins. J. D., M. A. Weiss, and H. Zi (1999). “Organizational Forms and Efficiency: The Coexistence of Stock and Mutual Property-Liability Insurers.” Management Science 45(9): 1254-1269. Dionne, G. (2000). “Handbook of Insurance,” Kluwer Academic Publishers. Edelbeg, W. (2004). “Testing for Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Consumer Loan Markets.” Borad of Governors of the Federals Reserve System Working Paper. Garven, J. R., and J. Lamm-Tennant, 2003, The Demand for Reinsurance: Theory and Empirical Tests, Assurances, 71: 217-238. Grossman, S., and O. Hart (1986). “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94: 691-719. Hyytinen, A., and M. Pajarinen (2005). “External Finance, Firm Growth and the Benefits of Information Disclosure: Evidence from Finland.” European Journal of Law and Economics 19(1): 69-93. Joskow, P. (1973). “Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 4: 375-427. Kim, W. J., D. Mayers, and C. W. Smith (1996). “On the Choice of Insurance Distribution Systems,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 63: 207-227. Lamm-Tennant, J., and L. T. Starks (1993). “Stocks versus Mutual Ownership Structures: The Risk Implication,” Journal of Business 66: 29-46. Lee, C. F., and Y. L. Wu (2009). “Two-Stage Models for the Analysis of Information Content of Equity-Selling Mechanisms Choices.” Journal of Business Research 62: 123-133. Makki, S. S, and A. Somwaru (2001). “Evidence of Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance Markets.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 68: 685-708. Marvel, H. (1982). “Exclusive Dealing.” Journal of Law and Economics 25: 1-25. Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith (1981). “Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in Insurance Markets,” Journal of Business 54: 407-434. Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith (1988). “Ownership Structure Across Lines of Property-Casualty Insurance,” Journal of Law and Economics 31: 351–378. Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith (1990). “On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market.” Journal of Business 63: 19-40. Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith (1994). “Managerial Discretion, Regulation, and Stock Insurer Ownership Structure,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 61(4): 638-655. Regan, L. (1997). “Vertical Integration in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A Transaction Cost Approach,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 64(1): 41-62. Regan, L. (1999). “Expense Ratios Across Insurance Distribution Systems: An Analysis by Line of Business.” Risk Management and Insurance Review 2. Regan, L., and S. Tennyson (1996). “Agent discretion and the Choice of Insurance Distribution System.” Journal of Law and Economics 39: 637-666. Regan, L., and L. Y. Tzeng (1999). “Organizational Form in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 66(2): 253-273. Sass, T. R., and M. Gisser (1989). “Agency Cost, Firm Size, and Exclusive Dealing,” Journal of Law and Economics 33: 381-399. Seog, S. H. (1999). “The Coexistence of Distribution Systems when Consumers are Informed.” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 24(2): 173-192. Seog, S. H. (2005). “Distribution Systems and Operating Leverage.” Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance 1(1): 45-61. Trigo-Gamarra, L. (2008). “Reasons for the Coexistence of Different Distribution Channels: An Empirical Test for the German Insurance Market.” The Geneva Paper on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice 33: 389-407. Viswanathan, K. S. and J. D. Cummins (2003). “Ownership Structure Changes in the Insurance Industry: An Analysis of Demutualization,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 70: 401-437. Wu, Y. L., and C. F. Lee (2008). “Specification Analysis of Corporate Equity Financing Decision: A Conditional Residual Approach.” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 31: 395-423. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/41300 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 美國產物保險公司的組織結構一般可分為四大類:股份有限公司型態 (Stock),相互公司型態 (Mutual),相互保險社 (Reciprocal)及勞依茲 (Lloyds)。不同的組織型態之間各有其相對的優勢,因而在不同的條件下,保險公司會選擇對其最有利的型態來經營。本篇論文主要針對兩個議題來討論:(1)討論保險公司的組織結構由相互公司結構轉變成為股份有限公司結構(Demutualization;去相互化),其再保險需求的變化為何。(2)討論保險公司的組織結構與保險通路之間的關聯性為何。
在議題(1)的研究中我們發現去相互化的保險公司明顯降低對非關係的再保險人(non-affiliated reinsurers)的再保險需求,但對其有關係的再保險人的再保險需求相對是增加的。此現象一個可能的解釋為去相互化的保險公司對再保險的使用為一種風險自留的態度,而並非風險移轉的做法。而如此做可以降低保險公司的再保險成本。本研究的結果亦顯示去相互化的保險公司在轉換後其整體的再保險需求(非關係的再保險人的再保險需求+關係的再保險人的再保險需求)並沒有明顯的改變。另外一個有趣的發現為去相互化的公司在轉換之前對非關係的再保險人的再保險需求是增加的。 在議題(2)的研究中我討論美國產物保險公司如何選擇其組織結構型態及保險通路。由於以往的研究結果並未發現一致的結論,所以本研究使用美國產物保險公司2004年的資料及採用遞減式的方法(reduced form approach)來重新檢驗組織結構型態及保險通路之間的關聯性為何。我們透過遞減式的方法(reduced form approach)來做條件相依性檢定(conditional dependence test),此檢定法可以避免結構式方法(structure form approach)的模型設定問題。當我們控制了相關的外生變數之後,我們發現組織結構型態及保險通路之間是條件不相關的。而此結果和Regan and Tzeng (1999)的發現是一致的,但卻和Baranoff and Sager (2003)及Kim et al. (1996)是不一致的。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In general, there are four types of organizational forms in the property liability insurance industry which are as follows: stock, mutual, reciprocal, and Lloyds. Organizational forms choice of insurers is driven by the differential relative advantages for themselves under its different conditions. Two essays are discussed in this dissertation: (1) Essay 1 we discuss the demutualization and demand for reinsurance for U.S. Property-Liability insurance industry. (2) Essay 2 we discuss the relationship between organizational forms and distribution channels for U.S. Property-Liability insurance industry.
Essay I investigates whether U.S. property-liability insurers change their demand for reinsurance after demutualization. We find that converting insurers decrease the demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers, but increase the demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers after the conversion. One possible explanation is that converting insurers may treat reinsurance to affiliated reinsurers as risk retention rather than risk transfer so that they can reduce reinsurance cost. Our empirical results show that the overall demand for reinsurance of converting insurers is not statistically different after the conversion. One other interesting finding is that converting insurers increase demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers before conversion. Essay II examines how do property liability insurance companies choose their organizational form and distribution channel? Prior studies have not yet provided a consistent conclusion. In this paper, we propose a reduced form approach to reexamine the relationship between organizational forms and distribution channels in the insurance industry, using cross-sectional data pertaining to U.S. property liability insurance companies in 2004. We adopt a conditional dependence test, which can overcome the sensitivity problem of the structure form setting. The results show that after we control for all explanatory variables, the relationship between organizational forms and distribution channels is conditionally uncorrelated. The result is consistent with Regan and Tzeng (1999); but do contradict to Baranoff and Sager (2003) and Kim et al. (1996). | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T00:15:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-D91723001-1.pdf: 484665 bytes, checksum: a40225c16cd9fdd5ab9f4f85865310f7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Essay I 1
Demutualization and Demand for Reinsurance 1 Abstract 1 1. Introduction 2 2. Research Hypothesis and Empirical Analysis 4 2.1. Research Hypothesis 4 2.2. Data and Variables Description 5 2.3 Regression Model 10 3. Empirical Results 12 4. Robustness of Results 16 5. Conclusions 17 References 19 Table 1 Summary Statistics of the Changes of the Reinsurance Ratio 23 Table 2 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 24 Table 3 Regression Results for Converting and Mutual Matching Firms after Conversion 25 Table 4 Results of Demutualized Firm Dummy Variable before Converting for Mutual Matching Firms 27 Table 5 Regression Results for Controlling M&A Activities after Conversion 28 Appendix 1 30 Essay II 31 A Reexamination of the Relation between Organizational Forms and Distribution Channels in the U.S. Property Liability Insurance Industry 31 Abstract 31 1. Introduction 32 2. Literature Review 35 2.1 Literature of Organizational Form Choice 36 2.2 Literature of Distribution Channel Choice 37 2.3 Integration of Organizational Form and Distribution Channel Choice 38 3. Data and Variables Description 40 3.1 Data 40 3.2 Variables Description 41 4. Methodology and Empirical Results 45 4.1 Methodology 45 4.2 Empirical Results 46 5. Conclusion 48 References 51 Table 1 Summary Statistics of Numerical Variables 57 Table 2 Probit Regression Results 59 Table 3 W Statistic Test 60 Table 4 Correlation coefficient test of bivariate probit regression models 61 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 結構式 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 再保險需求 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 產物保險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 去相互化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 關聯性再保險人 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 非關聯性的再保險人 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 風險自留 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 組織結構 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 行銷通路 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 條件相依性檢定 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 遞減式 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | distribution channel | en |
| dc.subject | organizational form | en |
| dc.subject | conditional dependence test | en |
| dc.subject | structure form | en |
| dc.subject | reduced form | en |
| dc.subject | Demand for reinsurance | en |
| dc.subject | property-liability insurance | en |
| dc.subject | demutualization | en |
| dc.subject | affiliated reinsurers | en |
| dc.subject | non-affiliated reinsurers | en |
| dc.subject | risk retention | en |
| dc.title | 美國產物保險公司組織結構實證分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Empirical Analysis of Organizational Forms of U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳業寧,王儷玲,黃瑞卿,鄭士卿 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 再保險需求,產物保險,去相互化,關聯性再保險人,非關聯性的再保險人,風險自留,組織結構,行銷通路,條件相依性檢定,遞減式,結構式, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Demand for reinsurance,property-liability insurance,demutualization,affiliated reinsurers,non-affiliated reinsurers,risk retention,organizational form,distribution channel,conditional dependence test,reduced form,structure form, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 61 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2009-06-16 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 | |
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