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Title: | 論內線交易刑事規範之正當性與理論基礎 The Legitimacy of the Criminal Rule of Insider Trading and the Theoretical Basis |
Authors: | Chih-Chung Huang 黃志中 |
Advisor: | 王皇玉 |
Keyword: | 內線交易,證券市場,市場論,義務論,特別關係理論,消息傳遞責任, insider trading,securities market,market-oriented theory,duty-oriented theory,special relationship theory,tipper/tippee liability, |
Publication Year : | 2008 |
Degree: | 碩士 |
Abstract: | 本論文主要是分析探討內線交易是否應該被禁止,以及如果要予以禁止的話,其背後的理論基礎應該為何。論文分成八章,第一章說明問題意識與研究範圍;第二章簡單說明內線交易的定義與法律上之效果;第三章詳細探討內線交易是否應該被禁止;第四章介紹內線交易各國之立法例;第五章說明禁止內線交易的理論基礎;第六章說明消息傳遞者之責任型態;第七章則處理其他內線交易相關問題,第八章是結論。
就內線交易應否禁止而言,本文認為基於一般人對於內線交易的誤解,以為內線交易是有害行為,將使內線交易的存在對證券市場產生不良的影響,所以仍應予以管制。但是從比例原則的角度觀之,既然內線交易的不良影響是起因於人們的誤解,則首要之務就是要消除此一誤解,不需要也不應該用刑事手段加以處理,因此內線交易刑事規範不具備必要性,難有正當的存續基礎。 雖然如此,現實上既然已經存在內線交易刑事規範,就仍有必要去探討其背後的理論基礎。在觀察各國立法例之後,本文採用「特別關係理論」作為禁止的理由。當行為人是透過特殊消息傳遞管道而獲知內線消息時,即應該受到內線交易規範的規制,藉此排除那些偶然獲知內線消息之人受到規範之可能性。並且在消息傳遞者責任型態的部分,也採用一貫的理論來處理責任範圍的問題。透過此一理論的運作,使內線交易之刑事責任能有一個比較合理的限制,以減輕其不正當性。 This thesis mainly discusses whether or not insider trading should be banned, and if so, what the theory basis should be. The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The First chapter describes the meaning of issues and the scope of research. The second chapter generally explains the definition of insider trading and its legal effect. The third chapter goes into whether or not insider trading should be forbidden. The fourth chapter demonstrates the instances of legislation of several countries about insider trading. The fifth chapter discusses the theory basis of controlling insider dealing. The sixth chapter shows the liability formation of tippers and tippees. The seventh chapter deals with other problems of insider trading. The last chapter is the conclusion. As to the question of banning insider trading, I think insider trading is detrimental only because of the people’s misunderstanding that it harms themselves. Thus insider dealing could influence the securities market in a disadvantage way. So it still has the need to be governed. Examined by the principle of proportionality, however, using criminal penalty to deal with insider trading is unnecessary. Since the detrimental character of insider trading is caused by people’s misreading, all we should do is to clarify the mistake. We don’t need to and shouldn’t to treat it with criminal penalty. Therefore, the criminal regulation of insider trading is not necessary, and its existence is hard to be justified. However, since the criminal regulations of insider trading already exist, we still need to probe into the theory basis which the regulations depend on. After observing several instances of legislation, I adopt “Special Relationship Theory” as the fundamental logic to prohibit insider trading. When a person gets inside information through a special information transferring route, he is entitled to subject to insider trading rules. In this way, we can exclude those who get inside information by chance from be criminalized. Moreover, when it comes to the tipper/tippee liability, we can also employ the persistent theory to determine the extension of responsibility. Under the practice of special relationship theory, we can apply a proper limitation on the criminal liability of insider trading, and make the regulation less unjustifiable. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/40912 |
Fulltext Rights: | 有償授權 |
Appears in Collections: | 法律學系 |
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File | Size | Format | |
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ntu-97-1.pdf Restricted Access | 1.67 MB | Adobe PDF |
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