傳訊理論與策略群組結構

Abstract

從傳訊理論應用在諸多領域的文獻回顧中，發現已有廣泛的模型、理論在討論具有資訊優勢的一方如何透過公開、明顯的訊號將私有資訊傳達給資訊劣勢的另一方。再者，策略群組的研究思潮也已經有三十多年的發展歷史。然而，在資訊不對稱下，策略群組組內及組間的廠商如何運用溝通手段或工具提供關於廠商自身典型及其策略定位的研究卻鮮少有探討。本論文的目的便試圖以傳訊理論解釋為何策略群組組內及組間績效會產生差異及其競爭動態，並據以提出初步的命題。 總括而言，本論文藉由橋接傳訊理論及策略群組研究以探究產業內定位對企業的影響。廠商在策略群組組內及組間的定位對其績效結果的策略意涵，將是經理人擬定企業成長策略的有用參考。

An extensive theoretical literature on signaling in diverse fields has provided rich models in which it is possible to credibly transmit private information from the informed to the uninformed party via the use of publicly observable ‘signals’. Besides, the development of the strategic groups has generated a broad and significant amount of research over the last three decades. However, in the presence of asymmetric information, the notion that firms within and across strategic groups may use a variety of instruments to provide relevant information about them or their positioning is rarely established in research. This thesis provides an initial conceptual endeavor to provide a series of propositions that elaborate how the use of signaling may explain the behavioral and performance differences of strategic group membership, as well as their competitive dynamics. In brief, this thesis explores the consequences associated with the positioning within the industry structure by bridging signaling theory and strategic group research. The performance implications of positioning within and across a strategic group structure will offer useful insights for managers when they make the strategic choice of firm growth.