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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 電機資訊學院
  3. 資訊工程學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/40444
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dc.contributor.advisor王大為(Da-Wei Wang),呂學一(Hsueh-I Lu)
dc.contributor.authorShih-Peng Linen
dc.contributor.author林世鵬zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-14T16:47:49Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-06
dc.date.copyright2008-08-06
dc.date.issued2008
dc.date.submitted2008-07-30
dc.identifier.citation[1] H. Z. Aashtiani and T. L. Magnanti. Equilibria on a congested transportation network. SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods, 2(3):213–226, 1981.
[2] M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, and C. B. Winsten. Studies in the Economics of Transportation. Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1956.
[3] R. Cocchi, S. Shenker, D. Estrin, and L. Zhang. Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 1(6):614–627, 1993.
[4] R. Cole, Y. Dodis, and T. Roughgarden. How much can taxes help selfish routing? In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 98–107, 2003.
[5] S. C. Dafermos. Traffic equilibrium and variational inequalities. Transportation Science, 14(1):42–54, 1980.
[6] S. C. Dafermos and F. T. Sparrow. The traffic assignment problem for a general network. Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards, Series B, 73B(2):91–118, 1969.
[7] P. Dubey. Inefficiency of nash equilibria. Mathematics of Operations Researc, 11(1):1–8, 1986.
[8] M. Florian. Nonlinear cost network models in transportation analysis. Mathematical Programming Study, 26:167–196, 1986.
[9] E. J. Friedman. Genericity and congestion control in selfish routing. In Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pages 4667– 4672, 2004.
[10] A. Kaporis and P. Spirakis. The price of optimum in stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, pages 19–28, 2006.
[11] G. Karakostas and S. G. Kolliopoulos. Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks. Technical report, McMaster University, June 2006.
[12] Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. The designer’s perspective to noncooperative networks. In Proceedings of the 14th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communication Societies, pages 562–570, 1995.
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[14] E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pages 404–413, 1999.
[15] V. S. A. Kumar and M. V. Marathe. Improved results for stackelberg scheduling strategies. In Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, pages 776–787, 2002.
[16] D.-S. Lee and B. Sengupta. Queueing analysis of a threshold based priority scheme for atm networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 1(6):709–717, 1993.
[17] D. McMillan. Delay analysis of a cellular mobile priority queueing system. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 3(3):310–319, 1995.
[18] R. B. Myerson. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1991.
[19] A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin. Competitive routing in multi-user communication networks. In Proceedings of the 12nd Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communication Societies, pages 964–971, 1993.
[20] M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
[21] G. Owen. Game Theory. Academic Press, Orlando, FL, 3rd edition, 1995.
[22] A. C. Pigou. The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, 1920.
[23] T. Roughgarden. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 67(2):341–364, 2003.
[24] T. Roughgarden. Stackelberg scheduling strategies. SIAM Journal on Computing, 33(2):332–350, 2004.
[25] T. Roughgarden. On the severity of braess’s paradox: Designing networks for selfish users is hard. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 72(5):922–953, 2006.
[26] T. Roughgarden. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy. MIT Press, 2006.
[27] T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM, 49(2):236–259, 2002.
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/40444-
dc.description.abstract在本論文中, 我們定義並研究了一種新的自私路由模型。在原來的模型中, 我們被給予一個網路, 以及欲流過此網路的交通流量。模型中的交通流量是由非常多的使用者所聚集起來的, 而且這些使用者不會彼此合作, 每個使用者都想找出能通過這個網路時間最短的路徑。在這個情況下, 根據賽局理論, 這些使用者流過網路的方式最終會達到一個平衡點, 稱為「納什平衡點」; 然而, 這個平衡點的系統效能會比套用最佳解時的系統效能為差。但我們觀察到, 若使交通流量能套用常見的「優先權」觀念, 使得某些使用者在移動時能感受到較短的時間, 我們證明其系統效能會有顯著的提升。
我們在此論文中證明了具優先權的納什平衡點之系統效能會較無優先權時的平衡點好, 也證明了具優先權納什平衡點的系統效能甚至會超過無優先權時的最佳解, 如果沒有超過, 具優先權平衡點的效能至少也與無優先權最佳解的效能相等。我們也給予了具優先權納什平衡點對系統效能的改進在對於不同網路時間設定時的上界, 此結果代表著具優先權納什點所最大能改善系統效能的程度與最佳解的程度是相同的。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractIn this work, we introduce and study a prioritized model of selfish routing. In the original model, there is a network in which the latency experienced by the users in the network on an edge is a function of the edge congestion, and each user will route itself on a minimum latency path without coordination. It is well known that the outcome of the selfish routing does not optimize the system performance. However, the performance can be improved by prioritizing the users. That is, some users are given high priority, and the remaining are given low priority. While the high users are traveling through the network, they will not be inflenced by the low priority ones. But when the low priority users are routing, they will be effected by both kinds of users.
We show that such a prioritized model performs better than the nonprioritized one. While comparing to the optimal solution, we show that the performance of the prioritized model will not be worse. We also study the maximum possible benefit achievable by the prioritized model, which is 1/4 times the nonprioritized one in networks with linear latency functions, and could be arbitrarily small in the general case. The latter results show the coincidence between the best achievable performance of the prioritized model and the optimal solution in the original model.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-14T16:47:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-97-R94922145-1.pdf: 330734 bytes, checksum: f765657e1e6cc273db57bf69e931b6cf (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2008
en
dc.description.tableofcontentsChapter 1. Introduction 1
1.1 Stackelberg routing, network taxes, and a motivating example 3
1.2 Our model 5
1.3 Our results 7
1.4 Related work 8
1.5 Organization 9
Chapter 2. Preliminaries 10
2.1 Flows at Nash equilibrium 10
Chapter 3. The power of prioritized selfish routing 12
3.1 Comparing to the nonprioritized Nash flows 12
3.2 Comparing to the optimal flows 17
Chapter 4. Bounding the performance improvement of the prioritized model 21
4.1 Linear latency functions 21
4.2 General latency functions 23
Chapter 5. Conclusion 26
Bibliography 28
dc.language.isoen
dc.subject自私路由zh_TW
dc.subject計算賽局理論zh_TW
dc.subject納什平衡zh_TW
dc.subjectselfish routingen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectalgorithmic game theoryen
dc.title具優先權之網路自私路由zh_TW
dc.titlePrioritized Selfish Routingen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear96-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.advisor-orcid,呂學一(hil@csie.ntu.edu.tw)
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee鍾國亮(Kuo-Liang Chung)
dc.subject.keyword自私路由,納什平衡,計算賽局理論,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordselfish routing,Nash equilibrium,algorithmic game theory,en
dc.relation.page31
dc.rights.note有償授權
dc.date.accepted2008-07-31
dc.contributor.author-college電機資訊學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept資訊工程學研究所zh_TW
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