對象錯覺論證與直接實在論的新辯護

Abstract

直接實在論主張，至少有些時候，我們直接經驗外在世界的事物。而錯覺論證的存在對直接實在論造成重大威脅。許多哲學家為了辯護直接實在論做了許多努力。 在傳統的討論中，當我們經歷錯覺的時候，我們把一物的性質知覺為另一個不同的性質。然而，我認為有另一種比較極端的錯覺狀況存在。在這種比較極端的錯覺狀況中，我們把一物知覺為不同種類的另一物，而不只是把一物的性質知覺為另一個不同的性質而已。 這種極端的錯覺狀況可以發展成一種新的錯覺論證。我把這種新的錯覺論證稱為「對象錯覺論證（the argument from object illusion）」。在以往的討論中，哲學家們不僅沒注意到對象錯覺的存在，更沒注意到可由對象錯覺發展出對象錯覺論證，以至於忽略了嚴重的後果：許多抵禦傳統錯覺論證的可能方式都將無法抵禦對象錯覺論證。 在本論文的第一章，我將先介紹從知覺經驗的一般特性。第二章則介紹傳統錯覺論證以及A. D. Smith和Alva Noë如何為直接實在論辯護。而在第二章我也將對Smith和Noë的回應提出批評。在本論文第三章我將接著介紹對象錯覺論證，並說明Smith和Noë的理論如何無法回應對象錯覺論證。在第四章我將提出一個嶄新的方式來為直接實在論辯護。

Direct realists claim that, we can at least sometimes directly perceive the external world. But the argument from illusion draws a serious threat. The argument is so striking that a lot of philosophers have been trying hard to defend direct realism. In traditional discussions, when we are struggling an illusion, we directly perceive an ordinary physical object as having a property which it doesn’t actually have. I think, however, there could be another kind of illusions which are more radical. When we are struggling those radical illusions, we directly perceive something else rather than the ordinary physical object having a illusory property. A new argument from illusion, which I shall call the argument from object illusion, could rise from those more radical illusions. In my opinion, philosophers have yet paid any attention to those radical illusions neither to the argument from object illusion. In the first chapter of this thesis, I will start with introducing the general features of perceptual experiences. In chapter two, I will introduce the traditional argument from illusion and how A. D. Smith and Alva Noë defend directly realism. Also in chapter two, I will show how their responses fail. In chapter three, I will introduce the argument from object illusion and show why Smith and Noë have no way to respond to the argument from object illusion. In chapter four, I will posit a novel defense for direct realism