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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 李存修(Tsun-Siou Lee) | |
| dc.contributor.author | YU-HSIANG CHIN | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 金宇祥 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-13T08:39:42Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-02-16 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-13T08:39:42Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2017-02-16 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2016-11-13 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文文獻
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Pagan, (1980), “ The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, Econometrics Issue, pp. 239-253 Calvo Guillermo (1979),“Quasi-Walrasian Theories of Unemployment,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 102-107. Charness,G, G.R.Frechette, and J.H.Kagel (2004), “How robust is laboratory gift exchange?” Experimental Economics, 7:189-205 Doğan Mesut, (2013), “Does Firm Size Affect The Firm Profitability? Evidence from Turkey,” Research Journal of Finance and Accounting ,Vol.4, No.4,pp. 53-59 Driscoll, J., and A. C. Kraay (1998), “Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially dependent data.” Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 549-560. Eaton, B. Curtis and White William (1982),“Agent Compensation and the Limits of Bonding,” Economic Inquiry, Vol 20,pp. 330-43. Feldstein, M., and Wright B. (1976),“High Unemployment Groups in Tight Labor Market.” Discussion Paper no. 488, Harvard Univ.,June Gintis , Herbert and Ishikawa, Tsuneo(1983 ),“Wages,Work Discipline and Macroeconomic Equilibrium,” mimeo., Greene, W. (2000), Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice–Hall Hannan, R.L.(2005),”The combined effect of wages and firm profit on employee effort.” The Accounting Review ,Vol. 80, No. 1 ,pp. 167-188 Hausman J. A., ( 1978), “Specification Tests in Econometrics,” Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 6, pp. 1251-1271 Hill W. L. Charles, Michael A. Hitt and Robert E. Hoskisson (1988) ,“Declining U.S. Competitiveness: Reflections on a Crisis,” The Academy of Management Executive (1987-1989), Vol. 2, No. 1, pp.51-60 Holmstrom, B.(1982),. “Moral hazard in teams”. Bell Journal of Economics Vol.13,No.2, pp. 324–340 Hoskisson, R., R. Johnson, and D. Moesel. (1994). “Corporate Divestiture Intensity in Restructuring Firm-Effects of Governance, Strategy, and Performance.” Academy of Management Journal, Vol 37, pp.1207-1251 Huber, P. J. (1967). “The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under Nonstandard Conditions,” Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability,vol. I, pp. 221–33. University of California Press, Berkeley. Keats, B. and M.Hitt. (1988)., “A Causal Model of Lindages among Environmental Dimensions, Macro Organizational Characteristics, and Performance.” Academy of Management Journal, Vol 31, pp. 507-598 Kocher, M.G., and M. Sutter.(2007). “Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments”. Empirica, Vol 34, pp. 63-88 Levine I. David. (1991),“You Get What You Pay For: Tests of Efficiency Wage Theories In The United States and Japan.” IRLE Working Paper No. 26-91. Levine I. David. (1992), “Can Wage Increases Pay For Themselves? Tests with a Productive Function” The Economic Journal, Vol. 102, No. 414, pp. 1102-1115 Milkovich, Gerorge.T& Jerry M. Newman(1990), Compensation. 3rd, Richar D.IRWIN,Inc Opler C. Tim and Sheridan Titman, (Jul., 1994), “Financial Distress and Corporate Performance,” The Journal of Finance Vol. 49, No. 3, January 3-5, 1994, pp. 1015-1040 Pesaran, M. H. (2004). “General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels.” University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics No. 0435 Rabin, Matthew (1993) “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” The American Economic Review., Vol 83,pp. 1281-1302. Robbins S. P., (1982), Personnel: The Management of Human Resources, Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., pp. 349-387 Rogers, W. H. (1993).” Regression standard errors in clustered samples.” Stata Technical Bulletin 13: 19–23.Reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints, vol. 3, pp. 88–94. Salop, Steven, (1979 )“A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment,” The American Economic Review, March ,Vol 69,pp.117-25. Samuel Bowles ,( 1981 ),“Competitive Wage Determination and Involuntary Unemployment: A conflict model,”mimeo.,University of Massachusetts. Samuel Bowles ,( 1983),“The production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian and Marxian Model,” mimeo.,University of Massachusetts. Sandeep Bhargava,( 1994) “Profit Sharing and the Financial Performance of Companies: Evidence from U.K. Panel Data,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 104, No. 426 , pp. 1044-1056 Shapiro, Carl and Stiglitz, Joseph,( 1982) ,“Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,” mimeo., Princeton University. Sloan, R. G. (1993), “Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1): 55-100. Solow Robert m.(1979), “Another possible source of wage stickiness,” Journal of Macroeconomics Vol 1, Issue 1, Winter, pp. 79–82 Stiglitz, Joseph,(1974 ),“Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.’s: The Labor Turnover Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 88, pp, 194-227. Wadhwani, Sushil B & Wall, Martin, (1991). 'A Direct Test of the Efficiency Wage Model Using UK Micro-data,' Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 529-48. White, H. (1980). “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Testfor Heteroskedasticity,”Econometrica, 48, 817–38. White, H. (1984),.” Asymptotic Theory for Econometricians.” Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Wolpin, Kenneth I.(1975), “Education and Screening.”Ph.D dissertation, City Univ.New York Wooldridge, J. M. (2002).Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press Yellen L Janet.(1984), “ Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment,” The American Economic Review Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 200-205 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/3982 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究中使用常見的會計及市場指標衡量公司績效表現，探討基層員工薪酬和公司績效表現是否存在正向關係及遞延效果。考慮不同的員工薪酬水準衡量方式及異質變異、序列相關、橫斷面相依等統計問題後，研究結果顯示，會計績效指標和員工薪酬的關係不明確，無法推論薪酬和會計績效間具有正向關係或遞延效果。
然而，在市場績效指標中，不論是否處理相關統計問題，基層員工薪酬和公司的市場績效指標具有正向關係，且為正向的遞延效果。而市場績效指標同時反應了未來預期及股東的財富，因此本文認為股東相較於會計指標，應會更加重視市場績效指標，故提高基層員工薪酬能夠增進公司的股票價值，進而創造股東財富，達成員工及股東雙贏的局面。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper uses both accounting and market indexes to measure firms’ performance and study whether rank- and-file employee compensation has positive and time lag effect to performance. After considering heteroscedasticity、serial correlation and cross sectional dependence, no evidence shows there is a relationship between rank- and-file employee compensation and firms’ performance in accounting measurement.
However, in the market indexes measurement, whether dealing with related statistic issues or not, evidence shows rank- and-file employee compensation has positive and time lag effect to performance. Shareholder should pay more attention to market indexes rather than accounting indexes because market indexes imply both future expectation and wealth of shareholder, while accounting does not. So raising rank- and-file employee compensation can improve value of firm and shareholders’ wealth, making a win-win situation. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-13T08:39:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R03723052-1.pdf: 1682258 bytes, checksum: 5431d19e67a5baa0d770873047490dd3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員會審定書 i 誌謝辭 ii 摘要 iii 英文摘要 iv 第一章 緒論 1 一、研究背景及動機 1 二、研究目的 3 三、研究流程 4 第二章 文獻探討 5 一、薪資定義 5 二、績效衡量 5 三、薪資與績效的關係 7 四、研究假說 10 第三章 研究方法 11 一、資料來源 11 二、變數定義 11 三、實證模型設定 15 第四章 實證結果 21 一、樣本一: 2009-2014年，以基層員工薪酬占營收淨額比衡量 21 二、樣本二: 2009-2013年，以基層員工年薪衡量 26 三、模型檢定 30 第五章 結論與建議 38 一、結論 38 二、研究限制與建議 39 參考文獻 40 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 公司績效表現 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 員工薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Driscoll and Kraay estimator | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 追蹤資料 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | employee compensation | en |
| dc.subject | Driscoll and Kraay estimator | en |
| dc.subject | panel data | en |
| dc.subject | firms’ performance | en |
| dc.title | 員工薪酬與公司的經營績效和市場績效之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Is Employee Compensation Related to Firms’ Operating Performance and Market Performance? | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 105-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳明賢,林姿婷 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 員工薪酬,公司績效表現,追蹤資料,Driscoll and Kraay estimator, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | employee compensation,firms’ performance,panel data,Driscoll and Kraay estimator, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 44 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201600691 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2016-11-14 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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