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標題: | 利用保險長期代理激勵模型論最適平準化佣金份額-不同效用函數、不同市場結構 Under different market structures and utility functions, disscus the best commission rate by a long-term insurance agency model. |
作者: | Yu-Chi Tai 戴玉琪 |
指導教授: | 曾郁仁 |
關鍵字: | 佣金平準化,市場結構,效用函數, level commission,market structure,utility function, |
出版年 : | 2005 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 摘要
本文闡述了在應用平準化佣金於保險激勵機制設計的過程中應當考慮哪些因素及其相互關係,為未來實行平準化時,在兼顧保險代理人的服務品質與激勵效果的考量下,提供了理論依據、方法指導與相關具參考價值的技術性結論。 茲將研究結果整理如下: 一、在保險代理市場為獨佔時: 在假設保險代理人效用函數為CARA或HARA的情形下,得到的結果一致:單位努力程度為保險代理人帶來的成本越大,或者約期越長,保險代理人應獲得的固定收入應當越小。且保險代理人獲得的固定收入應當收斂到固定數值。換言之,如果市場只存在單一保險人時,同時保險人對於保險代理人具完全資訊,則保險人只需支付相對應的固定工資即可。 二、當保險代理市場為完全競爭時: 帕雷托最優契約無法實現,除負指數效用函數外,其他效用函數(含CARA)均為市場波動與努力成本係數的減函數;而二項式效用函數中,最適平準化佣金份額則與市場波動與努力成本係數為增函數。且在保險代理人不同的效用函數條件下,風險佣金份額隨利率上升而減少,隨約期長度與固定收入上升而增加。上述結論對現實中的契約設計有著積極的指導意義。 本文承續了之前學者對於佣金制度領域的研究,其積極意義是可供將來保險公司考慮施行佣金平準化時,可針對保險代理人不同的效用函數或是不同市場結構下,利用上述變數對平準化佣金份額作適當調整,輔以商品利潤測試,以便找到最適的佣金比例。關於保險代理的最適佣金發放期間多長、最適的平準佣金比率是一個值得繼續研究的問題,這需要應用契約理論的最新成果。另外,在本文基礎之上進行實證研究也是必要的。 Abstract In this thesis, we analyze some modification manners’ by modeling agents’ behavior and the results can be a reference for insurance companies to design their commission system. When insurance agency market is a monopoly: No matter agents’ utility function is CARA or HARA, the results are consistent:the higher unit effort level or the longer policy period, the smaller best fixed income is. In other words, if there is only one insurer in the agency market, all the insurer should pay is a certain amount of fixed income to stimulate agents to extend new business. When insurance agency market is a perfect competition: Besides negative exponential utility function, all the other functions are inverse to market volatility and cost coefficient; when analyzing binominal function, the best leveled commission rate increases as market volatility and cost coefficient. Under all functions, the best leveled commission rate increases as contract period and fixed income, but decreases as interest rate. As for these methods of modification, the most popular methods are to prolong the policy period and shorten the difference between the first year commission and the following ones. However, the passive way is to organize the retention rate into the yearly employee scores. These modifications will be effective to stimulate agents to put more emphasis on their clients in the following years. In fact, to level the commissions has some difficulties in putting into practice because most agents would not adapt to the sudden change of their income structure and they often quit jobs to protest. So the best suggestion for insurance companies is to gradually lessen the difference between the first year and the next year commission rate. Insurers also have to put more attention on the after-service quality improvement and educate their employees to cherish the value of customers. In the end, we can achieve a goal to supply our clients with more thoughtful services. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/38819 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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