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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 周善瑜(Shan-Yu Chou),陳其美(Chyi-Mei Chen) | |
dc.contributor.author | Lu Hsiao | en |
dc.contributor.author | 蕭櫓 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T16:43:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2005-07-05 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2005-07-05 | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2005-06-30 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/38733 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 在過去的文獻中,最適的行銷策略常被認為能最大化整個公司的價值。
但在實務上,公司常會透過舉債等方式來籌措資金,以進行後續的產品生產與行銷等策略。 而在公司中的行銷策略常是由企業家本身或股東所推舉的經理人來制訂, 因此對他們來說,其目標應是最大化股東權益,而不是整個公司的價值, 所以廠商在有舉債下的最適策略的確有可能會與沒有舉債的情況有所不同。 本篇論文即在探討舉債與行銷策略間之互動。 我所探討的行銷策略包括了以下三種:產品線設計、廣告策略與品牌延伸策略。 本論文之目的有二: 一為探討廠商在有舉債下之最適行銷策略; 二為探討廠商對產品市場中最適行銷策略的考量如何影響其財務契約的設計。 本論文包含了三個Essay。 在Essay 1中,探討獨佔廠商在有舉債下之最適產品線設計, 分別根據行銷計畫是否能夠簽訂於契約中的情況來探討。 在Essay 2中,探討廠商在有舉債下之最適策略, 分別根據經理人與股東之間是否存在代理問題的情況來探討。 而在Essay 3中,則同時探討廠商在有舉債下之最適廣告策略與品牌延伸策略, 並討論兩策略間之互動如何因舉債而有所不同。 我以賽局理論的方式,透過模型的建立與均衡的分析,獲致以下之主要結果: Essay 1 • 當行銷計畫是可簽訂於契約中時,企業家在有舉債的情況下較傾向於提供低價低品質的產品。 • 當行銷計畫是不可簽訂於契約中時,企業家在有舉債的情況下較傾向於提供高價高品質的產品。 • 當行銷計畫是可簽訂於契約中時,隨著低需求買者的重要性逐漸增加,廠商最適之產品線決策變化如下:一開始當低需求買者的重要性很低時,廠商只在第一期提供高品質產品服務高需求買者;當低需求買者變得稍微重要時,廠商會在第一期提供高品質產品服務高需求買者,在第二期提供低品質產品服務低需求買者;當低需求買者變得更重要時,廠商會在第一期就同時服務高需求買者與低需求買者:當低需求買者的重要性再增加時,廠商會在第一期提供高品質產品服務高需求買者,在第二期提供低品質產品服務低需求買者;當低需求買者變得非常重要時,廠商會在第一期就同時服務高需求買者與低需求買者。隨著最適行銷策略來回地改變,相對應之最適財務契約亦如是。上述廠商最適行銷策略的變化順序,部分受到了對財務契約效率性的考量之影響。 • 當廠商可在同一期即推出一個產品線時,廠商之最適策略仍有可能一期只推一個產品。當廠商對未來的獲利非常有耐心但買者是非常沒有耐心時,廠商最適之行銷策略為依序地推出產品線,而非同時推出。 • 當行銷計畫是可簽訂於契約中,若是廠商對於簽定長期契約並沒承諾力時,或是在面對有潛在的進入威脅下,其最適的行銷策略將有較高的機會來服務低需求買者,更進一步地說,廠商更傾向不要延遲與低需買者的交易。 Essay 2 • 當經理人與股東間不存在代理問題,且經理人可利用無風險債券向完全競爭之投資人籌資時,在有舉債的情況下,經理人較傾向多做廣告,且最適的財務契約將最小化整個還款期間。 • 當經理人與股東間存在有代理問題,且經理人不可利用無風險債券向完全競爭之投資人籌資時,當查核成本較高時,經理人在有舉債的情況下傾向多做廣告;反之,當查核成本較低時,經理人在沒有舉債的情況下傾向多做廣告。 Essay 3 • 當清算狀態發生時,負債能力(debt capacity)愈高則品牌能夠延伸的機率愈大。當成本效果勝過收益效果時,廣告會降低負債能力;反之,當收益效果勝過成本效果時, 廣告會提升負債能力。 • 當做廣告所增加的品牌形象只嘉惠第一期的產品時,做廣告將降低清算狀態發生的機率。只要成本效果不要太強,即使做廣告本身是不效率的,廠商仍將選擇做廣告。 • 當做廣告所增加的品牌形象只嘉惠第二期的產品時,做廣告將提高清算狀態發生的機率。只要成本效果夠強,即使做廣告本身是效率的,廠商仍將選擇不做廣告。 • 與不做廣告的均衡相較,在有做廣告的均衡中,品牌延伸的機率反而可能較低。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In the previous literature, marketing strategies are derived to maximize firm
value. In reality, most firms use both debt and equity to finance productionmarketing activities, and the manager and entrepreneur that makes important decisions for the firm tends to be selected by shareholders. When an entrepreneur chooses among different production-marketing strategies, her goal would be to maximize equity value but not firm value. Thus under debt financing, optimal marketing strategy should vary with capital structure. In the dissertation, I am addressing the issue of the interaction between debt financing and marketing strategies. I focus on the following three kinds of marketing strategies: product line design, advertising strategy and brand extension strategy. The purpose of this dissertation is twofold: (i) to study an entrepreneur's optimal marketing strategy under debt financing; (ii) to examine how an entrepreneur's concerns for the effectiveness of marketing strategy in product market influence the financial contract design. The dissertation includes three essays. In Essay 1, I intend to characterize the optimal product line design for a financially levered monopolistic firm in the cases where the marketing plans are contractible and uncontractible respectively. In Essay 2, I study the leveraged firm's optimal advertising strategies in respectively the absence and the presence of the agency problem between shareholders and the manager. In Essay 3, I analyze the firm's advertising and brand extension strategies when the firm is debt financed. I establish game-theoretic models, analyze their equilibria, and obtain the following main results: Essay 1 • When the marketing plans are contractible, the entrepreneur is more willing to lower the price and quality of the product under debt financ- ing. • When the marketing plans are uncontractible, the entrepreneur is more willing to raise the price and quality of the product under debt financing. • When the marketing plans are contractible, as the low-valuation buyer becomes more and more important, the firm's product line decision un- dergoes the following changes: it starts out producing a high-quality item to serve the high-valuation buyer only, and then begins to serve the low-valuation buyer but only in period 2, and then it offers only a low-quality item to serve both types of the buyer in period 1, and then it serves the low-valuation buyer only in period 2, and finally when the low-valuation buyer becomes very important, the firm offers a low- quality item to serve both types of the buyer. Along the way the optimal product line strategy changes back and forth, the corresponding financial arrangements change drastically also; the concerns for the effciency of financial contracts have contributed partly to the above sequence of changes in the firm's marketing strategies. • Even if the firm is free to offer a product line in each period, it may be in the firm's interest to just offer one product item at a time. When the entrepreneur is very patient but the buyer is very impatient, the entrepreneur will prefer to offer a product line sequentially not simul- taneously. • When the marketing plans are contractible, if the firm does not have full commitment power in signing long-term financial contracts, or if the firm is facing the threat of potential entry, then the optimal marketing and financial strategies imply a higher probability that the low-valuation buyer may be served, and moreover, the firm tends not to delay the low- valuation buyer's transaction. Essay 2 • In the case where there is no agency problem between the entrepreneur and shareholders and the entrepreneur can use a riskless debt to finance from one of the competitive investors, the entrepreneur is more willing to advertise under debt financing and the optimal contract will minimize the payback period. • In the case where there is agency problem between the entrepreneur and shareholders and the entrepreneur can not use a riskless debt to finance from one of the competitive investors, when the verification cost is high, a leveraged firm is more willing to advertise; when the verification cost is low, a all-equity firm is more willing to advertise. Essay 3 • When the liquidation state appears, the probability that the brand is extended is correlated positively with the debt capacity. When the cost effect dominates the revenue effect, advertising decreases the debt ca- pacity; when the revenue effect dominates the cost effect, advertising increases the debt capacity. • When the enhanced brand image due to advertising benefits the date-1 product only, advertising will lower the probability that the liquidation state appears. As long as the cost effect is not too strong, the en- trepreneur will advertise even if advertising is ineffcient per se. • When the enhanced brand image due to advertising benefits the date-2 product only, advertising will increase the probability that the liquida- tion state appears. As long as the cost effect is strong enough, the entrepreneur will not advertise even if advertising is effcient per se. • Compared with the equilibrium without advertising, in the advertising equilibrium, the probability that the brand is extended may be lower. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T16:43:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-94-D90741003-1.pdf: 946171 bytes, checksum: 16946817a5cb265ebd7a458c721a583e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1 2 Literature Review 7 2.1 Product Line Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2 Durable Goods Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3 Advertising and Brand Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4 The Effects of Debt Financing on Marketing Strategies . . . . 14 3 Optimal Product Line Design under Debt Financing 18 3.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2 One-Period Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2.1 All-Equity Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2.2 Debt Financing with Contractible Marketing Plans . . 24 3.2.3 Debt Financing with Uncontractible Marketing Plans . 26 3.3 Two-Period Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.3.1 All-Equity Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.3.2 Debt Financing with Contractible Marketing Plans . . 38 3.3.3 Debt Financing with Uncontractible Marketing Plans . 41 3.4 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3.4.1 The Capacity Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3.4.2 Renegotiation-Proofness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.4.3 Potential Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4 Optimal Advertising Strategy under Debt Financing 54 4.1 Model I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 4.1.1 The Case of All-Equity Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.1.2 The Case of Debt Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.2 Model II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.2.1 The Case of All-Equity Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.2.2 The Case of Debt Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.3 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.3.1 Non-price Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.3.2 Recognition for Future Competition . . . . . . . . . . . 87 5 Optimal Brand Extension and Advertising Strategy under Debt Financing 88 5.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 5.2 The Case of All-Equity Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 5.3 The Case of Debt Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 6 Conclusion 110 References 113 Appendix 118 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 廠商在舉債下之最適行銷策略 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Essays on Optimal Marketing Strategies under Debt Financing | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 93-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉維琪(Wei-Chih Liu),巫和懋(Ho-Mou Wu),王泰昌(Tay-Chang Wang),李宗儒(Tzong-Ru Lee),蔣廷芳(Ting-Fang Chiang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 產品線設計,廣告策略,品牌延伸,財務契約, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Product Line Design,Advertising Strategy,Brand Extension,Financial Contract, | en |
dc.relation.page | 155 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2005-06-30 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 商學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 商學研究所 |
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