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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 資訊管理學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/3864
完整後設資料紀錄
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dc.contributor.advisor孔令傑(Ling-Chieh Kung)
dc.contributor.authorHo Hoen
dc.contributor.author何禾zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-13T08:37:43Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-02
dc.date.available2021-05-13T08:37:43Z-
dc.date.copyright2016-08-02
dc.date.issued2016
dc.date.submitted2016-07-25
dc.identifier.citationAkerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for” lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The quarterly journal of economics, 84(3), 488-500.
Angst, C., R. Agarwal, G. Gao, J. Khuntia, J.S. McCullough. (2014). Information technology and voluntary quality disclosure by hospitals. Decision Support Systems, 57, 367-375.
Balachander, S. (2001). Warranty signalling and reputation. Management Science, 47(9), 1282-1289.
Chaniotakis, I.E., C. Lymperopoulos. (2009). Service quality effect on satisfaction and word of mouth in the health care industry. Managing Service Quality: An International Journal, 19(2), 229-242.
Chevalier, J.A., D. Mayzlin. (2006). The effect of word of mouth on sales: Online book reviews. Journal of marketing research, 43(3), 345-354.
Chu, W., W. Chu. (1994). Signalling quality by selling through a reputable retailer: An example of renting the reputation of another agent. Marketing Science, 13(2), 177-189.
Desai, P.S., K. Srinivasan. (1995). Demand signalling under unobservable effort in franchising: Linear and nonlinear price contracts. Management Science, 41(10), 1608-1623.
Eysenbach, G. (2003). The impact of the internet on cancer outcomes. CA: A Cancer Journal for Clinicians, 53(6), 356-371.
Eysenbach, G., C. Kohler. (2003). What is the prevalence of health-related searches on the world wide web? qualitative and quantitative analysis of search engine queries on the internet. American Medical Informatics Association Annual Symposium Proceedings Archive. American Medical Informatics Association, 225-229.
Greaves, F., D. Ramirez-Cano, C. Millett, A. Darzi, L. Donaldson. (2013). Harnessing the cloud of patient experience: using social media to detect poor quality healthcare. BMJ quality & safety, 22(3), 251-255.
Greene, J.A., N.K. Choudhry, E. Kilabuk, W.H. Shrank. (2011). Online social networking by patients with diabetes: a qualitative evaluation of communication with facebook. Journal of general internal medicine, 26(3), 287-292.
Howard, D.H. (2002). Why do transplant surgeons turn down organs? A model of the accept/reject decision. Journal of Health Economics, 21(6), 957-969.
Jiang, B., X. Zhang. (2011). How does a retailer’s service plan affect a manufacturer’s warranty? Management Science, 57(4), 727-740.
Kalra, A., S. Li. (2008). Signalling quality through specialization. Marketing Science, 27(2), 168-184.
Kihlstrom, R.E., M.H. Riordan. (1984). Advertising as a signal. The Journal of Political Economy, 92(3), 427-450.
Mahmud, A., M. Parkhurst. (2007). Expanding economic opportunity: The role of pharmaceutical companies. Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Report (21). Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Mayzlin, D. (2006). Promotional chat on the internet. Marketing Science, 25(2), 155-163.
Milgrom, P., J. Roberts. (1986). Price and advertising signals of product quality. The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 796-821.
Moorthy, S., K. Srinivasan. (1995). Signaling quality with a money-back guarantee: The role of transaction costs. Marketing Science, 14(4), 442-466.
Nelson, P. (1974). Advertising as information. The journal of political economy, 82(4), 729–754.
Soberman, D.A. (2003). Simultaneous signaling and screening with warranties. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(2), 176-192.
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Su, X., S.A. Zenios. (2006). Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: A mechanism design model. Management Science, 52(11), 1647-1660.
Vick, S., A. Scott. (1998). Agency in health care. Examining patients’ preferences for attributes of the doctorpatient relationship. Journal of Health Economics, 17, 587-605.
Vogt, T.M., J.P. Mullooly, D. Ernst, C.R. Pope, J.F. Hollis. (1992). Social networks as predictors of ischemic heart disease, cancer, stroke and hypertension: incidence, survival and mortality. Journal of clinical epidemiology, 45(6), 659-666.
Wicks, P., D.L. Keininger, M.P. Massagli, C. Loge, C. Brownstein, J. Isojarvi, J. Heywood. (2012). Perceived benefits of sharing health data between people with epilepsy on an online platform. Epilepsy & Behavior, 23, 16-23.
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/3864-
dc.description.abstract醫療照護服務提供者與病患間的資訊不對稱一直是個重要的議題,而社群平台促進資訊分享與品質揭露的特性,被認為得以有效地緩解這種現象。我們欲研究醫療社群平台是否能夠幫助揭露醫療照護服務提供者的真實品質資訊,即使社群平台上可能存在著錯誤的資訊。在本篇研究中,我們探討一個醫療照護服務提供者、一個社群平台建置者,以及一群病患之間的資訊不對稱問題。在我們的模型中,病患無法直接地得知醫療照護服務提供者的品質資訊,而平台建置者則有可能知道該品質資訊。我們提出一個賽局理論模型,用以描述病患與平台建置者之間資訊交換的過程,平台建置者會決定其在平台上參與資訊交換的程度,參與度影響社群平台的網絡大小。曾經體驗過該醫療照護服務的病患,會在平台上向不曾體驗過服務的病患傳遞正面或負面的推薦訊息,接著,未曾體驗過服務的病患會根據推薦訊息更新他們對於該醫療照護提供者的認知品質,最後,再依據更新後的認知品質決定他們是否要購買服務。平台建置者的目標是找出其最佳參與度,以最大化病患加入平台的福利,而本研究的目的在於探討此最佳參與度的經濟與管理意涵。我們發現,即使社群平台上存在著錯誤訊息,醫療社群平台仍可以有效地揭露醫療照護服務提供者的品質資訊,此種平台的存在還是對緩解資訊不對稱有所幫助。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe issue of information asymmetry between healthcare receivers (patients) and healthcare providers has always been of great importance. One feasible way to mitigate this problem is through healthcare social networking sites, which provide a more efficient way to facilitate information sharing and quality disclosure. We examine whether healthcare social networking sites are indeed helpful for revealing the true quality of healthcare providers, though there may be false information (noise) being passed on the sites. In this study, we discuss an information asymmetry problem among a healthcare provider, a social networking platform, and a group of patients. The quality of the service provided by the healthcare provider cannot be observed by the patients and may or may not be observed by the platform owner. We develop a game-theoretic model describing the process of information exchange among patients themselves and the platform owner on a social networking site. The platform owner will decide to what extend to participate in content generation on the site. This affects the network size of the social networking site. Patients who have experienced the service will then pass positive or negative recommendations to unexperienced patients, who then update their beliefs on the healthcare provider’s quality. Finally, based on the updated beliefs, unexperienced patients will decide whether to purchase the service. We characterize the platform owner’s optimal degree of engagement and study the economic and managerial implications of it. We find that a healthcare social networking site helps reveal the true quality of a healthcare provider. Despite the fact that there may be false information (noise), the existence of the healthcare social networking site is still beneficial.en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-05-13T08:37:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-105-R03725041-1.pdf: 1067200 bytes, checksum: b9cd96ce636630c50c9318e080532d46 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2016
en
dc.description.tableofcontents1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Research Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Literature Review 7
2.1 Provider-Patient Information Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Social Networking and Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Signaling Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Problem Description and Formulation 13
4 Analysis for Innocent Platform 21
4.1 Basic Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.1 Impact of Prior Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.2 Impact of Noise Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.3 Impact of Recommendation Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Analysis for Knowledgeable Platform 29
5.1 Basic Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2.1 Impact of Prior Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2.2 Impact of Noise Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2.3 Impact of Recommendation Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6 Conclusions and Future Works 37
6.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.2 Future Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A Proofs of Propositions 41
B Summary of Closed-Form, Propositions, and Observations 49
Bibliography 55
dc.language.isoen
dc.subject網路外部性zh_TW
dc.subject社群平台zh_TW
dc.subject醫療照護zh_TW
dc.subject品質揭露zh_TW
dc.subject資訊不對稱zh_TW
dc.subjectSocial networking sitesen
dc.subjectHealthcareen
dc.subjectNetwork externalityen
dc.subjectQuality disclosureen
dc.subjectInformation asymmetryen
dc.title透過建構醫療社群平台揭露醫療照護服務提供者的品質資訊zh_TW
dc.titleRevealing Hidden Quality of a Healthcare Provider by
Constructing a Healthcare Social Networking Site
en
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear104-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee李瑞庭,洪一薰
dc.subject.keyword資訊不對稱,品質揭露,醫療照護,社群平台,網路外部性,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordInformation asymmetry,Quality disclosure,Healthcare,Social networking sites,Network externality,en
dc.relation.page58
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU201601294
dc.rights.note同意授權(全球公開)
dc.date.accepted2016-07-26
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept資訊管理學研究所zh_TW
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